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Chapter 1
Preliminaries
1.1 Preliminaries from topology
Classic books [Kel75] and [Bou98] are main references in this section.
A topological space (or simply space) is a pair (X,O) (perhaps both
X and O with subscripts), where O ⊆ P(X) and such that
1◦ ∅ ∈ O and X ∈ O;
2◦ for any U1, . . . , Un ∈ O, U1 ∩ . . . ∩ Un ∈ O;
3◦ for any {Ui}i∈I ⊆ O,
⋃
{Ui}i∈I ∈ O.
In a topological space (X,O), X is called the carrier of the space and O
is the topology of the space. The elements of O are called the open sets of
the space. The complement of an open set is called closed. The topology
O is called discrete if O = P(X). In our applications, we will be assuming
that X 6= ∅. If X is a finite set, any space (X,O) is called finite.
It is customary to apply the term space (or topological space) to X , mean-
ing that X is endowed with a family O of subsets of X satisfying the condi-
tions 1◦–3◦. It must be clear that X can be endowed with different families
of open sets. Slightly abusing notation, we write X = (X,O).
A family {Ui}i∈I ⊆ O is called an open cover of a space X = (X,O)
if
⋃
{Ui}i∈I = X . Any subfamily {Ui}i∈I0 with I0 ⊆ I is called a subcover
of the cover {Ui}i∈I if
⋃
{Ui}i∈I0 = X . A subcover is called finite if I0 is a
nonempty finite set.
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A topological space is called compact if each open cover has a finite
subcover.
The following observation is obvious.
Proposition 1.1.1. Any finite discrete topological space is compact.
Let X be a nonempty set. Suppose we have a family B0 := {Yi}i∈I ⊆
P(X). Assume that we want to define a topology O on X such that sets Yi
are open in X endowed with this topology.
First we form all intersections Yi1 ∩ . . . ∩ Yin collecting them in a set B.
Then, we define all unions
⋃
j∈J{Zj | Zj ∈ B} collecting them in a set O, to
which we add ∅ and X (if they are not yet there). The sets of the resulting
set O we announce open and define the space X := (X,O). It is not difficult
to check that the conditions 1◦–3◦ are satisfied. The family B0 is called a
subbase of the space X , and the set B is a base of X . It is obvious that all
sets of the subbase B0 are open in X .
Now we employ this way of introducing topology on a set to define the
cartesian product of topological spaces. Assume that we have a collection
{Xi}i∈I of topological spaces Xi := (Xi,Oi), where i ∈ I. First, we define
the cartesian product of the sets Xi; that is
P :=
∏
i∈I
Xi.
An arbitrary element x of P will be denoted by (xi)i∈I ; that is x := (xi)i∈I .
Given an i ∈ I, a projection ρi : P −→ Xi is defined by the mapping
ρi : x 7→ xi. Now we define:
B0 := {ρ
−1
i (U) | U ∈ Oi and i ∈ I}.
Finally, B0 is employed as a subbase to define a product topology (aka
Tychonoff topology) on P. Denoting the product topology on P by O,
we call the topological space (P,O) a cartesian product of the collection
{(Xi,Oi)}i∈I .
From the definition of the product topology, we see that its base B con-
stituted by the sets of the form
ρ−1i1 (Ui1) ∩ . . . ∩ ρ
−1
ik
(Uik),
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where Ui1 ∈ Oi1 , . . . , Uik ∈ Oik . This means that the sets of this base can be
represented as follows: ∏
i∈I
Zi, (1.1)
where either Zi ∈ Oi, if i ∈ I0, for some I0 ⋐ I, or Zi = Xi, if i /∈ I0. If
each Xi in the cartesian product P is a finite discrete space, then in each
representation (1.1) either Zi ⊆ Xi, whenever i ∈ I0, for some finite subset
I0 of I, or Zi = Xi.
In our application of cartesian product (Section 4.2) the following propo-
sition is essential.
Proposition 1.1.2 (Tychonoff theorem). The cartesian product of a collec-
tion of compact topological spaces is compact relative to the product topology.
Corollary 1.1.2.1. The cartesian product of a collection of discrete spaces
is compact relative to the product topology.
1.2 Preliminaries from algebra
1.2.1 Distributive lattices and Boolean algebras
Boolean algebras belong to to the class of distributive lattices.
An algebra L = 〈L;∧,∨〉 of type 〈∧,∨〉, where ∧ (meet) and ∨ (join) are
binary operations, is called a distributive lattice if the identities following
equalities hold in L for arbirary elements x, y and z of L:
(l1) i) x ∧ y = y ∧ x, ii) x ∨ y = y ∨ x,
(l2) i) x ∧ (y ∧ z) = (x ∧ y) ∧ z, ii) x ∨ (y ∨ z) = (x ∨ y) ∨ z,
(l3) i) (x ∧ y) ∨ y = y, ii) x ∧ (x ∨ y) = x,
(l4) i) x ∧ (y ∨ z) = (x ∧ y) ∨ (x ∧ z), ii) x ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∨ y) ∧ (x ∨ z).
In any distributive lattice the following identities hold:
x ∧ x = x and x ∨ x = x (idempotent laws)
Indeed, for any x, y ∈ L,
x = x ∧ (x ∨ y)
= (x ∧ x) ∨ (x ∧ y) [according to (l4–i)]
= ((x ∧ y) ∨ x) ∧ ((x ∧ y) ∨ x) [in virtue of (l1–ii) and (l4–ii)]
= x ∧ x. [according to (l3–i)]
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The second idempotent law can be proven in a similar fashion.
We observe that if L is a distributive lattice, then for any x, y ∈ L,
x ∧ y = x ⇐⇒ x ∨ y = y.
Indeed, assume that x ∧ y = x. Then we have: x ∨ y = (x ∧ y) ∨ y = y.
On the other hand, if x ∨ y = y, then x ∧ y = x ∧ (x ∨ y) = x.
The last equivalence induces the following definition. Given a distributive
lattice L, we define a binary relation on L as follows:
x ≤ y
df
⇐⇒ x ∧ y = x. (1.2)
According to the last equivalence, we have:
x ≤ y ⇐⇒ x ∨ y = y.
We also notice that ≤ is a partial ordering on L and, according to this
ordering, x∧y is the greatest lower bound and x∨y is the least upper bound
of {x, y}, respectively. This, in particular, implies that the operations ∧ and
∨ are monotone w.r.t. ≤. Namely,
x ≤ y implies x ∧ z ≤ y ∧ z and x ∨ z ≤ y ∨ z.
A Boolean algebra is an algebra B = 〈B;∧,∨,¬, 1〉 of type 〈∧,∨,¬, 1〉,
where ∧ (meet) and ∨ (join) are binary operations, ¬ (complementation) is
a unary operation and 1 (unit) is a 0-ary operation, if the equalities (l1)–(l4)
above and (b1)–(b2) below are satisfied in B for arbitrary elements x, y and
z of B:
(b1) i) x ∧ 1 = x, ii) x ∨ 1 = 1,
(b2) i) (x ∧ ¬x) ∨ y = y, ii) (x ∨ ¬x) ∧ y = y.
If we apply the definition (1.2) for B, we realize that 1 is the greatest
element and ¬1 the least element in B, respectively. Indeed, the former
comes from (b1–i) and the latter, with the help of (b2–i) and (b1–i), can be
obtained as follows:
x = (1 ∧ ¬1) ∨ x = ¬1 ∨ x.
Denoting
0 := ¬1, (1.3)
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we observe that for any x ∈ B, ¬x is a unique element y such that x∧ y = 0
and x∨y = 1. The element ¬x is called a complement of x. Thus any Boolean
algebra is a distributive lattice with a greatest element 1, a least element 0
and a complementation ¬x. This implies that, the view of commutativity
of ∧ and ∨ (the equalities (l1)), we can say the x is the complement of ¬x,
which immediately implies the equality
¬¬x = x. (1.4)
We also observe that
1 = x ∨ ¬x and 0 = x ∧ ¬x, (1.5)
for an arbitrary element x ∈ B.
It is obvious that a Boolean algebra is non-degenerate if, and only if,
0 6= 1. This implies that the simplest non-degenerate Boolean algebras
consists of two elements — 1 and 0. Usually, this algebra is depicted by the
following diagram.
•
•
1
0
Figure 1.1: A 2-element Boolean algebra
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Proposition 1.2.1. Let a Boolean algebra B be generated by a nonempty
finite set B0. Then any element x ∈ B can be represented in the form:
x =
m∨
i=1
ni∧
j=1
bij , (disjunctive normal form)
or in the form:
x =
m∧
i=1
ni∨
j=1
bij , (conjunctive normal form)
where for any i and j either bij ∈ B0 or ¬bij ∈ B0.
Proof. To prove this proposition, it suffices to notice that all elements of
B0 can be represented in both forms. Then, one shows that all elements
represented in the disjunctive normal form constitute a subalgebra of B; and
the same is true for the elements represented in the conjunctive normal form;
see [RS70], theorem II.2.1, for detail.
As we will see below (Proposition 1.2.2), the class of Boolean algebras
can be regarded as a subclass of a larger class of Heyting algebras which
are discussed in the next subsection. Therefore, many properties related
to Heyting algebras are applicable to Boolean algebras. For example, the
properties that are discussed below in Proposition 1.2.3 for Heyting algebras
(Section 1.2.2) can be applied to Boolean algebras as well.
1.2.2 Heyting algebras
A Heyting algebra is an algebra H = 〈H;∧,∨,→,¬, 1〉 of type 〈∧,∨,→
,¬, 1〉, where ∧ (meet) and ∨ (join), → (relative pseudo-complementation)
are binary operations, ¬ (pseudo-complementation) is a unary operation and
1 (unit) is a 0-ary operation, if, besides the equalities (l1)–(l2) and (b1)
(Section 1.2.1), the following equalities are satisfied for arbitrary elements x,
y, z of H:
(h1) x ∧ (x→ y) = x ∧ y,
(h2) (x→ y) ∧ y = y,
(h3) (x→ y) ∧ (x→ z) = x→ (y ∧ z),
(h4) x ∧ (y → y) = x,
(h5) ¬1 ∨ y = y,
(h6) ¬x = x→ ¬1.
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It is customary to denote:
x↔ y := (x→ y) ∧ (y → x).
As in the case of Boolean algebras, in Heyting algebras, in virtue of (b1),
the element 1 is a greatest element in Heyting algebra. The property (h4)
implies that
x→ x = 1. (1.6)
Using the notation (1.3) and the property (h5), we conclude that 0 is a
least element in Heyting algebra. According to (h6), we have:
¬x = x→ 0.
Thus, the last identity and (h1) imply the following:
x ∧ ¬x = 0. (1.7)
The following property characterizes pseudo-complementation:
x ≤ y → z ⇐⇒ x ∧ y ≤ z. (1.8)
Indeed, assume first that x ≤ y → z. Then, in view of (l1–i), the mono-
tonicity of ∧ w.r.t. ≤ and (h1), we have:
x ∧ y ≤ y ∧ (y → z) = y ∧ z ≤ z.
Conversely, suppose that x ∧ y ≤ z, that is x ∧ y = x ∧ y ∧ z. Then, in
virtue of (h2), (h4), (h3), we obtain:
x ≤ y → x = (y → x) ∧ (y → y) = y → (x ∧ y) = y → (x ∧ y ∧ z)
= (y → (x ∧ y)) ∧ (y → z) ≤ y → z.
Using (1.8), we receive immediately:
x ≤ y ⇐⇒ x→ y = 1; (1.9)
which in turn implies:
x = y ⇐⇒ x↔ y = 1.
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Proposition 1.2.2. Let H = 〈H;∧,∨,→,¬, 1〉 be a Heyting algebra. Then
its restriction B = 〈H;∧,∨,¬, 1〉 is a Boolean algebra if the identity x→ y =
¬x ∨ y holds in H. Conversely, if B = 〈B;∧,∨,¬, 1〉 is a Boolean algebra.
Then its expansion H = 〈B;∧,∨,→,¬, 1〉, where x → y := ¬x ∨ y, is a
Heyting algebra.
Proof. Let H be a Heyting algebra in which x → y = ¬x ∨ y. We observe
that, because of (1.7), the identity (b2–i) is true in H. The identity (b2–ii)
is also true, for we have:
(x ∨ ¬x) ∧ y = (x→ x) ∧ y = y.
Now assume that H is an expansion of a Boolean algebra B, where, by
definition, x→ y = ¬x∨ y. We aim to show that all the properties (h1)–(h6)
are valid in H. Indeed, we obtain:
x ∧ (x→ y) = x ∧ (¬x ∨ y) = (x ∧ ¬x) ∨ (x ∧ y) = x ∧ y;
(x→ y) ∧ y = (¬x ∨ y) ∧ y = y;
(x→ y) ∧ (x→ z) = (¬x ∨ y) ∧ (¬x ∨ z) = ¬x ∨ (y ∧ ¬x) ∨ (¬x ∧ z) ∨ (y ∧ z)
= ¬x ∨ (y ∧ z) = x→ (y ∧ z);
x ∧ (y → y) = x ∧ (¬y ∨ y) = x;
¬x = ¬x ∨ 0 = ¬x ∨ ¬1 = x→ ¬1.
Corollary 1.2.2.1. Let B = 〈H;∧,∨,¬, 1〉 be a Boolean algebra. Then for
an arbitrary x ∈ B, ¬¬x→ x = 1, where the operation x→ y is understood
as ¬x ∨ y.
Proof. Augmenting B with→ defined as above, we receive a Heyting algebra.
Then we use (1.6) and (1.4).
It should be clear that the simplest non-degenerate Boolean algebra (Fig. 1.2.1)
is also the simplest non-generate Heyting algebra.
We will be using Heyting algebras as a basic semantics for the intuition-
istic propositional logic (Section 5.3.3). For this purpose, in the sequel, we
will need the following propertied of Heyting algebras.
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Proposition 1.2.3. Let H = 〈H;∧,∨,→,¬, 1〉 be a Heyting algebra. For
arbitrary elements x, y and z of H the following properties hold:
(a) x ≤ y → x,
(b) x→ y ≤ (x→ (y → z))→ (x→ z),
(c) x ≤ y → (x ∧ y),
(d) x ∧ y ≤ x,
(e) x ≤ x ∨ y,
(f) x→ z ≤ (y → z)→ ((x ∨ y)→ z),
(g) x→ y ≤ (x→ ¬y)→ ¬x,
(h) x ≤ ¬x→ y.
Proof. We obtain successively the following.
(a) follows straightforwardly from (h2).
To prove (b), using (1.8), we have:
(x→ y) ∧ (x→ (y → z)) ∧ x = (x→ y) ∧ x ∧ (y → z)
= x ∧ y ∧ (y → z) = x ∧ y ∧ z ≤ z.
Then, we apply (1.8) again twice to get (b).
We derive (c) immediately from x ∧ y ≤ x ∧ y.
(d) and (e) are obvious.
To prove (f), we first have:
(x→ z) ∧ (y → z) ∧ (x ∨ y) = ((x→ z) ∧ (y → z) ∧ x) ∨ ((x→ z) ∧ (y → z) ∧ y)
= (x ∧ z ∧ (z → y)) ∨ (y ∧ z ∧ (x→ z))
= (x ∧ z) ∨ (y ∧ z) = (x ∨ y) ∧ z ≤ z.
Then, we apply (1.8) twice.
To prove (g), applying (1.8) twice, we have:
(x→ y) ∧ (x→ ¬y) ∧ x = x ∧ y ∧ ¬y = x ∧ 0 ≤ 0,
which implies that
(x→ y) ∧ (x→ ¬y) ≤ x→ 0 = ¬x.
It remains to apply (1.8).
Finally, we obtain (h) as follows:
x ∧ ¬x = 0 ≤ y.
Then, we apply (1.8).
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Chapter 2
Formal Languages and Their
Interpretation
2.1 Formal languages
It is commonly accepted that formal logic is an enterprise, in the broad sense
of the word, which is characterized, first of all, by the use, study and devel-
opment of formal languages. One of the grounds for this characterization is
that formal language ensures the codification of accepted patterns of reason-
ing. From the outset, we have to admit that such a representation of the
train of thought in argumentation confines it to a framework of the discrete
rather than the continuous. From this viewpoint, an explicit argument is
represented in a formal language by a sequence of discrete units.
It is also commonly accepted that logic, formal or otherwise, deals with
the concept of truth. Each unit in a formally presented reasoning is assumed
to bear truth-related content. Yet, the use of formal language for the codifi-
cation of the units of truth-related contents does not make logic formal; only
the realization that the discrete units, called words, of a formal language,
constituting a deduction chain, are codes of forms of judgments rather than
“formulations of factual, contingent knowledge” (Carnap) does.1
Thus we arrive at a twofold view on the units of formal language, which
are used to form the codes of formally presented deductions. On the one
hand, they are words of a given formal language, satisfying some standard
1Compare with the notion of elementary propositional function in [WR97], section A
∗1.
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requirements; on the other, they are forms that do not possess any factual
content but are intended to represent it. Moreover, the content that is meant
to be represented by means of a formal unit is intended to generate an as-
sertion, not command, exclamation, question and the like. Having this in
mind, we will be calling these formal units (sentential) formulas or terms,
depending on which role they play in our analysis.
Concerning formal deduction, or formal reasoning, we will make a distinc-
tion, and emphasize it, between what is known in philosophy of logic as the
theory of consequence, or dialectic argument, which is rooted in Aristotle’s
Analytica Priora, where the central question is ‘What follows from what?’,
and what philosophy of logic calls the theory of demonstration, which can
be traced to Analytica Posteriora, where the main question is ‘What can be
obtained from known (accepted) premises?’. The formulas qualifying to be
answers to the latter question will be called theses or (formal) theorems. We
note that the class of such theses depends on the set of premises, as well as
on the means of the deduction in use. The theory of consequence will be
analyzed in terms of a binary relation between the sets of formulas of a given
formal language and the formulas of this language. As to “the means of the
deduction in use,” it will be our main focus throughout the book.
After these preparatory remarks, we turn to definition of a formal lan-
guage. Here we face an obstacle. Since each formal language depends on a
particular set of symbols, in order to reach some generality, we are to deal
with a schematic language which would contain all main characteristics of
many particular languages that are in use nowadays; many other languages
of this category can be defined in the future. All our formal languages in
focus are sentential, that is, they are intended to serve for defining senten-
tial logical systems. However, for technical purposes, we will occasionally be
employing predicate languages, which will be introduced as needed.
The schematic language we define in this section will not be the only one
we are going to deal with. In order to advance Lindenbaum method, as we
understand it, to the limits we are able to envisage, we will discuss it in the
framework of some fragments of first order language as well.
A sentential schematic language L is assumed to contain symbols
of the following pairwise disjoint categories:
• a nonempty set V of sentential (or propositional) variables ; we will
refer to the elements of V as p, q, r, . . ., using subscripts if needed;
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• a set C (maybe, empty) of sentential (or propositional) constants ; we
will refer to the elements of C as a, b, c, . . ., using subscripts if necessary;
we assume that the cardinality of the set C is not bounded from above,
that is 0 ≤ card(C);
• a set F of sentential (or propositional) connectives is nonempty; we will
refer to the elements of F as F0, F1, . . . , Fγ, . . ., where γ is any ordinal;
for each connective Fi, there is a positive natural number #(Fi) called
the arity of the connective Fi. We will be omitting index and write
simply F , if confusion is unlikely; the cardinality of F is not bounded
from above; that is 0 < card(F).
We repeat: the sets V, C, and F , each consisting of symbols, are pairwise
disjoint, and assume also that the elements of each of these sets are distin-
guishable in such a way that a concatenation of a number of these symbols
can be read uniquely; that is, given a word w of L of the length 1, one can
decide whether w ∈ V or w ∈ C or w ∈ F ; if the word w has the length
greater than 1, then, we assume, it is possible to recognize each symbol of w
in a unique way.
Thus L gives space for defining many specific languages. To denote a
language defined by a specification within L we will be using subscripts or
other marks attached to L.
The most important concept within a language is that of formula. To refer
to formulas formed by the means of L, we use the letters α, β, γ, . . . (possibly
with subscripts or other marks), calling them L-formulas. Specifically, these
symbols play a role of informal metavariables for L-formulas. For specified
languages we reserve the right to employ other notations, about which the
reader will be advised. For a special purpose (to deal with structural inference
rules), we introduce formal metavariables as well.
Given two sentential languages, L′ and L′′ with V ′ ⊆ V ′′, C′ ⊆ C′′ and
F ′ ⊆ F ′′, L′′ is called an extension of L′ and the latter is a restriction of
the former. An extension L′′ of a language L′ is called primitive if C′ = C′′
and F ′ = F ′′, that is, when L′′ is obtained only by adding new variables, if
any, to V ′.
Definition 2.1.1 (L-formulas). The set FmL of L-formulas is formed in-
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ductively according to the following rules:
(a) V ∪ C ⊆ FmL; if α ∈ V ∪ C, α is called atomic;
(b) if α1, . . . , αn ∈ FmL and F ∈ F with #(F ) = n, then Fα1 . . . αn ∈ FmL;
(c) the L-formalas are only those L-words which can be obtained
successively according to the rules (a) and (b).
We will find useful the notion of the degree of a (given) formula α,
according to the following clauses:
(a) if α ∈ V ∪ C, then its degree is 0;
(b) if α = Fα1 . . . αn, then the degree of α is the sum of
the degrees of all αi plus 1.
It is easy to see that the degree of a formula α equals the number of occur-
rences of the sentential connectives that are contained in α.
As can be seen from the last definition, the degree of a formula is an
estimate of its “depth.” Also, in the last definition, it is assumed that if
α = Fiα1 . . . αn, that is if α /∈ V ∪ C, it begins with some sentential connec-
tive (F with #(F ) = n in our case). But then, the words α1, . . . , αn must
be recognizable as formulas. Thus it is important to note that for any given
word w of the language L, one can decide whether w is an L-formula or not.
One of the ways, by which it can be done, is the construction of a formula
tree for the formula in question.
Technically, it is convenient to have the notion of metaformula associated
with a given language L.
Definition 2.1.2 (L-metaformulas). Given a language L, the set MfL of
L-metaformulas is defined inductively by the clauses:
(a) MvL ∪ C ⊆MfL; where MvL is a set of metavariables α,β,γ, . . .
(with or without subscripts) with card(MvL) = card(FmL) and so that
MvL ∩ C = ∅ and MvL ∩ F = ∅;
(b) if φ1, . . . , φn ∈MfL and F ∈ F with #(F ) = n, then Fφ1 . . . φn ∈MfL;
(c) the L-metaformalas are only those formal words which can be obtained
successively according to the items (a) and (b).
The notion of the degree of metaformula is similar to that of formula.
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The intended interpretation of metavariables is L-formulas.
Now we turn again to formulas. We will be using the following notation:
Given an L-formula α,
V(α) is the set of variables that occur in α.
It will be assumed that the set V is decidable and the sets C and F are
decidable when they are countable; that is, for any L-word w of the length 1,
there is an effective procedure which decides whether w ∈ V, whether w ∈ C,
or whether w ∈ F . In this case, it is also effectively decidable whether any
L-word is an L-formula or not.
The cardinality of a language L, symbolically card(L), is card(FmL).
We will be using both notations. We note that for any language L, card(L) ≥
ℵ0.
The notion of a subformula of a (given) formula is defined inductively
through the notion of the set Sub(α) of all subformulas of a (given)
formula α as follows:
(a) if α ∈ V ∪ C, then Sub(α) = {α};
(b) if α = Fα1 . . . αn, then Sub(α) = {α} ∪ Sub(α1) ∪ . . . ∪ Sub(αn).
A subformula β of a formula α is called proper if β ∈ Sub(α) and β 6= α.
A useful view on a subfomula of a formula is that the former is a subword
of the latter and is a formula itself.
The formula tree for a formula α is a finite directed edge-weighted
labeled tree where each node is labeled by a subformula of the initial formula
α. The node labeled by α is the root of the tree; that is its indegree equals
0. Suppose a node is labeled by β ∈ Sub(α). If β ∈ V ∪ C, we call this
node a leaf ; its outdegree equals 0. Now assume that β = Fiβ1 . . . βn, that
is #(Fi) = n. Then outdegree of this node is n. Since α may have more
than one occurrence of a subformula β, all nodes labeled by the last formula
will have outdegree equal to #(Fi). Then, n directed edges will connect this
node to n nodes labeled by the subformulas β1, . . . , βn, wherein the weight
i is assigned to the edge connecting β with βi. These n nodes are distinct
from one another even if some of β1, . . . , βn may be equal. We note that each
occurrence of every subformula of α is a label of a formula tree for α. Also,
we observe that the degree of each βi is less than the degree of β. A formula
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tree for a given formula α is completed if each complete path from the root
ends with a leaf. This necessarily happens, for the degree of a formula is a
nonnegative integer.
We note that we use weighted edges only in order to identify a (unique)
path from the root of a tree to a particular node.
It should be obvious that all formula trees for a given formula are isomor-
phic as graphs. So one can speak of the formula tree for a given formula.
Let us illustrate the last definition for the formula FiFjapp with #(Fi) =
#(Fj) = 2. Below we identify the nodes with their labels.
FiFjapp
1
zztt
tt
tt
tt
t
2
##
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋❋
❋
Fjap
1
}}④④
④④
④④
④④ 2
%%
❑❑
❑❑
❑❑
❑❑
❑❑
p
a p
Figure 2.1: The formula tree for FiFjapq
It should be clear that the formula tree for an initial formula allows us
to work with each occurrence of every subformula of this formula separately
and also to follow through the subformula relation even within a designated
occurrence of a subformula of the initial formula. This observation will be
used in the operation of replacement below.
Let us consider any leaf of the formula tree of Figure 2.1, say the one
labeled by a. We observe that the nodes of the path from the root to the
selected leaf consist of all subformulas of the initial formula which contain a
as their subformula. Now let us color the first occurrence of p in red and the
second in blue so that we obtain
FiFjapp. (initial formula)
We use color only for the sake of clarity to identify the path we are working
with at the moment (see below); we could use weights of edges instead.
Next we consider the two paths: the first,
FiFjapp
1
−→ Fjap
2
−→ p, (red)
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corresponds to the red occurrence of p in the sense that its nodes constitute
all subformulas of the initial formula, which contain this red occurrence of p;
the second path,
FiFjapp
1
−→ p, (blue)
corresponds to the blue occurrence of p and satisfies the same property re-
garding this occurrence. Now we substitute for both occurrences of p in the
initial formula any formula α so that we obtain the formula
FiFjaαα. (red-blue α)
Instead of the tree of Figure 1 we will get the new tree:
FiFjaαα
1
yyss
ss
ss
ss
s
2
##
●●
●●
●●
●●
●●
Fjaα
1
||③③
③③
③③
③③ 2
&&
▲▲
▲▲
▲▲
▲▲
▲▲
α
a α
Figure 2.2: The transformed tree after the substitution p 7→ α
If α /∈ V ∪ C, the tree of Figure 2.2 is not a formula tree. However, the
last tree shows that the L-word FiFjaαα obtained by this substitution is an
L-formula. Instead of the paths (red) and (blue) we observe the following
paths:
FiFjaαα
1
−→ Fjaα
2
−→ α (red α)
and
FiFjaαα
2
−→ α. (blue α)
And again, we notice the same property: the nodes of (red α) form the set
of subsets of the red occurrence of α in the formula (red-blue α); the same
property regarding the blue occurrence of α is true for the path (blue α).
This observation will help us discuss a syntactic transformation which
is vital for the theory of sentential logic. Essentially, this transformation
makes speak of logic as a system of forms of judgments rather than that of
individual judgments about facts.
First we define a transformation related to a formula α and a sentential
variable p, denoting this operation by σαp . Before proceeding, we note that
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the initial formula FiFjapp was chosen rather arbitrarily; it might be that
it does not contain p. Having this in mind, given any L-formula α and any
sentential variable p, we define a unary substitution σαp : FmL −→ FmL
as follows:
• if β ∈ V ∪ C and β 6= p, then σαp (β) = β;
• if β = p, then σαp (β) = α;
• if β = Fiβ1 . . . βn, then σ
α
p (β) = Fiσ
α
p (β1) . . . σ
α
p (βn).
At first sight, it may seem that unary substitution is not powerful enough.
For example, let us take a formula FiFjapq, where connectives Fi and Fj have
the arity equal to 2. Assume that we want to produce a formula FiFjaαβ.
Suppose we first obtain:
σαp (FiFjapq) = FiFjaαq.
And we face a problem if α contains q, for then we get
σβq (FiFjaαq) = FiFjaσ
β
q (α)β,
which is not necessarily equal to FiFjaαβ. To overcome this difficulty, we
select a variable which occurs neither in α nor in the initial formula FiFjapq.
Suppose this variable is r. Then, we first produce:
σrq(FiFjapq) = FiFjapr.
Now the desirable formula can be obtained in two steps:
σαp (FiFjapr) = FiFjaαr,
σβr (FiFjaαr) = FiFjaαβ.
Thus we observe:
σβr ◦ σ
α
p ◦ σ
r
q(FiFjapq) = FiFjaαβ.
This leads to the conclusion that the composition of two and more unary
substitutions may result in substitution of a different kind; namely, we can
obtain the formula FiFjaαβ from the formula FiFjapq by substituting simul-
taneously the formulas α and β for the variables p and q, respectively. Thus
we arrive at the following definition.
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Definition 2.1.3 (substitution). A syntactic transformation σ : FmL −→
FmL is called a uniform (or simultaneous) substitution (or simply a
substitution or L-substitution) if it is an extension of a map σ0 : V −→
FmL, satisfying the following conditions :
(a) if α ∈ C, then σ(α) = α;
(b) if α = Fiα1 . . . αn, then σ(α) = Fiσ(α1) . . . σ(αn).
Given a substitution σ and a formula α, σ(α) is called a substitution
instance of α.
For a set X of L-formulas and an L-substitution σ, we denote:
σ(X) := {σ(α) | α ∈ X} and σ−1(X) := {α | σ(α) ∈ X}.
Thus, for any substitution σ,
σ(∅) = ∅ and σ−1(∅) = ∅.
Also, we observe:
i) σ(σ−1(X)) ⊆ X and ii) X ⊆ σ−1(σ(X)). (2.1)
(Exercise 2.1.2)
We leave for the reader to prove that, given a fixed formula α, any si-
multaneous substitution applied to α results in the composition of singular
substitutions applied to α. (See Exercise 2.1.3.)
Proposition 2.1.1. For any map σ0 : V −→ FmL, there is a unique substi-
tution σ : FmL −→ FmL extending σ0.
Proof is left to the reader. (Exercise 2.1.4.)
The last proposition allows us to think of a substitution simply as a map
σ : V −→ FmL, which will be convenient when we want to define a particular
substitution. On the other hand, the property (b) of Definition 2.1.3 allows
us to look at any substitution as a mapping satisfying a special algebraic
property, which will also be convenient when we want to use this property.
For now, we want to note that composition of finitely many substitutions
is a substitution. Moreover, for any substitutions σ1, σ2 and σ3,
σ1 ◦ (σ2 ◦ σ3) = (σ1 ◦ σ2) ◦ σ3 (2.2)
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(We leave this property for the reader; see Exercise 2.1.5.) This implies that
the set of all substitutions, related to a language L, along with composition
◦ constitute a monoid with the identity element
ι(p) = p, for any p ∈ V
which will be calling the identity substitution. It must be clear that for
any formula α,
ι(α) = α.
Because of (2.2), any grouping in
σ1 ◦ . . . ◦ σn
leads to the same result. For this reason, parentheses can be omitted, if we
do want to be specific.
We will call a set F ⊆ FmL closed under substitution if for any
L-formula α and substitution σ,
α ∈ F =⇒ σ(α) ∈ F.
We have already noted that the tree of Figure 2.2 is not a formula tree if
α /∈ V ∪ C. However, we can build the formula tree for α. It does not matter
how it looks; so we depict it schematically as follows:
α
O
O
O
◦ ◦ ◦
Figure 2.3: The formula tree for α
Attaching two copies of the last tree to the tree of Figure 2.2, we obtain
the tree for FiFjaαα.
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FiFjaαα
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yyss
ss
ss
ss
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❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏❏
❏
Fjaα
1
||③③
③③
③③
③③ 2
&&
▲▲
▲▲
▲▲
▲▲
▲▲
α
O
O
O
a α
O
O
O
◦ ◦ ◦
◦ ◦ ◦
Figure 2.4: The formula tree for FiFjaαα
We will call one copy of the formula tree for α the tree for red α and the
other copy the tree for the blue α.
Now let us take any formula β and construct the formula tree for it
depicted as follows:
β
O
O
O
• • •
Figure 2.5: The formula tree for β
Now in the path
FiFjaαα
1
−→ Fjaα
2
−→ α
of the tree of Figure 2.4, we replace all red occurrences of α by β and replace
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the tree for red alpha by the tree for β (Figure 2.5), arriving thus at the
following tree:
FiFjaβα
1
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tt
t
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❑
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O
a β
O
O
O
◦ ◦ ◦
• • •
Figure 2.6: The formula tree for FiFjaβα
This is the formula tree for FiFjaβα. The syntactic transformation just
described shows that replacing a designated subformula of a formula, we ob-
tain a formula. Such a transformation is called replacement. Designating
a subformula β ∈ Sub(α), we write α[β]. The result of the replacement of
this particular subformula β with a formula γ, we denote by α[γ].
Before going over examples of some sentential languages, we discuss how
any metaformula can be seen in the light of the notion of substitution. It
must be clear that the intended interpretation of any metaformula φ is the
set of formulas of a particular shape.
Similar to Definition 2.1.3, any map σ0 : MvL −→ FmL can uniquely
be extended to σ : MfL −→ FmL. We will call both σ0 and its extension
σ a realization, or instantiation, of metaformulas in L. The following
observation will be useful in the sequel. An instantiation σ is called simple
if it is the extension of σ0 :MvL −→ VL.
Proposition 2.1.2. Let φ be an L-metaformula and Σφ be the class of all
instantiations of φ. Then for any L-substitution σ and any L-formula α,
α ∈ Σφ =⇒ σ(α) ∈ Σφ.
Proof is leaft to the reader. (Exercise 2.1.6)
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Below we give examples of languages that are specifications of the schematic
language L. All these languages include a denumerable set V as the set of
sentential variables.
LA: In this language, there is no sentential constants; there are four (asser-
toric) logical connectives: ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), → (impli-
cation or conditional), and ¬ (negation), having the arities #(∧) =
#(∨) = #(→) = 2 and #(¬) = 1. It is customary to use an infix
notation for this language; however, the use of infix notation for this
language requires two additional symbols: “(” and “)” called the left
and right parenthesis, respectively. Accordingly, the definition of for-
mula will be different: (α ∧ β), (α ∨ β), (α→ β) and ¬α are formulas,
whenever α and β are. The parentheses do not apply to atomic formu-
las and negations. Sometimes, we will not employ all the connectives
of LA but some of them, continuing to call this restricted language LA.
Sometimes, LA is considered in its extended version, when a connective
↔ is added; if not, then the last connective is used as an abbreviation:
α↔ β := (α→ β) ∧ (β → α).
LB: This language extends LA by adding to it two constants: ⊤ (truth or
verum) and ⊥ (falsehood or falsity or falsum or absurdity). Sometimes,
only one of these constants will be employed. The parentheses do not
apply to atomic formulas, negations and to the constants ⊤ and ⊥.
We will call all these variants by LB, indicating every time the list of
constants.
LC: This language extends either LA or LB with two sentential connectives
(modalities): 2 (necessity) and 3 (possibility) both of the arity 1, that
is #(2) = #(3) = 1. In addition to the corresponding requirements
above, the parentheses do not apply to the formulas that start with the
modalities 2 and 3. Sometimes, when only one of these modalities is
employed, we continue to call this language LC .
In the sequel we will employ more formal languages, which do not fit the
proposed framework but closely related to it.
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Exercises 2.1
1. Here we give another definition of a formula tree. This new definition
is convenient when we deal with an algorithmic problem, in which case
the sets V, C and F are regarded countable and effectively decidable.
One of such problems will be raised below as an exercise. We note that
in this definition a designated path can be identified exclusively by the
nodes it comprises.
The formula tree for a formula α is a finite directed labeled tree
where each node is labeled with a pair 〈n, β〉, where n is a natural
number and β is a subformula of α.
There is a unique node, called the root, labeled by 〈p0, α〉, the ingdegree
of which is 0.2 The ingdegree of all other nodes of the tree, if any, equals
1. Let a node v be labeled with 〈n, β〉, where β ∈ V ∪ C. Then the
outdegree of v is always 0. Such nodes are called leaves. (As the reader
will see below, leaves are always present in a formula tree.) Thus if
α ∈ V ∪ C, the formula tree of α consists of only one node, the root,
which is also a leaf. Assume that β = Fβ1 . . . βk with F ∈ F is a proper
subformula of α and a node v is labeled with 〈n, β〉. Suppose that pj is
the greatest prime number that divides n. Then the outdegree of v is
#(F ), that is in our case, equals k. And then v will be connected via k
edges to k different nodes, v1, . . . , vk. (The direction of each such edge
is from v to vi.) We label vi with 〈n · pj+i, βi〉. Thus, if βi = βj , then
the two distinct nodes, vi and vj , will be labeled with labels distinct in
their first place and equal in the second. Also, we note that the degree
of each βi is less than the degree of β.
Use the new definition of formula tree to prove the following.
There is a mechanical procedure (an algorithm) which, given
a list of pairs 〈n1, α1〉, . . . , 〈nk, αk〉, where each ni is a posi-
tive integer, can assemble a formula tree, where the pairs are
regarded as the nodes of the tree, or states that such a tree
does not exist.
2. Prove the inclusions (2.1).
2We remind the reader that p0,p1,p2, . . . is the sequence of prime numbers.
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3. Prove that (a) for any fixed formula α and any fixed substitution σ,
there are unary substations σ1, . . . , σn such that σ(α) = σ1 ◦ . . .◦σn(α);
however, (b) for any fixed substitution σ, there is no finitely many fixed
unary substitutions σ1, . . . , σn such that for any formula α, σ(α) =
σ1 ◦ . . . ◦ σn(α).
4. Prove Proposition 2.1.1.
5. Prove (2.2).
6. Prove Proposition 2.1.2.
2.2 Semantics of formal language
One of our concerns in this book is to show how truth can be transmit-
ted through formulas of a formal language by formally presented deduction.
Calling a formula true, we will mean a kind of truth which does not depend
on any factual content. Moreover, sharing the view of the multiplicity of the
nature of truth, we will be dealing rather with degrees of truth, calling them
truth values. Then, the idea of truth will find its realization in the idea of
validity.
Concerning the independence of any factual, contingent content in rela-
tion to truth values, let us consider the following two sentences — ‘Antarctica
is large’ and ‘Antarctica is large or Antarctica is not large’. If our formal
language contains a symbol for the grammatical disjunction “. . .1 or . . .2”,
say “. . .1 ∨ . . .2” (as in the languages LA–LC of Section 2.1), and a symbol
for creating the denial of sentence, say “¬ . . .” (also as in LA–LC), we can
write in symbolic form the first sentence as p and the second as p ∨ ¬p.
From the viewpoint of Section 2.1, both formal expressions are formulas of
the language LA. Now, depending on familiarity with geography, as well as
of personal experience, one can count p true or false. The second formula
p ∨ ¬p, however, in some semantic systems takes steadily the truth value
true, regardless of any personal relation towards p. The universality of this
kind will be stressed in the idea of validity.
From the last example, it should be clear the distinction between the
statements, the truth value of which (understood as the degree of trust or
that of informativeness) is dependent on the contingency of facts, the level of
knowledge or personal beliefs, and the formal judgments, which obtain their
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logical status or meaning determined by semantic rules. These rules will
allow us to interpret the formal judgments of a language in abstract struc-
tures, reflecting the structural character of these judgments, as well as the
universal character of their validity, thereby understanding their invalidity
as the failure to satisfy this universality.
In this book, semantics will play pragmatic rather than explanatory role;3
namely we will be stressing the use of semantic structures as separating
means. This will be explained in Section 4.3. Moreover, we want to empha-
size that in our approach to semantics we adhere to the relativistic position,
according to which a single formal judgment can be valid according to one
semantic system and invalid with respect to another.
Now we turn to the definition of semantics of the schematic language
L exemplified by the languages LA–LC in Section 2.1. Depending on one’s
purposes, or depending on the lines, along which the semantics in question
can be employed, the semantics we propose can use the items of the following
two categories — the algebras of type L and expansions of the latter called
logical matrices. Later on, we will generalize the notion of logical matrix,
when we discuss consequence relation in Chapter 3.
The following semantic concepts will be specified later on as needed.
Definition 2.2.1 (algebra of type L). An algebra of type L (or an L-
algebra or simply an algebra when a type is specified ahead and confusion
is unlikely) is a structure A = 〈A;F , C〉, where A is a nonempty set called
the carrier (or universe) of A; F , which in the notion of L-formulas
represents logical connectives, now represents a set of finitary operations on
A of the corresponding arities; and C, which is a set of logical constants, now
represents a set of nullary operations on A. As usual, we use the notation
|A| = A. The part 〈F , C〉 of the structure A is called its signature. Thus,
referring to an algebra A, we can say that it is an algebra of signature 〈F , C〉
or of signature F , if C = ∅.
Thus any L-formula in relation to any algebra of type L becomes a term.
Naturally, the sentential variables of a formula understood as term become
3However, since we state validity conditions for formal judgments, these conditions
generate the meanings of the judgments, according to the point of view that has been
emphasized by Wittgenstein in Tractatus ; cf. [Wit01], 4.024. Also, compare with Curry’s
statement that “the meaning of a concept is determined by the conditions under which it
is introduced into discourse;” cf. [Cur66], section II.2.
the individual variables of this term. Since each algebraic term of, say, n
variables can be read as an n-ary derivative operation in an algebra of type
L, so can be understood any L-formula containing n sentential variables.
Definition 2.2.2 (inessential expansion of an algebra, equalized algebras).
Given an algebra A = 〈A;F , C〉, we obtain an inessential expansion of A
if we add to F one or more terms regarding them as new signature operations,
or if we add to C one or more symbols with their intended interpretation as
elements of A. Two algebras (or their signatures) are called equalized if
they have inessential expansions of one and the same type.
The central notion of Lindenbaum method is that of formula algebra
associated with a particular language. The formula algebra of type L has
FmL as its carrier and the signature operations as defined in Definition 2.1.1.
This algebra is denoted by FL. Thus we have:
FL = 〈FmL;F , C〉.
Analogously, the set of L-metaformulas along with the set C regarded as
nullary operations and the set F regarded as non-nullary operations consti-
tute a metaformula algebra ML of type L.
A relation between the L-formulas and the algebras of type L is estab-
lished through the following notion.
Definition 2.2.3 (valuation, value of a formula in an algebra). Let A be an
algebra of type L. Then any map v : V −→ |A| is called a valuation (or
an assignment) in the algebra A. Then, given a valuation v, the value of
an L-formula α with respect to v, in symbols v[α], is defined inductively as
follows :
(a) v[p] = v(p), for any p ∈ V;
(b) v[c] is the value of the nullary operation of A corresponding to
the constant c of L;
(c) v[α] = Fv[α1] . . . v[αn] if α = Fα1 . . . αn.
If V ′ ⊂ V, then a map v : V ′ −→ |A| is called a V ′-valuation, or a
valuation restricted to V ′.
It makes sense to denote the mapping
α 7→ v[α]
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by the same letter v. The following observation is a justification for this
usage.
Proposition 2.2.1. Let v be a valuation in an algebra A. Then the map-
ping v : α 7→ v[α] defines a homomorphism FL −→ A. Conversely, each
homomorphism FL −→ A is a valuation.
Proof of the first part is based on the clauses (a)–(c) of Definition 2.2.3. The
second part is obvious.
Thus, given a valuation v inA and a formula α(p1, . . . , pn) where p1, . . . , pn
are all variables occurring in α, we observe that
v[α] = α(v[p1], . . . , v[pn]).
Grounding on the last observation base in turn on Proposition 2.2.1, very
often a valuation is defined as a homomorphism FL −→ A.
Comparing (b)–(c) of Definition 2.2.3 with (a)–(b) of Definition 2.1.3, we
obtain the following.
Proposition 2.2.2. Any substitution is a valuation in FL and vice versa.
Hence any substitution is an endomorphism FL −→ FL.
The converse of the last conclusion is also true: any endomorphism
FL −→ FL can be regarded as a substitution. (Exercise 2.2.1.)
Now we turn to a central notion of any semantics — the notion of validity.4
This notion in turn is defined in the framework of the notion of logical matrix.
Definition 2.2.4 (logical matrix of type L). A logical matrix (or simply
a matrix) of type L is a structure M = 〈A, D(x)〉, where A is a nontrivial
algebra of type L, which, if considered as part of M, is called an M-algebra,
and D(x) is a predicate on |A|. We will also denote a matrix as a structure
〈A;F , C, D(x)〉 or as a structure 〈A;F , D(x)〉, if C = ∅. We will also denote
a matrix as 〈A, D〉 or as 〈A;F , D〉 or as 〈A;F , D〉, if C = ∅, where D ⊆ |A|.
In the last three notations D is called the set of designated elements or a
logical filter (or simply a filter) in (or of) M.
4W. and M. Kneale note, “[. . . ] logic is not simply valid argument but the reflection
upon principles of validity;” [KK62], section I.1.
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We should remark that using “logical” in the last two definitions was a
bit hasty, for the first connection with logic emerges, at least in the case of
logical matrices, in the next definition when we separate semantically valid
L-formulas from the other formulas.
Definition 2.2.5. Let M = 〈A, D〉 be a logical matrix of type L. Then a
formula α is satisfied by a valuation v in A if v[α] ∈ D, in which case we
say that v satisfies α in M; further, α is semantically valid (or simply
valid) in M, symbolically M |= α or |=M α, if for any valuation v in A,
v[α] ∈ D. If a formula is not valid in a matrix, it is called invalid in this
matrix or is rejected by the matrix or one can say that this matrix rejects
the formula. If v[α] /∈ D in M, v is a valuation rejecting or refuting α.
The set of all formulas valid in a matrix M is denoted by LM and is called
the logic of M.
Proposition 2.2.3. Let M = 〈A, D〉 be a matrix (of type L). Then for any
substitution σ, if M |= α, so is M |= σ(α).
Proof. Let v be any valuation in A. According to Propositions 2.2.2 and 2.2.1,
σ : FL −→ FL and v : FL −→ A are homomorphisms. Then v ◦ σ is also
a homomorphism FL −→ A and hence, by Proposition 2.2.1, is a valuation.
Therefore, M |= α implies that v[σ(α)] ∈ D.
The last proposition induces a way of how, given a matrix, to obtain a
matrix on the formula algebra so that both matrices validate the same set of
formulas.
Let M = 〈A, D〉 be a matrix. We denote
DM = {α | M |= α}
and then define a matrix
MFm = 〈FL, DM〉.
We observe that for any formula α,
MFm |= α⇐⇒M |= α. (Lindenbaum equivalence)
Indeed, let MFm |= α. Then for any substitution σ (which, according to
Proposition 2.2.2, is a valuation in FL), σ(α) ∈ DM; in particular, ι(α) =
α ∈ DM, that is M |= α.
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Now suppose thatM |= α, that is α ∈ DM. In virtue of Proposition 2.2.3,
DM is closed under substitution. This completes the proof of the equivalence
above.
Next let us consider M = 〈FL, D〉. We observe that if α ∈ DM, that is
M |= α, then, since, by virtue of Proposition 2.2.2, each substitution is a
valuation in FL and vice versa, α ∈ D.
Now let D′ ⊆ D and D′ be closed under substitution. Assume that
α ∈ D′. Then, obviously, M |= α and hence α ∈ DM.
Thus we have obtained the following.
Proposition 2.2.4. For any matrix M, there is a matrix on the formula
algebra, namely MFm, such that both matrices validate the same set of L-
formulas. Moreover, given a matrix M = 〈FL, D〉, the filter of the matrix
MFm = 〈FL, DM〉 is the largest subset of D closed under substitution. Thus,
if D itself is closed under substitution, then D = DM.
The importance of the last proposition for what follows is that it shows
that the matrices of the form 〈FL, D〉, where a filter D is closed under substi-
tution, suffice for obtaining all sets of valid L-formulas, which can be obtained
individually by the matrices of type L. This observation will be clarified be-
low as Lindenbaum’s Theorem; see Proposition 3.3.4.
Now we turn to some special matrices which have played their important
role in the development of sentential logic. In all these matrices, the filter of
designated elements consists of one element. In this connection, we note the
following equivalence, which will be used throughout: If D = {c}, then
x ∈ D ⇐⇒ x = c. (2.3)
In the sequel, we find useful the following property.
Proposition 2.2.5. Let M1 = 〈A1, D1〉 and M2 = 〈A2, D2〉 be matrices
of the same type. Also, let h be an epimorphism of A1 onto A2 such that
h[D1] ⊆ D2. Then LM1 ⊆ LM2
Proof. Let v be a valuation in A2. Since h is an epimorphisms, for each
variable pγ, there is an element xγ ∈ |A1| such that h(xγ) = v[pγ]. We define
a valuation v′ in A1 as follows: v
′[pγ] = xγ, for any variable pγ. It is obvious
that h(v′[pγ ]) = v[pγ]. Assume that α ∈ LM1; in particular, v
′[α] ∈ D1. This
implies that v[α] ∈ D2.
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2.2.1 The logic of a two-valued matrix
We begin with a well-known matrix of the so-called “two-valued logic.” The
significance of this matrix in the history of logic is difficult to overestimate.
The two-valued matrix was assumed, first, to distinguish true statements
from false ones; and, second, to validate only the former. As we will see
below, the main logic laws such as, for example, the law of identity, the law
of contradiction, the law of the excluded middle (see below) and others can
be demonstrated as valid formulas in this matrix. For this reason, it is worth
considering this matrix first. Later on, we will explain another significance
of this matrix, purely algebraic in nature, which leads to a very important
view on this matrix as a refuting and separating means.
The two-valued matrix assumes two main variants of formulation — as
a matrix of type LA and as that of type LB. As will be seen below, the
difference between these variants concerns only semantic rules and does not
affect essentially the set of valid formulas in the corresponding matrices. For
this reason, we denote both variants by B2. The elements of B2 are denoted
by 0 (false) and 1 (true), which constitute a Boolean algebra with 0 as the
least element and 1 as the greatest with respect to the partial ordering 0 ≤ 1.
According to the intended interpretation, 1 represents a truth value true, 0
represents false. Being viewed as a 2-element Boolean algebra of type LA, the
connectives ∧, ∨ and ¬ are interpreted as meet, join and complementation,
respectively, while
x→ y := ¬x ∨ y.5 (2.4)
This leads to the familiar truth tables:
x ∧ y
x\y 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
x ∨ y
x\y 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 1
x ¬x
0 1
1 0
x→ y
x\y 0 1
0 1 1
1 0 1
We observe that for any x, y ∈ |B2|,
x→ y = 1⇐⇒ x ≤ y;
x→ 0 = ¬x;
1→ x = x.

 (2.5)
5We remind the reader that, in terms where the complementation (or pseudo-
complementation) occurs, it precedes both meet and join when we interpret such terms in
the lattices with complementation or pseudo-complementation.
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If one regards B2 (more exactly, its counterpart) as an algebra of type
LB, two nullary operations, 0 and 1, should be added to the signature, along
with the intended interpretation of ⊥ and ⊤ as 0 and 1, respectively. Making
of B2 a logical matrix, we add a logical filter {1}. Thus a formula α of type
LA (or of type LB) is valid in B2 if for any valuation v,
v[α] = 1.
We denote both, the algebra and the matrix, grounded on this algebra, by
B2. It must be clear that any LA-formula is valid in the matrix B2 of type
LB if and only if it is valid in B2 of type LA.
A formula α valid in B2 is called a classical tautology. It is not difficult
to see that the following formulas are classical tautologies:
p→ p, (law of identity)
¬(p ∧ ¬p), (law of contradiction)
p ∨ ¬p; (law of the excluded middle)
as well as the following:
p→ (q → p);
¬p→ (p→ q).
}
(“paradoxes of material implication”)
The above tautologies had been known from ancient times. In modern times,
such tautologies as the following have been in focus:
((p→ q)→ p)→ p; (Peirce’s law)
¬¬p↔ p; (double negation law)
¬(p ∧ q)↔ ¬p ∨ ¬q;
¬(p ∨ q)↔ ¬p ∧ ¬q.
}
(De Morgan’s laws)
By the two-valued logic, one usually means the set of all classical tau-
tologies.
2.2.2 The  Lukasiewicz logic of a three-valued matrix
Perhaps, the “ Lukasiewicz 3-valued logic” is the best-known of all multiple-
valued systems alternative to the set of classical tautologies. The matrix
which defines this “logic” has three values, 0 (false), τ (indeterminate) and
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1 (true), which are arranged by a linear ordering as follows: 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. On
this carrier, an algebra of type LA is defined in such a way that ∧ and ∨
are interpreted as meet and join in the 3-element distributive lattice; then,
¬ and → are defined according to the following tables:
x ¬x
0 1
τ τ
1 0
x→ y
x\y 0 τ 1
0 1 1 1
τ τ 1 1
1 0 τ 1
We denote this algebra by  L3. Actually, when we have defined ¬ in  L3
as above, the operation → can be defined according to (2.5). Moreover, the
following identities can be easily checked:
x ∨ y = (x→ y)→ y;
x ∧ y = ¬(¬x ∨ ¬y).
}
(2.6)
(Exercise 2.2.6.) Also, we note that, as algebras of type LA, B2 is a subalgebra
 L3. (See Exercise 2.2.7.)
Now taking {1} as a logical filter, we obtain the  Lukaciewicz 3-valued
matrix which is also denoted by  L3.
We note that the law of the excluded middle and Peirce’s law, which
are tautologies of the two-valued logic, fail to be tautologous in  L3. (Exer-
cise 2.2.8.) The law of contradiction is also invalid in  L3, for the set {τ} ⊆ | L3|
is closed under ∧ and ¬.
By the  Lukasiewicz 3-valued logic one means the set of formulas which are
validated by  L3. These formulas are called  L3-tautologies. It should be clear
that the set  L3-tautologies is a proper subset of the set of classical tautologies.
(Exercise 2.2.9.) One time, it had been assumed that the matrix 〈 L3, {τ , 1}〉
validates the classical tautologies and only them. If the first part of the last
statement is obviously true, the second is false. The following counterexample
is due to A. R. Turquette: the formula ¬(p→ ¬p)∨¬(¬p→ p) is a classical
tautology but is refuted in the last matrix by the assignment v[p] = τ .
2.2.3 The  Lukasiewicz modal logic of a three-valued
matrix
Both the algebra and matrix  L3 can be expanded to type LC as follows:
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x 2x 3x
0 0 0
τ 0 1
1 1 1
The last definitions of the modalities 2 and 3 are not independent of
the other assertoric connectives, for in the expanded algebra  L3 the following
identities hold:
3x = ¬x→ x;
2x = ¬3¬x.
}
(2.7)
We leave for the reader to check this. (See Exercise 2.2.12.)
We observe that the formulas
2p→ p, p→ 3p and 2p→ 3p
are valid in the expanded matrix, while their converses,
p→ 2p, 3p→ p and 3p→ 2p,
are rejected by it. (See Exercise 2.2.13.)
2.2.4 The Go¨del n-valued logics
As in the case  L3, let us consider the three distinct “truth values,” 0, τ
and 1, arranged by a linear ordering as follows: 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1. Regarding
this chain as a Heyting algebra with ∧, ∨, → and ¬ as meet, join, relative
pseudo-complementation and pseudo-complementation, respectively, we get
an algebra G3 of type LA. Thus we arrive at the following truth tables:
x ∧ y
x\y 0 τ 1
0 0 0 0
τ 0 τ τ
1 0 τ 1
x ∨ y
x\y 0 τ 1
0 0 τ 1
τ τ τ 1
1 1 1 1
x ¬x
0 1
τ 0
1 0
x→ y
x\y 0 τ 1
0 1 1 1
τ 0 1 1
1 0 τ 1
We notice that all properties (2.5) are satisfied in G3.
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Taking into account the relation ≤, the above truth tables can be read
through the following equalities.
x ∧ y = min(x, y)
x ∨ y = max(x, y)
x→ y =
{
1 if x ≤ y
y otherwise
¬x =
{
0 if x 6= 0
1 otherwise,


(2.8)
Taking {1} as a logical filter, we obtain a logical matrix G3. The last
matrix can be generalized if instead of 3 elements we take 4 and more elements
and use (2.8) to define the same signature operations as inG3. Thus we obtain
Go¨del’s n-valued logics Gn, where n ≥ 3. We note that (2.8) are also valid
in B2; therefore, it is sometimes convenient to rename the algebra B2 by G2.
The matrices Gn, n ≥ 2, have been in particular important in investiga-
tion of the lattice of intermediate logics, that is the logics the valid formulas
of which contain all intuitionistic tautologies and are included into the set of
classical tautologies. In particular, all the matrices Gn, n ≥ 3, fail Peirce’s
law, the double negation law, as well as both De Morgan’s laws. (Exer-
cise 2.2.14.)
2.2.5 The Dummett denumerable matrix
An denumerable generalization of Gn, n ≥ 2, can be obtained if we take
take a denumerable set and arrange it by a linear ordering ≤ according to
type 1 + ω∗. We denote the least element by 0 and the greatest by 1. (We
note: the ordinal notation of the former is ω and of the latter is 0.) Then,
introducing the operations ∧, ∨, → and ¬ as meet, join, relative pseudo-
complementation and pseudo-complementation, respectively, of a Heyting
algebra and equipping the latter algebra with a logical filter {1}, we receive
the Dummett denumerable matrix LC. As for G3, the algebra of the Dummett
matrix satisfies the properties (2.5) and also (2.8). We note that LC validates
the formula
(p→ q) ∨ (q → p).
The set of all formulas valid in this matrix, LLC, is called the Dummett
logic.
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M. Dummett shows in [Dum59], theorem 2, that
LLC =
⋂
n≥2
LGn. (2.9)
In the sequel, we will need another logical matrix whose logic coincides
with the Dummett logic LC.
Let us consider a denumerable set arranged linearly according to type
ω + 1. We treat this structure as a Heyting algebra with a least element 0,
greatest element 1 and operations ∧, ∨, → and ¬ that are defined according
to (2.8). Announcing {1} a logical filter, we define the logical matrix LC∗.
Proposition 2.2.6. LLC = LLC∗.
Proof. We show that
LLC∗ =
⋂
n≥2
LGn.
It is clear that for any n ≥ 2, the algebra of Gn is a homomorphic image of
the algebra of LC∗; see Section 1.2.2. In virtue of Proposition 2.2.5, LLC∗ ⊆⋂
n≥2 LGn.
Now, assume that a valuation v in LC∗ refutes a formula α, that is α /∈
LLC∗. Let β1, . . . , βn be all subformulas of α. Then, according to (2.8), the
set {v[β1], . . . , v[βn], 0, 1} is the carrier of a subalgebra of the LC
∗-algebra,
which in turn is isomorphic to a Gn-algebra, for some n ≥ 2. This implies
that α /∈
⋂
n≥2LGn.
2.2.6 Two infinite generalizations of  Lukasiewicz’  L3
The  Lukasiewicz algebra  L3 can be easily generalized if we take for a carrier
the interval [0, 1] or the rational scaleQ or on the real scale R arranged in both
cases by the ordinary less-than-or-equal relation ≤. The set of designated
elements in both cases is {1}. The operations ¬ and→ are defined as follows:
¬x := 1− x,
x→ y := min(1, 1− x+ y);
then, the other operations are defined according to (2.6). This leads to the
identities
x ∧ y = min(x, y) and x ∨ y = max(x, y),
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which can be taken as definitions of ∧ and ∨ as well.
The set of formulas valid in the first matrix, that is when [0, 1] is con-
sidered in the rational scale, is denoted by  Lℵ0 and the formulas valid in the
second matrix by  Lℵ1 .
So far, we have discussed the semantic rules for the language L. As we
introduce other schematic languages later on, we will have to adjust these
rules for them. However, although semantic rules allow us to distinguish
valid formulas from refuted ones, they, taken alone, do not suffice to ana-
lyze reasoning. This echoes the remark due to Aristotle that “it is absurd
to discuss refutation (ἔλεγχος) without discussing reasoning (σνλλογισμός);”
cf. [KK62], section I.4. We discuss the relation of formal deduction between
L-formulas in the form of consequence relation. This is a topic of the next
chapter.
Exercises 2.2
1. Show that any endomorphism f : FL −→ FL can be regarded as a
substitution; that is f is a unique extension of v : V −→ FL such that
v(p) = f(p), for any p ∈ V.
2. Prove the second part of Proposition 2.2.1.
3. Prove that the laws of identity, of contradiction, of the excluded middle,
as well as Peirce’s and double negation laws are tautologies in B2.
4. Prove the properties (2.5).
5. Show that for any two LA-formulas α and β, α ↔ β is a classical
tautology if and only if for any B2-valuation v, v[α] = v[β].
6. Prove the identities (2.6).
7. Prove that B2 is a subalgebra of  L3.
8. Show that the law of the excluded middle and Peirce’s law are not
tautologous in  L3.
9. Prove that the set of  L3-tautologies is properly included in the set of
classical tautologies.
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10. Prove that the “paradoxes of material implications” (p. 32) are  L3-
tautologous.
11. Show that the following formulas are  L3-tautologies.
(a) p→ (q → p);
(b) (p→ q)→ ((q → r)→ (p→ r));
(c) (¬p→ ¬q)→ (q → p);
(d) ((p→ ¬p)→ p)→ p.
12. Prove that the identities (2.7) hold the algebra  L3 expanded by the
modalities 2 and 3.
13. Show that the logical matrix of type LC of Section 2.2.3 validates the
formulas 2p → p, p → 3p and 2p → 3p and rejects their converses
p→ 2p, 3p→ p and 3p→ 2p.
14. Show that Peirce’s law, the double negation law and both De Morgan’s
laws can be refuted in G3.
15. Let us designate on the algebra G3 the logical filter {τ , 1}. We denote
the new matrix by G′3. Show that G
′
3 validates a formula α if and only
if α is a classical tautology.
2.3 Historical notes
The idea that logic, as the science of reasoning, deals with the universal rather
than the particular can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle. According to
the Platonic doctrine of Forms, a single Form is associated with each group
of things to which a common name can be applied. Plato believed that each
Form differs from the particulars it represents but, at the same time, is a
particular of its own kind. Applying this doctrine to reasoning, he believed
that correct reasoning is based on the connections of the involved Forms.
This is how W. Kneale and M. Kneale summarize Plato’s view on reasoning.
“For Plato necessary connexions hold between Forms, and infer-
ence is presumably valid when we follow in thought the connex-
ions between Forms as they are. How is this view related to the
theory which assigns truth and falsity to sentences made up of
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nouns and verbs? Plato seems to hold that a sentence is true if
the arrangement of its parts reflects or corresponds to connexion
between Forms.” ([KK62], section I.5.)
However, what Plato wrote about correct thinking can be regarded as
philosophy of logic rather than logic itself. The first construction of for-
mal logic we encounter in Aristotle. Although Aristotle was influenced by
Plato’s doctrine of Forms, he rejected it. Nevertheless, we dare to assert that
Aristotle’s doctrine of the syllogism is formal in the Platonic sense. Namely
Aristotle was the first to introduce variables into logic. In his influential book
on Aristotle’s syllogistic J.  Lukasiewicz makes the following comment about
this fact.
“It seems that Aristotle regarded his invention as entirely plain
and requiring no explanation, for there is nowhere in his logical
works any mention of variables. It was Alexander who first said
explicitly that Aristotle presents his doctrine in letters, στοιχεˆια,
in order to show that we get the conclusion not in consequence
of the matter of the premisses, but in consequence of their form
and combination; the letters are marks of universality and show
that such a conclusion will follow always and for any term we
may choose.” ([ Luk57], § 4.)
Although in the course of the development of logic, when after Aristotle
the generalized nature of formal judgments was reflected in the use of letters,
and the latter were perceived, at least gradually, as sentential variables, and
therefore it would be natural to consider the uniform substitution, as defined
above, as a legitimate operation that would apply to all formal judgments,
however, the uniform substitution was first proposed as an inference rule,
that is, only in conjunction with (and for constructing) logical inferences.
Nonetheless, the realization, though implicit and at least for propositional
languages such as L-languages above, of that the set of formulas is closed
under substitution and that the notion of validity should be defined in such
a way to maintain this closedness for the formulas identified as valid one can
find in George Boole. As to the first part of this observation, Boole puts it
as follows.
“Let us imagine any known or existing language freed from idioms
and divested of superfluity and let us express in that language any
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given proposition in a manner the most simple and literal [. . . ]
The transition from such a language to the notation of analysis
would consist of no more than the substitution of one set of signs
for another, without essential change either in form or character.”
([Boo03], chapter 11, section 15.)
As to the second, he writes:
“I shall in some instances modify the premises by [. . . ] substitu-
tion of some new proposition, and shall determine how by such
change the ultimate conclusions are affected.” ([Boo03], chapter
13, section 1.)
It appears that this idea has become fully realized by the 1920s in the
Lvov-Warsaw School, for without this, Lindenbaum’s Theorem (Proposi-
tion 3.3.4) would be impossible. Although we can only guess, but it seems
plausible to suggest that the confusion between the concepts of predicate and
propositional term was an obstacle for such a long delay.
With merely some reservation, one can say that George Boole was the
first who interpreted symbolic expressions representing “laws of thought”
as algebraic terms. However, his algebraic treatment of logic was merely
the beginning of a long way. This is how T. Hailperin estimates Boole’s
contribution.
“Boole wrote his Laws of Thought before the notion of an ab-
stract formal system, expressed within a precise language, was
fully developed. And, at that time, still far in the future was
the contemporary view which makes a clear distinction between
a formal system and its realization or models. Boole’s work con-
tributed to bringing these ideas to fruition.” ([Hai86], chapter 1,
§ 1.0.)
We find interpretation of formal judgments in an abstract logical matrix
in, namely B2, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus ; cf. [Wit01], 4.441 and further. Also,
Wittgenstein used the term tautology, applying it to any classical tautology.
Later on, logical matrices turned to be a natural way to define numerous de-
ductive systems. We owe to Alfred Tarski a systematic approach to deductive
systems through logical matrices.
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At first matrices were employed in the search for an independent ax-
iomatic system for the set of classical tautologies; cf. [Ber26] and [ Luk64],
section 6. Also, J. C. C. McKinsey [McK39] used matrices to prove indepen-
dence of logical connectives in intuitionistic propositional logic.
The idea of the use of a 3-valued matrix was expressed by Jan  Lukasiewicz
in his inaugural address as Chancellor of the University of Warsaw in 1922.
In 1961, a revised version of this speech was published, where one can read:
“I maintain that there are propositions which are neither true nor
false but indeterminate. All sentences about future facts which
are not yet decided belong to this category. Such sentences are
neither true at the present moment, for they have no real corre-
late, nor are they false, for their denials too have no real correlate.
If we make use of philosophical terminology which is not partic-
ularly clear, we could say that ontologically there corresponds to
these sentences neither being nor non-being but possibility. Inde-
terminate sentences, which ontologically have possibility as their
correlate, take the third truth-value.” ([ Luk70], p. 126.)
Technically, however,  Lukasiewicz proposed  L3 already in 1920; cf. [ Luk20].
In [ Luk30] he expands  L3 to include modalities and thus obtain the matrix
of Section 2.2.3. In fact, he defines only 3, but it is easy to check that the
definition
2x := ¬3¬x
gives operation 2 as introduced in Section 2.2.3 directly.
It is worth noting that Lukasiewicz’s interest in ”multivalued logic” (in
the sense of logical matrices having more than two values) was motivated by
his interest in modal contexts, and not vice versa. Indeed, he wrote:
“I can assume without contradiction that my presence in Warsaw
at a certain moment of next year, e.g. at noon on 21 December, is
at the present time determined neither positively nor negatively,
Hence it is possible, but not necessary, that I shall be present in
Warsaw at the given time. On this assumption the proposition
‘I shall be in Warsaw at noon on 21 December of next year’, can
at the present time be neither true nor false. For if it were true
now, my future presence in Warsaw would have to be necessary,
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which is contradictory to the assumption. If it were false now,
on the other hand, my future presence in Warsaw would have
to be impossible, which is also contradictory to the assumption.
Therefore the proposition considered is at the moment neither
true nor false and must possess a third value, different from ‘0’
or falsity and ‘1’ or truth. This value we can designate by ‘1
2
’. It
represents ‘the possible’, and joins ‘the true’ and ‘the false’ as a
third value.” ([ Luk30], § 6; cf. English translation in [Me67], pp.
40–65.)
The logical matrix Lℵ1 and its logic for the first time were discussed by
 Lukasiewicz in his address delivered at a meeting of the Polish Philosophical
Society in Lvov on October 14, 1922. The report of this lecture was published
in Ruch Filozoficzny, vol. 7 (1923), no. 6, pp. 92–93; see English translation
in [ Luk70], pp. 129–130. According to this report,  Lukasiwicz’s motivation
for this matrix was as follows.
“The application of this interpretation is twofold: 1) It can be
demonstrated that if those verbal rules, or directives, which are
accepted by the authors of Principia Mathematica (the rule of
deduction and the rule of substitution) are adopted, then no set
of the logical laws that have the numerical value 1 can yield any
law that would have a lesser numerical value. 2) If 0 is interpreted
as falsehood, 1 as truth, and other numbers in the interval 0–1
as the degrees of probability corresponding to various possibili-
ties, a many-valued logic is obtained, which is an expansion of
three-valued logic and differs from the latter in certain details.”
([ Luk70], p. 130.)
It is clear that Lℵ0 is an obvious simplification of Lℵ1 .
Answering a question of Hahn, Kurt Go¨del considered [Go¨d32] (see En-
glish translation in [Go¨d86]) an infinite series of finite logical matrices and
their logics, where the matrix B2 was the second and G3 the third in the
series. All these matrices were partially ordered chains with the maximal
element designated. Go¨del’s goal was twofold: to show that 1) the intuition-
istic propositional calculus cannot be determined by a single matrix; and
that 2) there are at least countably many logics between the intuitionistic
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and classical logics. (These logics will be descussed in more detail in Chap-
ter 3.)
The aforementioned series of Go¨del’s matrices produces a descending
chain of logics all containing the intuitionistic propositional logic. Michael
Dummett showed [Dum59] that LC equals the intersection of all Go¨del’s
logics. He also gave an axiomatization of LC, which will be discussed in
Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3
Logical Consequence
The conception of logical consequence which we discuss in this chapter can be
traced back to Aristotle’s distinction between demonstrative and dialectical
argument. The essence of their difference lies in the status of the premises
of the argument in question. In a demonstrative argument, its premises are
regarded as true. Aristotle called the argument with such premises “didactic”
and compared them with what a teacher lays down as a starting point of the
development of his subject. We would call such premises the axioms of a
theory. In a dialectical argument, according to Aristotle, any assumptions
can be employed for premises. More than that, in the reductio ad absurdum
argument one starts with a premise which is aimed to be proven false.
Thus, the focus in the dialectical reasoning is transferred on the argument
itself. This involves considering such an argumentation as a binary relation
between a set of premises and what can be obtained from them in the course
of this argumentation. And the first question raised by this point of view
is this: What characteristics of the dialectical argument could qualify it as
sound?
3.1 Consequence relation
From the outset, we are faced with a choice between two paths each address-
ing one of the questions: Should consequence relation state determination
between a set of premises (which can be empty) and a set of conclusions
(which can also be empty), or should it do it between a set of premises (pos-
sibly the empty one) and a single formula? In this text, we address the first
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option. The framework of this option is known as single-conclusion, while
that of the second as multiple-conclusion or poly-conclusion consequence re-
lation.
Talking about consequence relation in general, we denote it by “⊢” and
equip this sign with subscript when referring to a specific consequence rela-
tion.
In the context of consequence relation, we use the following notation:
X, Y, . . . , Z := X ∪ Y ∪ . . . ∪ Z;
X,α, . . . , β := X ∪ {α, . . . , β},
}
(3.1)
for any sets X, Y, . . . , Z of L-formulas and any L-formulas α, . . . , β.
Definition 3.1.1 (single-conclusion consequence relation). A relation ⊢⊆
P(Fm)×Fm is an L-single-conclusion consequence relation (or sim-
ply an L-consequence relation or just a consequence relation when
consideration occurs in a fixed, perhaps unspecified, formal language) if the
following conditions are satisfied :
(a) α ∈ X implies X ⊢ α; (reflexivity)
(b) X ⊢ α and X ⊆ Y imply Y ⊢ α; (monotonicity)
(c) if X ⊢ β, for all β ∈ Y , and Y, Z ⊢ α, then X,Z ⊢ α, (transitivity)
for any sets X, Y and Z of L-formulas.
In case Y = {β}, the property (c) reads:
(c∗) X ⊢ β and Z, β ⊢ α imply X,Z ⊢ α. (cut)
A consequence relation ⊢ is called nontrivial if
⊢ ⊂ P(Fm)×Fm;
otherwise it is trivial.
A consequence relation ⊢ is called finitarity if
X ⊢ α implies that there is Y ⋐ X such that Y ⊢ α, (finitariness)
where here and on Y ⋐ X means that Y is a finite (maybe empty) subset of
X .
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The last notion can be generalized as follows. Let κ be an infinite cardinal.
A consequence relation ⊢ is called κ-compact if
X ⊢ α implies that there is Y ⊆ X such that Y ⊢ α and card(Y ) < κ.
(κ-compactness)
Thus finitariness is simply ℵ0-compactness.
A consequence relation ⊢ is structural if
X ⊢ α implies σ(X) ⊢ σ(α), (structurality)
for any set X ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm and any L-substitution σ.
We will be using the term sequent for a statement “X ⊢ α”.
Note on monotonicity of ⊢. The property (b) of Definition 3.1.1
characterizes the category of monotone consequence relations as
opposed to that of non-monotone consequence relations when the
property (b) does not hold. In this book we consider only the first
category of consequence relations. (End of note.)
Other, specific, properties in addition to (a)–(c) have been considered in
literature. For instance, for the language LB and its expansions the following
property is typical for many consequence relations:
X,α ⊢ ⊥ implies X ⊢ ¬α. (reductio ad absurdum)
We will be using indices to distinguish in the same formal language either
two different consequence relations or two equal consequence relation that
are defined differently. The following three propositions will be used in the
sequel.
Proposition 3.1.1. Let {⊢i}i∈I be a family of consequence relations in a
language L. Then the relation ⊢ defined by
⋂
i∈I{⊢i} is also a consequence
relation. Moreover, if each ⊢i is structural, so is ⊢. In addition, if I is finite
and each ⊢i is finitary, then ⊢ is also finitary.
Proof is left to the reader. (See Exercise 3.1.2.)
Given a consequence relation ⊢ and a set X0 of L-formulas. We define a
relation as follows:
X ⊢X0 α
df
⇐⇒ X,X0 ⊢ α.
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Proposition 3.1.2. For any consequence relation ⊢ and arbitrary fixed set
X0, ⊢X0 is a consequence relation such that
∅ ⊢X0 α ⇐⇒ X0 ⊢ α.
Proof is left to the reader. (Exercise 3.1.3)
For any consequence relation ⊢, we define:
X ⊢◦ α
df
⇐⇒ X ⊢ α and X 6= ∅. (3.2)
Proposition 3.1.3. Let ⊢ be a consequence relation. Then ⊢◦ is also a
consequence relation. In addition, if ⊢ is structural, ⊢◦ is also structural;
further, if ⊢ is κ-compact, so is ⊢◦.
Proof is left to the reader. (Exercise 3.1.4)
As is seen from the Proposition 3.1.1, Definition 3.1.1 is essentially ex-
tensional, because it does not show how the transition from premises to
conclusion can be carried out. However, before addressing this issue, we
will discuss how the concept of single-conclusion consequence relation can be
represented purely in terms of sets of L-formulas.
Exercises 3.1
1. Consider the properties (a), (b) and (c) of Definition 3.1.1. Show that
(a) and (c) imply (b).
2. Prove Proposition 3.1.1.
3. Prove Proposition 3.1.2.
4. Prove Proposition 3.1.3.
3.2 Consequence operator
Let ⊢ be a consequence relation for L-formulas. Then, we define:
Cn(X) := {α | X ⊢ α}, (3.3)
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for any set X of L-formulas. We observe the following connection:
X ⊢ α if and only if α ∈ Cn(X). (3.4)
The last equivalence induces the following definition.
Definition 3.2.1. A map Cn : P(Fm) −→ P(Fm) is called a conse-
quence operator if it satisfies the following three conditions:
(a†) X ⊆ Cn(X); (reflexivity)
(b†) X ⊆ Y implies Cn(X) ⊆ Cn(Y ); (monotonicity)
(c†) Cn(Cn(X)) ⊆ Cn(X), (closedness)
for any sets X and Y of L-formulas.
A consequence operator Cn is called finitary (or compact) if
(d†) Cn(X) ⊆
⋃
{Cn(Y ) | Y ⋐ X}. (finitariness or compactness)
As in case of consequence relation, we generalize the last notion for any
infinite cardinal κ: an consequence operator Cn is κ-compact if
Cn(X) ⊆
⋃
{Cn(Y ) | Y ⊆ X and card(Y ) < κ}. (κ-compactness)
And a consequence operator Cn is called structural, if for any set X
and any substitution σ,
σ(Cn(X)) ⊆ Cn(σ(X)). (structurality)
Note on monotonicity of Cn. A consequence operator as de-
fined in Definition 3.2.1 is called monotone as opposed to non-
monotone consequence operators. (End of note.)
A set X of formulas is called closed, or is a theory, (w.r.t. Cn) if
X = Cn(X). This, in view of (a†) and (c†), any set Cn(X) is a theory; we
call it the theory generated by X (w.r.t. Cn).
We observe the following.
Proposition 3.2.1. Given a consequence operator Cn, any set
⋂
i∈I{Cn(Xi)}
is closed.
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Proof is left to the reader. (See Exercise 3.2.1.) Compare this proposition
with Proposition 3.1.1.
The next proposition establishes connection between the notion of conse-
quence relation and that of consequence operator.
Proposition 3.2.2. Let ⊢ be a consequence relation. The operator Cn de-
fined by (3.3) is a consequence operator. Conversely, for a given consequence
operator Cn, the corresponding relation defined by (3.4) is a consequence
relation. Moreover, Cn is finitary (κ-compact) if, and only if, so is ⊢. In
addition, Cn is structural if, and only if, so is ⊢.
Proof can be obtained by routine check and is left to the reader. (See Exer-
cise 3.2.2.)
Proposition 3.2.2 allows us to use the notion of consequence re-
lation and that of consequence operator interchangeably.
The next observation confirms the last remark; it just mirrors Proposi-
tion 3.1.1
Proposition 3.2.3. Let {Cni}i∈I be a family of consequence operators in a
language L. Then the operator Cn defined by the equality
Cn(X) :=
⋂
i∈I
Cni(X)
is also a consequence operator. Moreover, if each Cni is structural, so is Cn.
In addition, if I is finite and each Cni is finitary, then Cn is also finitary.
Proof is left to the reader. (Exercise 3.2.5)
Besides the properties (a†)–(c†), finitariness and κ-compactness, other
properties of a map Cn : P(Fm) −→ P(Fm) related to logical consequence
have been considered in literature. These are some of them.
(e†) X ⊆ Cn(Y ) implies Cn(X) ⊆ Cn(Y ); (comulative transitivity)
(f†) X ⊆ Cn(Y ) implies Cn(X ∪ Y ) ⊆ Cn(Y ); (strong comulative transitivity)
(g†) X ⊆ Y ⊆ Cn(X) implies Cn(Y ) ⊆ Cn(X); (weak comulative transitivity)
(h†)
⋃
{Cn(Y ) | Y ⋐ X} ⊆ Cn(X); (finitary inclusion)
(i†) if X 6= ∅, then Cn(X) ⊆
⋃
{Cn(Y ) | Y 6= ∅ and Y ⋐ X}; (strong finitariness)
(j†) if α /∈ Cn(X), then there is a maximal X∗ such that X ⊆ X∗
and α /∈ Cn(X∗). (maximalizability)
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Proposition 3.2.4. Let Cn be a map from P(Fm) into P(Fm), Then the
following implications hold :
i) (a†) and (g†) imply (c†);
ii) (b†) and (c†) imply (e†);
iii) (e†) implies (g†);
iv) (f†) implies (g†);
v) (a†) and (g†) imply (f†);
vi) (a†) and (f†) imply (c†);
vii) (a†) and (b†) and (c†) imply (f†);
viii) (i†) implies (d†);
ix) (b†) and (d†) imply (i†);
x) (b†) implies (h†);
xi) (b†) and (d†) imply (j†);
xii) (d†) and (h†) imply (b†).
Proof. We prove (vi), (xi) and (xii), in this order, and leave the rest to the
reader. (See Exercise 3.2.6.)
SupposeX ⊆ Cn(Y ), Then, by virtue of (a†),X∪Y ⊆ Cn(Y ). According
to (b†) and (c†), we have: Cn(X ∪ Y ) ⊆ Cn(Cn(Y )) ⊆ Cn(Y ).
To prove (xi), we assume that α /∈ Cn(X), for some set X .
Let us denote
Cα := {Y | X ⊆ Y and α /∈ Cn(Y )}.
We aim to show that Cα contains a maximal set.
First, we observe that Cα is nonempty, for X ∈ Cα. Regarding Cα as a
partially ordered set with respect to ⊆, we consider a chain {Yi}i∈I in Cα.
That is, either Yi ⊆ Yj or Yi ⊆ Yj, and α /∈ Yi, for any i ∈ I. Next we denote
Y0 :=
⋃
i∈I
{Yi}.
We aim to show that α /∈ Cn(Y0). For contradiction, assume that α ∈
Cn(Y0). Then, by (d
†), there is a set Y ′ ⋐ Y0 such that α ∈ Cn(Y
′). We
note that Y ′ 6= ∅, for otherwise, by (b†), we would have that α ∈ Cn(X).
Since Y ′ is finite, there is i0 ∈ I such that Y
′ ⊆ Yi0. Then, by virtue of
(b†), α ∈ Cn(Yi0). We have obtained a contradiction. Thus Cα satisfies the
conditions of Zorn’s lemma, according to which Cα contains a maximal set.
51
Finally, to prove (xii), we assume that X ⊆ Y and α ∈ Cn(X). In virtue
of (d†), there is a finite Y ′ ⊆ X such that α ∈ Cn(Y ′). We note that, by
premise, Y ′ ⋐ Y . Then, by (h†), α ∈ Cn(Y ).
Exercises 3.2
1. Prove Proposition 3.2.1.
2. Prove Proposition 3.2.2.
3. Prove that a consequence operator Cn is structural if, and only if,
Cn(σ(Cn(X))) = Cn(σ(X)), for any set X and any substitution σ.
4. Let Cn be a structural operator. Prove that a set σ(Cn(X)) is closed
(or is a theory) if, and only if, σ(Cn(X)) = Cn(σ(X)), for any set X
and any substitution σ.
5. Prove Proposition 3.2.3.
6. Complete the proof of Proposition 3.2.4.
3.3 Defining consequence relation
In order to distinguish consequence relations or consequence operators we
will be using the symbols ⊢ and Cn with subscripts. Quite often, we employ
a letter ‘S’, calling a consequence relation ⊢S and the corresponding conse-
quence operator CnS an abstract logic S. Thus, given an abstract logic S,
for any sets X of L-formulas and any L-formula α, we have:
X ⊢S α⇐⇒ α ∈ CnS(X). (3.5)
Further, we denote
TS := CnS(∅)
and call the elements of the latter set theorems , or theses, of S, or simply
S-theorems, or S-theses. Any set CnS(X) is call the S-theory generated
by a set X . Thus TS is the least S-theory with respect to ⊆.
A set X , as well as the theory CnS(X), is called inconsistent (relative
to S) if CnS(X) = Fm; otherwise both are consistent. An abstract logic S
is trivial if ⊢S is trivial, and otherwise is nontrivial. We observe that any
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structural S is trivial if, and only if, for any arbitrary variable p, p ∈ CnS(∅).
(Exercise 3.3.1) We note that for any nontrivial abstract logic S, TS ⊂ Fm.
(Exercise 3.3.2) ) We also note that a theory is not required to be closed under
substitution. A bit more we can say about substitution in the structural
abstract logics: every theory of a structural abstract logic is closed under
substitution if, and only if, this theory is generated by a set itself closed
under substitution. (Exercise 3.3.3)
We denote
ΣS := {X | CnS(X) = X} (the set of S-theories)
and
ΣcS := {X | CnS(X) = X ⊂ Fm} (the set of consistent S-theories)
3.3.1 Consequence operator (relation) via a closure sys-
tem
A set A ⊆ P(Fm) which contains Fm and is closed under any nonempty
intersections in P(Fm) is called a closure system over Fm. That is, for
any closure system A, Fm ∈ A and for any I 6= ∅,
{Xi}i∈I ⊆ A =⇒
⋂
i∈I
{Xi} ∈ A.
All operators in this subsection are considered over a fixed language L.
Proposition 3.3.1. Let A be a closure system. Then the operator
CnA(X) :=
⋂
{Y | X ⊆ Y and Y ∈ A}
is a consequence operator and A = {X | X = CnA(X)}. Conversely, if
Cn is a consequence operator and ACn is the family of its closed sets, then
Cn = CnACn .
Proof. Assume that A is a closure system. It is easy to check that the
operator CnA satisfies the properties (a
†) and (b†) of Definition 3.2.1. We
prove that it also satisfies (c†). For this, given a set X , we denote
X0 := CnA(X)
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and suppose that α ∈ CnA(X0). Aiming to show that α ∈ X0, we note that
α ∈ X0 ⇐⇒ ∀Y ∈ A. X ⊆ Y ⇒ α ∈ Y.
Thus, we assume that X ⊆ Y , for an arbitrary Y ∈ A. In virtue of (b†),
X0 ⊆ CnA(Y ) and hence Cn(X0) ⊆ Y , for Y ∈ A. This implies that α ∈ Y
and, using the equivalence above, we obtain that α ∈ X0.
Finally, one can easily observe that
X ∈ A ⇐⇒ CnA(X) = X.
Conversely, suppose Cn is a consequence operator and
ACn := {X | Cn(X) = X}.
Assume that {Xi}i∈I ⊆ ACn and denote
X0 :=
⋂
i∈I
{Xi}. (3.6)
Since X0 ⊆ Xi, for each i ∈ I, Cn(X0) ⊆ Cn(Xi) = Xi, also for each i ∈ I.
Hence Cn(X0) ⊆ X0, that is X0 ∈ ACn.
Finally, we show that for any formula α and any set X of formulas,
α ∈ Cn(X)⇐⇒ α ∈ CnACn(X).
First, we notice that
α ∈ CnACn(X)⇐⇒ ∀Y. (X ⊆ Y and Cn(Y ) = Y )⇒ α ∈ Y. (∗)
Then, in virtue of (∗), we have:
α ∈ CnACn(X) =⇒ [(X ⊆ Cn(X) and Cn(Cn(X)) = Cn(X))⇒ α ∈ Cn(X)]
=⇒ α ∈ Cn(X).
Now we suppose that α ∈ Cn(X), X ⊆ Y and Cn(Y ) = Y . From the
second premise, we derive that Cn(X) ⊆ Cn(Y ) and hence Cn(X) ⊆ Y .
Thus α ∈ Y . Since Y is an arbitrary set satisfying the aforementioned
conditions, using (∗), we conclude that α ∈ CnACn(X).
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Given an abstract logic S, we remind the notation:
ΣS := {X | X = CnS(X)}.
We conclude with the following observation.
Proposition 3.3.2 (Brown-Suszko theorem). An abstract logic S in a lan-
guage L is structural if, and only if, for any set X ⊆ Fm and any substitution
σ, the following holds:
X ∈ ΣS =⇒ σ
−1(X) ∈ ΣS .
Proof. Suppose S is structural. Let σ be a substitution andX ∈ ΣS . Assume
that σ−1(X) ⊢S α. Since S is structural, we have: σ(σ
−1(X)) ⊢S σ(α). In
virtue of (2.1–i), X ⊢S σ(α), that is σ(α) ∈ X . This means that α ∈ σ
−1(X).
To prove the converse, we assume that the conditional above holds. Then
we, with help of (2.1–ii), obtain that X ⊆ σ−1(σ(X)) ⊆ σ−1(CnS(σ(X))).
This implies that CnS(X) ⊆ CnS(σ
−1(CnS(σ(X)))). Applying the assump-
tion, we get that CnS(X) ⊆ σ
−1(CnS(σ(X))). Thus, if X ⊢S α, that is
α ∈ CnS(X), then α ∈ σ
−1(CnS(σ(X))), that is σ(X) ⊢S σ(α).
3.3.2 Consequence relation via logical matrices
Given a (logical) matrix M = 〈A, D〉, we define a relation |=M on P(Fm)×
Fm as follows:
X |=M α
df
⇐⇒ (v[X ] ⊆ D ⇒ v[α] ∈ D, for any valuation v in A),
where
v[X ] := {v[β] | β ∈ X}.
LetM be a nonempty class of matrices. We define the relation ofmatrix
consequence (w.r.t. a class M) as follows:
X |=M α
df
⇐⇒ (X |=M α, for all M ∈M). (3.7)
Accordingly, the relation |=M is called a single-matrix consequence, or
M-consequence for short. If a class M is known, we call a matrix conse-
quence associated with a class M an M-consequence. Given a nonempty
set of matrices M, we denote the M-consequence by SM and say that an
abstract logic S is determined by M if S = SM.
The justification for the terminology ‘M-consequence’ and ‘M-consequence’
is the following.
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Proposition 3.3.3. Any matrix consequence is a structural consequence re-
lation.
Proof. Let M = {Mi}i∈I be a nonempty set of matrices. We have to check
that the conditions (a)–(c) of Definition 3.1.1 are satisfied for the relation
|=M. In addition, we have to show that this consequence relation is struc-
tural. We leave this routine check to the reader. (Exercise 3.3.4)
Let S be an abstract logic and M = 〈A, D〉 be a matrix. Accordingly,
we have the consequence relation ⊢S and a single-matrix consequence |=M.
If ⊢S⊆|=M, we call the filter D an S-filter, in which case the matrix M is
called an S-matrix (or an S-model ).
Definition 3.3.1 (Lindenbaum matrix). Let S be a structural abstract logic
and DS be an S-theory. The matrix 〈FL, DS〉 is called a Lindenbaum matrix
(relative to S). For an arbitrary X ⊆ Fm, we denote:
LinS [X ] := 〈FL,CnS(X)〉
and
LinS := 〈FL,CnS(∅)〉
The reader is advised to remember that (Proposition 2.2.2)
any L-substitution is a valuation in FL and vice versa.
Proposition 3.3.4 (Lindenbaum’s theorem). Let S be a structural abstract
logic. Then LinS is an S-model. Also, if a set X ⊆ Fm is closed under
arbitrary L-substitution, then for any L-formula α,
X ⊢S α ⇐⇒ |=LinS [X] α;
in particular,
α ∈ TS ⇐⇒ |=LinS α.
Proof. Let us take any set X ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm such that X ⊢S α. Then, for
an arbitrary L-substitution σ, σ(X) ⊢S σ(α). Therefore, if σ(X) ⊆ CnS(∅),
then σ(α) ∈ CnS(∅). Thus LinS is an S-model.
Now, if, in addition, σ(X) ⊆ X , then σ(α) ∈ CnS(X). Since σ is an
arbitrary L-substitution, we have that |=LinS [X] α.
Conversely, if |=LinS [X] α, then, in particular, ι(α) ∈ CnS(X), that is
X ⊢S α.
The second equivalence is a specification of the first.
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We say that a matrix is weakly adequate for an abstract logic S if this
matrix validates all S-theorems and only them. Thus, by virtue of the last
equivalence of Proposition 3.3.4, we obtain the following.
Corollary 3.3.4.1. Let S be structural abstract logic. Then any Lindenbaum
matrix relative to S is an S-model. Moreover, LinS is weakly adequate for
S.
Proof is left to the reader. (Exercise 3.3.5)
Proposition 3.3.4 can be generalized as follows.
Proposition 3.3.5. Given a structural abstract logic S, let MS be the set
of all Lindenbaum matrices relative to S. Then ⊢S = |=MS ; that is for any
set X of formulas and any formula α,
X ⊢S α⇐⇒ X |=MS α.
Proof. First we suppose thatX ⊢S α. Let us take any 〈FL, DS〉. Assume that
for some substitution σ, σ(X) ⊆ DS . Since S is structural, σ(X) ⊢S σ(α).
This implies that σ(α) ∈ CnS(σ(X)) and hence σ(α) ∈ DS .
Conversely, assume that X 6⊢S α. This means (see (3.5)) that α /∈
CnS(X). Let us denote M := 〈FL,CnS(X)〉 and take the identity sub-
stitution ι. It is obvious that ι(X) ⊆ CnS(X) but ι(α) /∈ CnS(X); that is
X 6|=M α.
The last proposition inspires us for the following (complex) definition.
Definition 3.3.2. A (nonempty) family B = {〈Ai, Di〉}i∈I of matrices of
type L is called a bundle if for any i, j ∈ I, the algebras Ai and Aj are
isomorphic. A pair 〈A, {Di}i∈I〉, where each Di is a logical filter in (or of)
A, is called an atlas. By definition, the matrix consequence relative
to an atlas 〈A, {Di}i∈I〉 is the same as the matrix consequence related the
bundle {〈A, Di〉}i∈I, which in turn is defined in the sense of (3.7). Given
an abstract logic S, the bundle {〈FL, D〉}D∈ΣS , where ΣS is the set of all
S-theories, is called the Lindenbaum bundle relative to S and the atlas
Lin[ΣS ] := 〈FL,ΣS〉, is called the Lindenbaum atlas relative to S.
We say that a given matrix (bundle or atlas) is adequate for an abstract
logic S if ⊢S and the corresponding matrix relation coincide.
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We denote:
X |=Lin[ΣS ] α
df
⇐⇒ for any L-substitution σ and any DS ∈ ΣS ,
σ(X) ⊆ DS implies σ(α) ∈ DS ,
for any X ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm.
Thus we conclude with the following.
Corollary 3.3.5.1. The Lindenbaum atlas relative to a structural abstract
logic is adequate for this logic. That is, for any X ∪ {α} ⊆ Fm,
X ⊢S α ⇐⇒ X |=Lin[ΣS ] α.
Proof is left to the reader. (Exercise 3.3.6)
Corollary 3.3.5.2. Let S be a structural abstract logic and M be the set of
all S-models. Then S = SM.
Proof is left to the reader. (Exercise 3.3.7)
3.3.3 Consequence relation via inference rules
Since we perceive the sentential formulas as forms of judgments (Section 2.1),
our understanding of a rule of inference, at least in one important case, will
be a relation in the class of forms of formulas. As in the first event, where
substitution plays a key role in seeing any sentential formula as an abstract
representation of infinitely many judgments, it will play a similar role in the
concept of inference rule, at least in this important class of inference rules.
It is a way, by which we create an abstraction of infinitely many instances of
one element that falls under the name of structural inference rule.
An inference rule is a set R ⊆ P(Fm)×Fm. An inference rule receives
its significance, when it is a subset of some consequence relation, say ⊢. We
say that a rule R is sound w.r.t. ⊢ if for any 〈Γ, α〉 ∈ R, Γ ⊢ α.
Let R be a set of inference rules. Taking into account that P(Fm)×Fm
is the trivial consequence relation (relative to a language L), we define
⊢[R]:=
⋂
{⊢S | ∀R ∈ R. R is sound w.r.t. S}. (3.8)
(We note that the right-hand set is nonempty.)
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It is not difficult to see that ⊢[R] is a consequence relation. (Exercise 3.3.8)
We say that an abstract logic S is determined by a set R of inference rules
if ⊢S =⊢[R]. Given an abstract logic S, one can treat the consequence rela-
tion ⊢S as an inference rule that determines S.
Now we turn to structural rules.
Let us consider a pair 〈Γ, φ〉 ∈ P(MfL)×MfL. We call the set
R〈Γ,φ〉 := {〈σ(Γ),σ(φ)〉 | σ is an instantiation of MvL}
a structural rule (in L) with the premises Γ and conclusion φ. Each pair
〈σ(Γ),σ(φ)〉 is an instance of the rule R〈Γ,φ〉 (with the premises σ(Γ) and
conclusion σ(φ)). It is convenient (and we follow this practice) to identify the
rule R〈Γ,φ〉 with its label 〈Γ, φ〉, using them interchangeably. It is customary
to write a structural rule 〈Γ, φ〉 in the forms Γ/φ or Γ
φ
. (It is customary to
omit the set-builder notation “{. . .}”, when a set of premises is finite, and
leave the space blank if Γ = ∅.)
Given an abstract logic S, specifically, a structural rule 〈Γ, φ〉 is sound
w.r.t. S if for any instantiation σ, σ(Γ) ⊢S σ(φ).
A structural rule is called finitary (or a modus or modus rule) if
Γ ⋐MfL. If an abstract logic S is determined by a finite set of modus rules,
one says that set of modus rules is a calculus for S. An abstract logic may
be defined by more than one calculus, if any. An example of a modus rule is
modus ponens which is the rule α,α→ β/β.
Not all useful inference rules are structural.
Let σ be a fixed L-substitution. Then we define
Rσ := {〈{α}, σ(α)〉 | α ∈ Fm}.
Then the rule of substitution is the set
Rsub :=
⋃
{Rσ | σ is an L-substitution}.
Each 〈α, σ(α)〉 is called an application of the substitution σ to α. A
customary utterance is: σ(α) is obtained from α by substitution σ.
Although substitution is an important component of any structural rule
(see Proposition 2.1.2), the rule of substitution itself is not structural, pro-
viding that L contains sentential connectives.
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Indeed, for contradiction, we assume that
Rsub = R〈Γ,φ〉,
for some Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ MfL. Let us fix an arbitrary p ∈ VL. By definition,
it is clear that for any α ∈ Fm, 〈{p}, α〉 ∈ Rsub. This implies that for any
α ∈ Fm, there is an instantiation ξα such that ξα(Γ) = {p} and ξα(φ) = α.
Thus, we conclude that Γ ∪ {φ} ⊆ MvL and Γ ∩ {φ} = ∅; moreover, it
must be clear that Γ cannot have more than one metavariables, because if
it were otherwise, the claim 〈{p}, α〉 ∈ R〈Γ,φ〉 would not be true. Thus,
〈Γ, φ〉 = 〈{γ}, β〉, for two distinct metavariables γ and β. Then, providing
that L contains sentential connectives, there is an instantiation ξ such that
the degree of ξ(γ) is greater than the degree of ξ(β). A contradiction.
We will not discuss here non-structural rules, except substitution.1
Proposition 3.3.6. Let S be a structural abstract logic in L. Then there is
a set of structural rules that determines S.
Proof. Since card(VL) ≤ card(MvL), there is a one-one map VL −→ MvL
which can, obviously, be extended to f : FL −→ML. (We employ the same
notation for both maps.)
Next, we define:
R := {〈f(X), f(α)〉 | X ⊢S α}.
It must be clear that any ruleR ∈ R is structural. And ifR = 〈f(X), f(α)〉,
then there is an instantiation ξ0 such that ξ0(f(X)) = X and ξ0(f(α)) = α.
This implies that any rule R ∈ R is sound w.r.t. S. Hence ⊢[R]⊆⊢S .
Now we assume that any rule R ∈ R is sound w.r.t. some S ′. Sup-
pose X ⊢S α. Then 〈f(X), f(α)〉 ∈ R. Therefore, for any instantiation
η, η(f(X)) ⊢S′ η(f(α)). In particular, ξ0(f(X)) ⊢S′ ξ0(f(α)). Hence
X ⊢S′ α.
For defining consequence relations, especially structural consequence re-
lations, sometimes even more powerful machinery is convenient. We mean
the use of hyperrules.
1However, we note that the hyperrules introduced below, strictly speaking, are also not
structural.
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An (n+1)-tuple
Θ := 〈〈Γ1, φ1〉, . . . , 〈Γn, φn〉, 〈∆, ψ〉〉,
where Γ1 ∪ . . . ∪ Γn ∪ ∆ ∪ {φ1, . . . φn, ψ} ⊆ MfL, is called a (structural )
hyperrule.
A hyperrule Θ is sound w.r.t. an abstract logic S if for any L-instantiation
ξ and any set X ⊆ Fm,
[X ∪ ξ(Γ1) ⊢S ξ(φ1), . . . , X ∪ ξ(Γn) ⊢S ξ(φn)] =⇒ X ∪ ξ(∆) ⊢S ξ(ψ).
If a hyperrule Θ is employed in relation to an abstract logic S, it is
customary to write this hyperrule in the following form:
X,Γ1 ⊢S φ1; . . . ;X,Γn ⊢S φn
X,∆ ⊢S ψ
.
Next, using rules and hyperrules (not all of them for each example but
selectively), we define several consequence relations in language LA (Sec-
tion 2.1) and discuss their properties.
Inference rules:
(a) i)
α,β
α ∧ β
ii)
α
α ∨ β
iii)
β
α ∨ β
iv)
α
¬¬α
(b) i)
α ∧ β
α
ii)
α ∧ β
β
iii)
α,α→ β
β
iv)
¬¬α
α
.
Hyperrules:
(c) i)
X,α ⊢ β
X ⊢ α→ β
ii)
X,α ⊢ β; X,α ⊢ ¬β
X ⊢ ¬α
iii)
X,α ⊢ γ; X,β ⊢ γ
X,α ∨ β ⊢ γ
,
where ⊢ in the hyperrules above denotes a fixed binary relation on P(Fm)×
Fm.
First we define a relation ⊢1 on P(Fm)× Fm and then prove that it is
a consequence relation. Then, we do the same for relations ⊢2 and ⊢3. In all
three definitions, we use the concept of (formal ) derivation (or formal
proof ). The relations being defined are written as X ⊢i α, where i = 1, 2, 3.
(For convenience we call X ⊢i α a sequent, even when we may not know
yet that ⊢i is a consequent relation.) If X ⊢i α is justified according to the
clauses below, we say that X derives α, or α is derivable from X (all w.r.t.
⊢i). It is for such a justification we use the notion of derivation.
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Relation ⊢1 Given a set X of LA-formulas and an LA-formula α, deriva-
tion confirming (or establishing or justifying) a sequent X ⊢1 α is a finite
(nonempty) list of LA-formulas
α1, . . . , αn (3.9)
such that
(d1) αn = α; and
(d2) each αi is either in X or obtained from one or more formulas
preceeding it on the list (3.9) by one of the rules (a)–(b).
It is easy to see that ⊢1 satisfies the properties (a)–(c) of Definition 3.1.1
and thus is a consequence relation. Moreover, this relation is obviously fini-
tary and structural. One peculiarity of it is that the set of the theses of this
relation is empty. Another property of ⊢1 is that
X ⊢1 α =⇒ X |=B2 α, (3.10)
where |=B2 is a single-matrix consequence w.r.t. matrix B2 (Section 2.2.1).
To prove (3.10), one needs to show that each rule of (a)–(b) preserves validity
in B2. We leave this task to the reader. (Exercise 3.3.10)
Clearly, the converse of (3.10) is not true, for if α is a classical tautology,
then ∅ |=B2 α but ∅ 6⊢1 α.
Relation ⊢2 Our next example, relation ⊢2, is a modification of ⊢1. Namely
we define:
X ⊢2 α
df
⇐⇒ X,LB2 ⊢1 α,
where LB2 is the logic of matrix B2 (Definition 2.2.5), that is the set of
classical tautologies. According to Proposition 3.1.2, ⊢2 is a consequence
relation whose set of theses is LB2.
In addition, we claim that
X ⊢2 α =⇒ X |=B2 α. (3.11)
The proof of (3.11) follows from the proof of (3.10), where we have to
add one more (obvious) case — when αi in (3.9) is a classical tautology, that
is αi ∈ LB2.
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The converse of (3.11) is also true, that is
X |=B2 α =⇒ X ⊢2 α. (3.12)
To prove (3.12), we first prove that the consequence relation |=B2 is fini-
tary. Indeed, the premise X |=B2 α is equivalent to that the set X ∪ {¬α} is
not satisfiable in B2, that is for any valuation v in B2, v[X ∪ {¬α}] 6⊆ {1}.
Then, by compactness theorem,2 X ∪ {¬α} is not finitely satisfiable in B2,
that is, there is X0 ⋐ X such that X0 ∪ {¬α} is not satisfiable in B2. The
latter is equivalent to X0 |=B2 .
3
In the next step, having X0 |=B2 α with X0 ⋐ X , we show that X0 ⊢2 α.
If X0 = ∅, then α is a classical tautology and the conclusion is obvious.
Assume that
X0 := {β1, . . . , βn}.
We denote
∧X0 := (. . . (β1 ∧ β2) ∧ . . . ∧ βn)
and observe that ∧X0 → α is a classical tautology, that is ∧X0 → α ∈ LB2.
Further, it is easy to see that X0 ⊢2 ∧X0. The two last observations imply
that X0 ⊢2 α and hence X ⊢2 α.
According to Proposition 3.3.3 and the consideration above, |=B2 , as well
as ⊢2, is a finitary structural consequence relation.
Relation ⊢3 For the next example, we employ the hyperrules (c). We state
that X ⊢3 α when the latter can be confirmed by one of the following types
of confirmation or their combination. A formal definition is the following.
1◦ The first type is a derivation of α from X by using steps de-
termined by (d1)–(d2), that is a derivation confirming X ⊢1 α.
2◦ The second type is when confirmed premises of one of the hy-
perrules (c) are satisfied for ⊢3, we can confirm the conclusion of
this hyperrule. (This means an application of the hyperrule in
question.)
3◦ The third type consists in the following. When we have con-
firmedX ⊢3 α1, . . . , X ⊢3 αn, we confirmX ⊢3 α ifX,α1, . . . , αn ⊢1
α.
2Cf. [Bar77], J. Barwise, An introduction to first-order logic, theorem 4.2. See
also [CK90], corollary 1.2.12.
3We will consider this argument in a more general setting in Section 4.2.
63
Thus, for any set X of LA-formulas and any LA-formula α, X ⊢3 α is
true if, and only if, there is a consecutive finite number of confirmations of
the types of 1◦–3◦. In particular,
X ⊢1 α =⇒ X ⊢3 α. (3.13)
We illustrate the last definition on the following example. Using X =
{α, β} (for concrete formulas α and β), we confirm X ⊢3 α ∧ β by the
derivation
α, β, α ∧ β.
Then, we rewrite the last sequent as {α}, β ⊢3 α ∧ β and apply (c-i) to
obtain {α} ⊢3 β → (α ∧ β) (confirmation of the second type). Now, we
rewrite the last sequent as ∅, α ⊢3 β → (α ∧ β) and apply this hyperrule one
more time. The resulting sequent is ∅ ⊢3 α → (β → (α ∧ β)), or simply
⊢3 α→ (β → (α ∧ β)).
It should be clear that the relation ⊢3 is monotone; that is
X ⊢3 α and X ⊆ Y imply Y ⊢3 α. (3.14)
At the point, we do not know yet if ⊢3 is a consequence relation. Our aim
is to prove this. More than that, we shall show that ⊢3 and ⊢2 are equal as
relations, though defined differently. We discuss advantage and disadvantage
of ⊢3 in relation to ⊢2 at the end of this subsection.
Aiming to prove ⊢3=⊢2, we notice that the relation ⊢3 enjoys the follow-
ing variant of cut (the property (c∗) from Definition 3.1.1).
If X, β ⊢3 α and ⊢3 β, then X ⊢3 α. (3.15)
Indeed, applying the hyperrule of (c-i), we confirm that X ⊢3 β → α.
Using (3.14), we obtain that X ⊢3 β. Finally, we use a confirmation of type
3◦ to conclude that X ⊢3 α.
On the next step, we prove that
X ⊢2 α =⇒ X ⊢3 α. (3.16)
Our proof of (3.16) is based on the following observation.
If α ∈ LB2, then ⊢3 α. (3.17)
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To prove (3.17), first, we show that for any LA-formula α,
⊢3 α ∨ ¬α. (3.18)
Indeed,4
1. {¬(α ∨ ¬α)}, α ⊢3 α ∨ ¬α [for ¬(α ∨ ¬α), α ⊢1 α ∨ ¬α and (3.13)]
2. {¬(α ∨ ¬α)}, α ⊢3 ¬(α ∨ ¬α) [for ¬(α ∨ ¬α), α ⊢1 ¬(α ∨ ¬α) and (3.13)]
3. ¬(α ∨ ¬α) ⊢3 ¬α [by (c-ii) with 1 and 2 as premises]
4. ¬(α ∨ ¬α) ⊢3 ¬¬α [analogously to 1–3]
5. ⊢3 ¬¬(α ∨ ¬α) [by (c-ii) with 3 and 4 as premises]
6. ⊢3 α ∨ ¬α [by applying (3.15) to 5 and ¬¬(α ∨ ¬α) ⊢1 α ∨ ¬α]
Also, we will use lemma 13 of [Kle52], § 29, which we formulate in a
paraphrased form as follows.
Let α be an LA-formula in the distinct propositional variables
p1, . . . , pn; let v be a valuation in B2; and let a sequence of LA-
formulas is produced according to the rule: if v(pj) = 1, then
βj = pj , and if v(pj) = 0, then βj = ¬pj . Then β1, . . . , βn ⊢3 α or
β1, . . . , βn ⊢3 ¬α, according as for the given valuation v α takes
the value 1 or the value 0.
Now, to prove (3.17), we assume that α ∈ LB2 and p1, . . . , pn are all vari-
ables that occur in α. Then, according to the last property, p1, . . . , pn ⊢3 α
and p1, . . . ,¬pn ⊢3 α. This, in virtue of (c-iii), implies that p1, . . . , pn−1, pn∨
¬pn ⊢3 α. Since, by (3.15), ⊢3 pn ∨ ¬pn, we obtain that p1, . . . , pn−1 ⊢3 α.
Continuing the elimination of the variables pj , we come to the conclusion
that ⊢3 α.
Now we obtain the proof of (3.16) as follows.
Assume that X ⊢2 α; that is for some α1, . . . , αn ∈ LB2, X,α1, . . . , αn ⊢1
α. According to (3.13), X,α1, . . . , αn ⊢3 α, where for each αj , in virtue
of (3.17), ⊢3 αj. Using (3.15) n times, we obtain that X ⊢3 α.
Finally, we show that
X ⊢3 α =⇒ X ⊢2 α. (3.19)
The last implication will be proven if we show that
X ⊢3 α =⇒ X |=B2 α (3.20)
4The following steps 1–6 are the adaptation of the proof of 51∗ from [Kle52], § 27.
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and then apply (3.12).
We note that (3.20) will be proven if we establish that every rule of (a)–
(b) and every hyperrule of (c) preserves the truth value 1. Let us check this
property for the hyperrules.
We begin with (c-i). Assume that for any valuation v′ in B2,
v′[X,α] ⊆ {1} =⇒ v′[β] = 1.
Suppose for some valuation v, v[X ] ⊆ {1}. We observe that if v[α] = 0, then
v[α → β] = 1, regardless of the value of v[β]. However, if v[α] = 1, then
v[α→ β] = 1, by premise.
Now we turn to (c-ii). Suppose that for any valuation v′ in B2,
v′[X,α] ⊆ {1} =⇒ both v′[β] = 1 and v′[¬β] = 1.
It is clear that this premise is equivalent to that for any valuation v′ in B2,
v′[X,α] 6⊆ {1}.
Thus, if for some valuation v, v[X ] ⊆ {1}, then obviously v[α] = 0, that is
v[¬α] = 1.
To prove this preservation property for (c-iii), we suppose that for any
valuation v′ in B2, both
v′[X,α] ⊆ {1} =⇒ v′[γ] = 1 and
v′[X, β] ⊆ {1} =⇒ v′[γ] = 1
hold. Now assume that for some valuation v, v[X,α ∨ β] ⊆ {1}. It is clear
that either v[α] = 1 or v[β] = 1 (or both). In each case, we obtain that
v[γ] = 1.
Thus we have obtained the equality ⊢2=⊢3. As a byproduct of this equal-
ity, we conclude that ⊢3 is a structural consequence relation.
Comparison of ⊢2 and ⊢3 We begin with the remark that neither ⊢2 nor
⊢3 is a calculus; the later is not because of the presence of hyperrules, the
former because of the factual presence of the infinite set LB2 of classical
tautologies. However, ⊢2 can be reformulated in such a way that in a new
formulation, let us call it ⊢2◦ , the latter is a calculus. First of all, we remove
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from the definition of ⊢2 all rules except α, α→ β/β (known as modus ponens
or detachment). The removed rules are actually replaced with rules without
premises, that is rules of type ∅/ϕ, where ϕ is one of the following forms of
formulas (which are called axiom schemata):
ax1 α→ (β → α),
ax2 (α→ β)→ ((α→ (β → γ))→ (α→ γ)),
ax3 α→ (β → (α ∧ β)),
ax4 (α ∧ β)→ α,
ax5 (α ∧ β)→ β,
ax6 α→ (α ∨ β),
ax7 β → (α ∨ β),
ax8 (α→ γ)→ ((β → γ)→ ((α ∨ β)→ γ)),
ax9 (α→ β)→ ((α→ ¬β)→ ¬α),
ax10 ¬¬α→ α.
We will not prove that ⊢2◦ =⊢2, but we state that ⊢2◦ is a calculus.
However, the aforementioned removal of rules is not necessary; it would
suffice to add to the rules (a)–(b) nine new rules of type ∅/ϕ, where ϕ is one
of the schemata ax1–ax10; in this case, the notion of derivation should be
modified from ⊢1 (namely the clause (d2)) by including the new rules. We
treat the forms ax1–ax10 as premiseless modus rules.
Although ⊢3 is not a calculus, it is very convenient in confirming sequents
that are true w.r.t. ⊢2◦ . For instance, we show that the schema ax8 above is
a thesis of ⊢3. Indeed, we have:
1. {α→ γ, β → γ}, α ⊢3 γ; {α→ γ, β → γ}, β ⊢3 γ [two ⊢1-derivations]
2. {α→ γ, β → γ}, α ∨ β ⊢3 γ [from 1 by (c-iii)]
3. {α→ γ}, β → γ ⊢3 (α ∨ β)→ γ [from 2 by (c-i)]
4. α→ γ ⊢3 (β → γ)→ ((α ∨ β)→ γ) [from 3 by (c-i)]
5. ⊢3 (α→ γ)→ ((β → γ)→ ((α ∨ β)→ γ)). [from 4 by (c-i)]
However, there is a price for such a convenience. While in proving X ⊢2 α
(or in proving X ⊢2◦ α) a set X stays the same in each application of a rule;
in proving X ⊢3 α, when we need to apply a hyperrule, the set “X” in the
premise(s) of a hyperrule may differ from the original X in the sequent we
are proving. In addition, in each application of a hyperrule, the X in its
premise(s) may vary from hyperrule to hyperrule or from one application to
another of the same hyperrule.
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The idea of semantic completeness The equalities like ⊢2= |=B2 or ⊢2◦
= |=B2 or ⊢3= |=B2 , but not ⊢2=⊢2◦ or ⊢2=⊢3, (see Section 3.3) are typical
examples of semantic completeness. That is, a completeness result is claimed
when one and the same consequence relation admits two different definitions
— one purely syntactic and the other with the help of semantic concepts,
such as, e.g., logical matrices. The former is regarded as a convenient way to
define an abstract logic, say S, the latter as an effective way to show that for
a particular set X and formula α, the sequent X ⊢S α does not hold. This
issue will be further discussed in the next chapter (Section 4.3).
To demonstrate, e.g., the validity of ⊢2= |=B2, we proved the proper-
ties (3.11) and (3.12). The former is known in literature as soundness, the
latter as (properly) semantic completeness. Thus we can state that the ab-
stract logic ⊢2 is complete w.r.t. the logical matrix B2, or that ⊢2 is deter-
mined by B2.
Although the main concept of this book is consequence relation, the equal-
ities like
TLC = LLC and TLC = LLC
∗
(compare with the LC completeness above) will attract our attention too.
We call them also completeness results but in a weaker sense of the term
“completeness”.
Exercises 3.3
1. Prove that a structural logic S is trivial if, and only if, for any arbitrary
variable p, p ∈ CnS(∅).
2. Prove that for any abstract logic S, S is trivial if, and only if, TS is
inconsistent.
3. Let S be a structural abstract logic. Prove that an S-theory is closed
under substitution if, and only if, this theory is generated by a set
closed under substitution. Prove that TS is the least S-theory closed
under any substitution.
4. Prove Proposition 3.3.3.
5. Prove Corollary 3.3.4.1.
6. Prove Corollary 3.3.5.1
68
7. Prove Corollary 3.3.5.2
8. Show that ⊢[R] is a consequence relation.
9. Prove that for any abstract logic S, the consequence relation ⊢S is
determined by {⊢S}.
10. Prove (3.10).
11. Show that the schemata ax1–ax7 and ax9–ax10 are theses of ⊢3.
12. Although for any consequence operator Cn, Cn(X ∩ Y ) ⊆ Cn(X) ∩
Cn(Y ) for any sets X and Y , the converse inclusion is not necessar-
ily true. Define such an abstract logic S that CnS(X) ∩ CnS(Y ) 6⊆
CnS(X ∩ Y ) for some sets X and Y .
3.4 Abstract logics defined by modus rules
When we use or investigate calculi, we inevitably deal with modus rules. As
we will see below (Corollary 3.4.1.2), for a structural logic to be finitary and
defined as calculus, are equivalent properties. On the other hand, the modus
rules are naturally modeled in first order logic.
3.4.1 General characterization
If R is a set of modus rules, there is an effective way to determine the
consequence relation ⊢[R] defined in (3.8) (Section 3.3.3). For this, we define
a relation ⊢R on P(Fm)× Fm, by generalizing (for L-formulas) the notion
of derivation which earlier was defined for LA-formulas via (d1)–(d2).
The relation X ⊢R α holds, by definition, if there is a list
α1, . . . , αn, α (3.21)
(the list α1, . . . , αn can be empty), where each formula on (3.21) is
(d∗1) either in X or
(d∗2) obtained from the formulas preceding it on (3.21) by one of the rules R.
We note that so defined ⊢R is finitary. About (3.21), we say that it is an
R-derivation of α from X .
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Proposition 3.4.1. Let R be a set of modus rules. Then ⊢R=⊢[R]. Hence
⊢R is a consequence relation.
Proof. We shall prove successively the following three claims.
1◦ ⊢R is a structural consequence relation;
2◦ for any R ∈ R, R is sound w.r.t. ⊢R;
3◦ if an abstract logic S is such that if for any R ∈ R,
R is sound w.r.t. S, then ⊢R⊆⊢S .
We notice that the properties (a)–(b) of Definition 3.1.1 are obviously true
for ⊢R; and we leave for the reader to check the property (c) and structurality
property. (Exercise 3.4.2)
Next, suppose that 〈Γ, φ〉 ∈ R. Let σ be an arbitrary instantiation in L.
Since Γ is finite, we denote
σ(Γ) := {α1, . . . , αn}.
According to the clauses (d∗1)–(d
∗
2), the list
α1, . . . , αn,σ(φ)
is an R-derivation of σ(φ) from σ(Γ). Hence σ(Γ) ⊢R σ(φ).
Finally, let S be an abstract logic and for any R ∈ R, R is sound w.r.t.
S. We show that then
X ⊢R α =⇒ X ⊢S α.
Suppose (3.21) is a derivation w.r.t. R. We prove that for each formula
αi of (3.21), X ⊢S αi. We employ induction on the number of the formulas
preceding α in (3.21). Indeed, we see that, if α = α1, then X ⊢S α1, for
either α ∈ X or α is a conclusion of a premiseless rule.
Now, suppose α is obtained by application of a rule R〈Γ,β〉. That is, for
some formulas αi1 , . . . , αik preceding α and some instantiation σ, σ(Γ) =
{αi1, . . . , αik} and σ(β) = α. Since, by induction, X ⊢S αij , 1 ≤ j ≤ k, and,
by soundness of R〈Γ,β〉 w.r.t. S, σ(Γ) ⊢S α, we conclude that X ⊢S α.
Given a set R of modus rules, we denote by SR the abstract logic corre-
sponding to ⊢[R] (see the definition (3.8)) or, equivalently (due to Proposi-
tion 3.4.1), to ⊢R.
Corollary 3.4.1.1. If R is a set of modus rules, then the abstract logic SR
is structural and finitary.
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Proof is left to the reader. (Exercise 3.4.1)
Corollary 3.4.1.2. Let S be a structural abstract logic. Then S is finitary
if, and only if, there is a set R of modus rules such that S = SR.
Proof. The if-part follows from Corollary 3.4.1.1.
To prove the only-if part, we assume that S is finitary. Next we define:
R := {〈Γ, φ〉 | Γ ∪ {φ} ⋐MfL and ξ(Γ) ⊢S ξ(φ), for any instantiation ξ}.
We aim to prove that S = SR.
First, assume that X ⊢S β, for a particular set X ∪ {β} ⊆ Fm. Since
S is finitary, there is a set Y ⋐ X such that Y ⊢S β. Now, replacing
the variables V(Y ∪ {β}) with metavariables according to arbitrary one-one
correspondence, we obtain a finite set Γ ∪ {φ} of metaformulas such that
for any instantiation ξ, ξ(Γ) ⊢S ξ(φ) and for a particular instantiation ξ0,
ξ0(Γ) = Y and ξ0(φ) = β. This implies that 〈Γ, φ〉 ∈ R. The latter in turn
allows us to conclude that Y ⊢R β and hence X ⊢R β.
Now, we suppose that X ⊢R β. That is, there is an R–derivation, deter-
mined by (d∗1)–(d
∗
2):
α1, . . . , αn, β. (∗)
It is obvious that the list (∗) is not empty. We prove (by induction) that
for each formula γ of (∗), X ⊢S γ.
It is true for the first formula γ in (∗), in which case γ = α1 = β, for,
then, γ ∈ X and hence X ⊢S γ.
Suppose we proved that for each αi, X ⊢S αi. If β ∈ X , we are done.
If β /∈ X , then β is obtained from αi1 , . . . , αik by a rule 〈Γ, φ〉 ∈ R. By
induction, this implies that {αi1 , . . . , αik} ⊢S β. By the transitivity property,
we conclude that X ⊢S β.
3.4.2 The class of S-models
In this subsection we focus on the class of S-models, when an abstract logic
S can be determined by a set of modus rules. Given a structural abstract
logic S in a language L, we employ for our characterization of S-models a
special language of first order. This language depends on L and we denote
it by FOL.
The denumerable set of the individual variables of FOL consists of the
symbols xα, for each metavariable α. The functional connectives coincide
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with the connectives of L. Also, there is one unary predicate symbol, D, two
logical connectives, & (conjunction) and ⇒ (implication), universal quanti-
fier ∀, as well the parentheses, ‘(’ and ‘)’. The rules of formula formation
are usual, as well as is usual the notion of an FOL-structure (including the
notions of satisfactory and validity). If Θ is an FOL-formula containing only
free variables, its universal closure is denoted by ∀ . . .∀Θ. Main reference
here is [CK90].
It must be clear that if φ is a metaformula relevant to L, then, replacing
each metavariable α in φ with the individual variable xα, we obtain a term
of FOL. We denote this term (obtained from φ) by φ
∗.
Further, any modus rule R :=
ψ1, . . . , ψn
φ
is translated to the formula
R∗ := ∀ . . . ∀((D(ψ∗1)& . . .&D(ψ
∗
n))⇒ D(φ
∗)) (3.22)
and any premiseless rule T := ∅/φ to the formula
T ∗ := ∀ . . .∀D(φ∗). (3.23)
The formulas of types (3.22) and (3.23) belong to the class of basic Horn
sentences ; cf. [CK90], section 6.2.
It is clear that any matrix M = 〈A, D〉 of type L can be regarded as a
model for FOL-formulas. We denote the validity of a closed formula Θ in M
by M  Θ.
Let ψ be a metaformula ofMfL containing only metavariables α1, . . . , αn.
We note that there is a strong correlation between the standard valuation
of the term ψ∗ (containing only individual variables xα1 , . . . , xαn) in a first
order structure M and a valuation of a formula ξ(ψ), obtained from ψ by
a simple instantiation ξ, in a logical matrix M. For instance, let us denote
the value of ψ∗ on a sequence a1, . . . , an in M (as a first order structure) by
ψ∗[a1, . . . , an]. Now let ξ be a simple instantiation with ξ(αi) = pi. Then, if
v is a valuation in A with v[pi] = ai, then ψ
∗[a1, . . . , an] = v[ξ(ψ)]. This can
be proven by induction on the degree of ψ.
Grounding on the last conclusion, we obtain The first order formulaD(ψ∗)
is satisfied on the sequence α1, . . . , αn in the first order structure M if, and
only if, v[ξ(ψ)] ∈ D in the logical matrix M.
This argument leads to the following lemma.
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Lemma 3.4.1. Let M = 〈A, D〉 be a matrix of type L. For any modus rule
R, R is sound w.r.t. |=M if, and only if, M  R
∗.
Proof is left to the reader. (Exercise 3.4.5)
Proposition 3.4.2. Let R be a set of modus rules in L. Then for any
L-matrix M, M is an SR-model if, and only if, M  R
∗, for any R ∈ R.
Proof. We fix an L-matrixM = 〈A, D〉. In view of Proposition 3.4.1, we can
associate with the abstract logic SR the consequence relation ⊢R.
We begin with the “only-if” part. Thus we assume that the inclusion
⊢R⊆ |=M holds. This implies that any R ∈ R is sound w.r.t. |=M. By
Lemma 3.4.1, this in turn implies that M  R∗, for any R ∈ R.
To prove the “if” part, we assume that the last conclusion holds. By
Lemma 3.4.1, we derive that any R ∈ R is sound w.r.t. |=M.
Now, suppose that X ⊢R α. That is, there is an R-derivation (3.21).
By induction on the length of (3.21), one can prove that for any valuation
v in A, if v[X ] ⊆ D, then v[α] ∈ D. We leave this task to the reader.
(Exercise 3.4.6)
Corollary 3.4.2.1. Let R be a set of modus rules in L. Then the class of all
SR-models is closed under reduced products, in particular under ultraproducts.
Proof. LetM be the class of all SR-models. According to Proposition 3.4.2,
an L-matrix M ∈ M if, and only if, for any R ∈ R, R ∈ R. This means
that M is determined by a set of Horn formulas. It is well known that
every Horn sentence is preserved under reduced products, in particular under
ultraproducts; cf. [CK90], proposition 6.2.2.
3.4.3 Modus rules vs. non-finitary rules
Proposition 3.4.1 and Corollary 3.4.1.1 show limitation of modus rules in
defining consequent relations. It should not be surprising that there are con-
sequence relations that cannot be defined by any set of modus rules. Below
we discuss an example of the consequence relation of that kind; moreover, the
theorems of that abstract logic, as we will show, coincide with the theorems
of a calculus, LC. (See LC completeness below.)
In the language LA, we formulate two more premiseless structural rules:
ax11 β → (¬β → α),
ax12 (α→ β) ∨ (β → α).
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A calculus LC is defined through derivations according to (d1)–(d2) where
in (d2), however, we use only the rules ax1–ax9, ax11-ax12 and (b-iii) (modus
ponens).
We note two properties of LC. The first is that for any set X0 ∪ {α} ⋐
FmLA,
X0 ⊢LC α ⇐⇒ ∧X0 ⊢LC α. (3.24)
(See Exercise 3.4.3.)
The second property is known as the “deduction theorem” (for LC), which
in its⇒-part, in essence, asserts that the hyperrule (c–i) is sound w.r.t. ⊢LC.
Namely, for any set X ∪ {α, β} ⊆ FmLA,
X,α ⊢LC β ⇐⇒ X ⊢LC α→ β. (3.25)
(See Exercise 3.4.4.)
In our consideration, we employ the single matrix relation |=LC which is
grounded on the logical matrix LC; see Section 2.2.5.
We will need the following property.
For any LA-formulas α and β,
⊢LC α ⇐⇒ |=LC α. (LC completeness)
The last equivalence is due to M. Dummett [Dum59], theorem 1.
Next, we define a consequence relation, ⊢LC (or abstract logic LC), analo-
gously to the relation ⊢◦2 (Section 3.3), but by using the rules ax1–ax9, ax11–
ax12 and modus ponens (the rule (b-iii)) for the notion of LC-derivation
defined by the clauses (d∗1)–(d
∗
2) above.
In addition, we consider the non-modus structural rule R∗ := R〈Γ∗,α0〉
with
Γ∗ := {(αi ↔ αj)→ α0 | 0 < i < j < ω},
where αi, 0 ≤ i < ω, are pairwise distinct metavariables. Also, we define an
infinite set of modus rules
R := {Γ/α0 | ∅ ⊂ Γ ⋐ Γ
∗}.
Then, two consequence relations, ⊢∗ and ⊢⋆, are defined in P(FmLA) ×
FmLA similarly to the notion of LC-derivation but also for ⊢
∗ with R∗ as an
additional inference rule and for ⊢⋆ with the rules ofR as additional inference
rules.
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We aim to show that, although for any set X0 ∪ {α} ⋐ FmLA,
X0 ⊢
⋆ α ⇐⇒ X0 ⊢
∗ α, (3.26)
the consequence relation ⊢∗ cannot be defined by any set of structural modus
rules, for, as we will show, it is not finitary; see Corollary 3.4.1.1.
As concerns (3.26), it is obvious, for in any ⊢∗-derivation with a fi-
nite set X0 as a set of premises, the rule R
∗ can be applied only under
such an instantiation ξ, for which there is an instantiation ζ such that
ξ(Γ∗)/ξ(α0) = ζ(Γ)/ζ(α), for some Γ ⋐ Γ
∗; and vice versa.
Finally, we demonstrate that the consequence relation ⊢∗ differs from
⊢LC, for the latter is finitary (Corollary 3.4.1.1), while the former cannot be
defined by any set of modus rules.
For contradiction, assume that ⊢∗ is finitary. Let σ be an instantiation
such that σ(αi) = pi, 0 ≤ i < ω. We note that σ(Γ
∗) ⊢∗ p0. By assumption,
for some finite X0 ⋐ σ(Γ
∗), X0 ⊢
∗ p0. In virtue of (3.26), X0 ⊢LC p0. This
in turn, according to (3.24) and (3.25), implies that ⊢LC ∧X0 → p0. By LC
completeness, we obtain that |=LC ∧X0 → p0 and hence X0 |=LC p0. Thus,
by monotonicity, we have that σ(Γ∗) |=LC p0. However, let v be such a
valuation that v[p0] is a pre-last element a of LC w.r.t. ≤ and v[pi] 6= v[pj],
whenever i < j. Then, since v[pi ↔ pj] ≤ a, we have: v[σ(Γ
∗)] ⊆ {1}, but
v[p0] = a 6= 1.
Exercises 3.4
1. Prove Corollary 3.4.1.1.
2. Show that if R is a set of structural modus rules, then the relation ⊢[R]
satisfies the property (c) and structurality property of Definition 3.1.1.
3. Prove the equivalence (3.24).
4. Prove the equivalence (3.25) (the deduction theorem for LC).
5. Prove Lemma 3.4.1.
6. Finish the proof of Proposition 3.4.2.
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3.5 Extensions of abstract logics
In this section we consider interaction of abstract logics defined in different
formal languages. We begin with the following two definitions.
Definition 3.5.1 (extension, conservative extension). Let a language L+ be
an extension of a language L. Also, let S+ and S be abstract logics in the
languages L+ and L, respectively. The abstract logic S+ is an extension of
(or over) S if for any set X of L-formulas,
CnS(X) ⊆ CnS+(X).
We call S+ a conservative extension of (or over) S if for any set X
of L-formulas,
CnS+(X) ∩ Fm = CnS(X). (3.27)
The following two observation are obvious.
Proposition 3.5.1. Let a language L+ be an extension of a language L.
Assume that S is a structural logic in L and S+ is its structural extension
in L+. Then if S is trivial, then so is S+.
Proof. If S is trivial, then p ∈ CnS(∅), for an arbitrary p ∈ VL. Since S
+
is an extension of S, p ∈ CnS+(∅). And since S
+ is structural, the latter
implies that S+ is trivial.
Proposition 3.5.2. Let a language L+ be an extension of a language L and
let S be an abstract logic in L. The intersection of any nonempty set of
conservative extensions of S in L+ is a conservative extensions of S in L+.
Proof is left to the reader. (Exercise 3.5.1)
A simple way to obtain a (structural) conservative extension of a given
abstract logic is the following.
Indeed, assume that S is a structural logic in L and L+ is an extension of
L. According to Corollary 3.3.5.1, the atlas Lin[ΣS ] = 〈FL,ΣS〉 is adequate
for S. Let us select an arbitrary formula α ∈ Fm and expand the signature
of FL to L
+, thereby obtaining an expansion FL[α]
+, as follows. For any
c ∈ CL+ \ CL we interpret as the element α ∈ |FL|. Similarly, for any new
connective F ∈ FL+\FL, we interpret any term F (β1, . . . , βn) by α. Then, we
define an abstract logic S+ as the one determined by the atlas 〈FL[α]
+,ΣS〉.
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According to Proposition 3.3.3, S+ is structural. Further, S+ is a conser-
vative extension of S, for for any set X ∪ {β} ⊆ Fm,
X ⊢S+ β ⇐⇒ X |=Lin[ΣS ] β. (3.28)
We leave the reader to prove (3.28); see Exercise 3.5.2.
In virtue of Proposition 3.5.1, S+ is trivial if S is trivial.
We summarize as follows.
Proposition 3.5.3. Let S be an structural abstract logic in L and L+ be an
extension of L. Then there is a conservative structural extension S+ of S.
Moreover, if S is trivial, S+ is also trivial.
Corollary 3.5.3.1. Let a language L+ be an extension of a language L. Any
structural abstract logic in L has a least structural conservative extension in
L+.
Proof. We use Proposition 3.5.3 and Proposition 3.5.2.
Our next definition will play a key part in the sequel.
Definition 3.5.2 (relation ⊢(S)+). Let a language L
+ be an extension of a
language L. Also, let S be an abstract logic in L. We define a relation ⊢(S)+
in P(FmL+)×FmL+ as follows:
X ⊢(S)+ α
df
⇐⇒ there is a set Y ∪ {β} ⊆ Fm and an L+-substitution
σ such that σ(Y ) ⊆ X, α = σ(β) and Y ⊢S β.
We find a justification for the last definition in the following proposition.
Proposition 3.5.4. Let a language L+ be an extension of a language L and
S be a structural abstract logic in L. If the relation ⊢(S)+ is a consequence
relation, then (S)+ is the least structural conservative extension of S in L+.
In addition, (S)+ is nontrivial if, and only if, S is nontrivial.
Proof. It is obvious that (S)+ is a conservative extension of S. (The struc-
turality of S should be used.)
Next, we prove the structurality of (S)+. For this, assume thatX ⊢(S)+ α.
By definition, there are a set Y ∪ {β} ⊆ Fm and an L+-substitution σ such
that Y ⊢S β, σ(Y ) ⊆ X and σ(β) = α. Let ξ be any L
+-substitution.
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We observe: ξ ◦ σ(Y ) ⊆ ξ(X) and ξ ◦ σ(β) = ξ(α). Then, by definition,
ξ(X) ⊢(S)+ ξ(α).
Now, let S+ be an arbitrary structural conservative extension of S in
L+. Suppose that X ⊢(S)+ α. Then there is a set Y ∪ {β} ⊆ Fm and an
L+-substitution σ such that Y ⊢S β, σ(Y ) ⊆ X and σ(β) = α. By premise,
Y ⊢S+ β. Since S
+ is structural, we also have that σ(Y ) ⊢S+ σ(β). This
implies that X ⊢S+ α.
Finally, the last claim of the proposition follows from the conservativeness
of (S)+ over S.
In the next proposition, we give a sufficient condition for (S)+ to be a
consequence relation.
Proposition 3.5.5. Let L be a language with κ = card(VL) ≥ ℵ0 and L
+ be
a primitive extension of L. Assume that S is a structural abstract logic in
L. Then the relation ⊢(S)+ is a consequence relation in L
+. Moreover, the
abstract logic (S)+ is κ-compact; further, if S is finitary, then (S)+ is also
finitary.
Proof. First, we have to show that ⊢(S)+ satisfies the properties of (a)–(c) of
Definition 3.1.1. Leaving the check of the properties (a)–(b) to the reader,
we turn to the property (c). (Exercise 3.5.3)
Assume that for a set X ∪ Y ∪ Z ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL+ ,
(P1) X ⊢(S)+ γ, for all γ ∈ Y ;
(P2) Y, Z ⊢(S)+ α.
In virtue of (P2) and Definition 3.5.2 (further in this proof, simply def-
inition), there are sets Y0 and Z0 with Y0 ∪ Z0 ∪ {β0} ⊆ Fm and an L
+-
substitution σ0 such that σ0(Y0) ⊆ Y , σ0(Z0) ⊆ Z, σ0(β0) = α and Y0, Z0 ⊢S
β0.
We denote:
{γi}i∈I := σ0(Y0).
In virtue of (P1) and definition, for each i ∈ I, there is a set Xi ∪ {βi} ⊆
Fm and an L+-substitution σi such that σi(Xi) ⊆ X , σi(βi) = γi and Xi ⊢S
βi.
Now the assumptions (P1)–(P2) can be refined as follows.
(P1∗)
⋃
i∈I σi(Xi) ⊢(S)+ γi, for all i ∈ I;
(P2∗) {γi}i∈I , σ0(Z0) ⊢(S)+ α.
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We denote:
X∗ :=
⋃
i∈I
σi(Xi) and Z
∗ := σ0(Z0).
We aim to show that X∗, Z∗ ⊢(S)+ α. Since X
∗ ⊆ X and Z∗ ⊆ Z, we
will thus obtain that X,Z ⊢(S)+ α, for we have already proved that ⊢(S)+ is
monotone.
Let us make notes about the cardinalities of the L+-variables of some
formula sets. (This is where we use that the extension L+ is primitive.)
• card(V({γi}i∈I)) ≤ card(VL);
• card(V(Z∗)) = card(V(σ0(Z0))) ≤ card(VL);
• card(V(X∗)) = card(V(
⋃
i∈I σi(Xi))) ≤ card(VL).
Thus we have: card(V({γi}i∈I ∪X
∗ ∪Z∗ ∪ {α})) ≤ card(VL). This allows
us to claim that there is a one-one map
f : V({γi}i∈I ∪X
∗ ∪ Z∗ ∪ {α})
1–1
−→ VL.
For simplicity, we denote:
V∗ := V({γi}i∈I ∪X
∗ ∪ Z∗ ∪ {α}).
Next we define two L+-substitutions. Let q be an arbitrary fixed L-
variable. Then, we define:
µ(p) :=
{
f(p) if p ∈ V∗
q otherwise;
ν(p) :=
{
f−1(p) if p ∈ f(V∗)
p otherwise.
We observe the following:
• µ ◦ σi, for all i ∈ I, and µ ◦ σ0 are L-substitutions;
• ν ◦ µ ◦ σi(Xi) = σi(Xi) and ν ◦ µ(γi) = γi, for all i ∈ I, ν ◦µ ◦ σ0(Z0) =
σ0(Z0) and ν ◦ µ ◦ σ0(β0) = σ0(β0);
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• thus ν(
⋃
i∈I µ ◦ σi(Xi)) = ν(µ(X
∗)) = X∗, ν(µ ◦ σ0(Z0))ν(µ(Z
∗)) = Z∗
and ν(µ ◦σ0(β0)) = ν(µ(α)) = α. And, by definition, we conclude that
X∗, Z∗ ⊢(S)+ α.
From this, since S is structural, we obtain:
• µ ◦σi(Xi) ⊢S µ ◦σi(βi), for each i ∈ I, which implies µ(
⋃
i∈I σi(Xi)) ⊢S
µ(γi), for each i ∈ I;
• {µ(γi)}i∈I , µ ◦ σ0(Z0) ⊢S µ ◦ σ0(β0).
Then, from the two last assertions and the transitivity of S, we derive:
µ(X∗), µ(Z∗) ⊢S µ(α).
Exercises 3.5
1. Prove Proposition 3.5.2
2. Prove the equivalence (3.28), that is for any set X ∪ {β} ⊆ Fm,
X |=〈FL[α]+,ΣS〉 β ⇐⇒ X |=〈FL,ΣS〉 β.
(Hint : Show that for any valuation v in FL, there is a valuation v
∗ in
FL[α]
+ such that v∗↾Fm = v.)
3. Let L+ be a primitive extensions of a language L and let S be an
abstract logic in L. Show that the relation ⊢(S)+ of Definition 3.5.2
satisfies the properties (a)–(b) of Definition 3.1.1.
4. Prove that (S)+ in Proposition 3.5.5 is κ-compact.
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Chapter 4
Matrix Consequence
4.1 Single-matrix consequence
Two circumstances draw our attention to a single matrix consequence. The
first one is Lindenbaum’s theorem (Proposition 3.3.4) which provides a uni-
versal way of definition of a weakly adequate logical matrix, namely the
Lindenbaum matrix, which being defined for a given consequence relation,
validates all of the theses of this consequence relation and only them. The
other circumstance is related to the consequence relation ⊢2 (Section 3.3)
which turned out to be equal to the single-matrix relation |=B2. These cir-
cumstances lead to the the following concept.
We recall (Section 3.3) that a logical matrix M is called adequate for an
abstract logic S if ⊢S = |=M; that is, for any set X of L-formulas and any
L-formula α,
X ⊢S α⇐⇒ X |=M α.
In connection with the notion of an adequate matrix, two questions arise.
Is it true that any abstract logic has an adequate matrix? And if the answer
to the first question is negative, what are the properties of an abstract logic
that make it have an adequate matrix.
The first question can be answered in the negative as follows. Suppose S
is a nontrivial abstract logic in L with card(VL) ≥ ℵ0, which has a nonempty
consistent set, say X0, and such that TS 6= ∅. Now, let ⊢
◦
S be a relation
obtained from ⊢S according to (3.2). In virtue of Proposition 3.1.3, ⊢
◦
S is
a consequence relation. We claim that there is no adequate matrix for ⊢◦S .
(Such a relation ⊢◦S can be exemplified, e.g., by |=
◦
B2
where |=B2 is a single-
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matrix consequence of Section 3.3.)
Indeed, for contradiction, assume that a matrix M = 〈A, D〉 is adequate
for ⊢◦S . Since X0 is consistent w.r.t. S, it is also consistent w.r.t. ⊢
◦
S .
This and the assumption that X0 is nonempty imply that D 6= ∅. Assume
that a ∈ D. By premise, there is a thesis α ∈ TS . Let us take a variable
p ∈ VL \ V(α). By definition, ∅ 6⊢
◦
S α and p ⊢
◦
S α. The former implies that
there is a valuation v in A such that v[α] /∈ D. Now we define a valuation:
v′[q] :=
{
v[q] if q 6= p
a if q = p.
It is clear that v′[α] = v[α] and hence p 6|=M α.
Trying to find a characteristic for abstract logic to have an adequate
matrix, we consider any logical matrix M := 〈A, D〉 of type L.
Now, let α, β and γ be L-formulas with (V(α)∪V(β))∩V(γ) = ∅. Assume
that for some valuation v0, v0(γ) ∈ D. (This assumption is equivalent to the
condition that the set {γ} is consistent w.r.t. the consequence relation |=M.)
We prove that
γ, α |=M β implies α |=M β.
Indeed, for contrapositive, suppose that α 6|=M β; that is, for some valu-
ation v, v(α) ∈ D, but v(β) /∈ D.
Let us define a valuation
v1(p) =
{
v0[p] if p ∈ V(γ)
v[p] otherwise.
We note that v1[γ] = v0[γ], v1[α] = v[α] and v1[β] = v[β]. This implies
that γ, α 6|=M β.
The last consideration leads to the following definition.
Definition 4.1.1 (uniform abstract logic). An abstract logic S is said to be
uniform if for any set X∪Y ∪{α} of L-formulas with V(X∪{α})∩V(Y ) = ∅
and CnS(Y ) 6= FmL, if X, Y ⊢S α, then X ⊢S α.
We note that the consequence relation |=◦
B2
mentioned above is finitary
but not uniform. (Exercise 4.1.1) The importance of the last definition be-
comes clear from Proposition 4.1.1 below. We prove this proposition by
means of two lemmas.
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Lemma 4.1.1. If an abstract logic S has an adequate matrix, then S is
uniform.
Proof. Let a matrix M = 〈A, D〉 be adequate for S. Suppose X, Y ⊢S α,
where V(X,α)∩V(Y ) = ∅ and CnS(Y ) 6= FmL. We will show that X |=M α,
which, in virtue of the adequacy of M for S, will in turn imply that X ⊢S α.
For contradiction, assume that for some valuation v in A, v[X ] ⊆ D but
v[α] /∈ D. Since Y is consistent w.r.t. S, there is a valuation v′ such that
v′[Y ] ⊆ D. Then, we define a valuation v′′ as follows:
v′′[p] :=
{
v[p] if p ∈ V(X,α)
v′[p] if p ∈ V(Y ).
It must be clear that v′′[β] = v[β], whenever β ∈ X ∪ {α}, and v′′[β] =
v′[β], if β ∈ Y . Therefore, X, Y 6|=M α; that is X, Y 6⊢S α. A contradiction.
As preparation to the next proposition we observe the following.
Lemma 4.1.2. Let S be a uniform structural abstract logic in a language L
with card(VL) ≥ ℵ0 and L
+ be a primitive extension of L. Then the abstract
logic (S)+ is also uniform.
Proof. Suppose for a set X ∪Y ∪{α} ⊆ FmL+ , X, Y ⊢(S)+ α, providing that
V(X ∪{α})∩V(Y ) = ∅ and Y is consistent w.r.t. (S)+. Then, by definition,
there is X0∪Y0∪{β} ⊆ FmL and an L
+-substitution σ such that σ(X0) ⊆ X ,
σ(Y0) ⊆ Y , σ(β) = α and X0, Y0 ⊢S β. It is clear that V(X0∪{β})∩V(Y0) =
∅. Also, Y0 is consistent w.r.t. S, for if it were otherwise, in virtue of
conservativity of (S)+ over S, we would have σ(Y0) ⊢(S)+ γ, for any arbitrary
L+-formula γ. This would imply the inconsistency of Y in (S)+.
Since S is uniform, X0 ⊢S β and hence X0 ⊢(S)+ β, for (S)
+ is a con-
servative extension of S. And since (S)+ is structural (Proposition ??),
σ(X0) ⊢(S)+ α and hence X ⊢(S)+ α.
Proposition 4.1.1 (Los´-Suszko-Wo´jcicki theorem). Let S be a finitary struc-
tural abstract logic in a language L with card(VL) ≥ ℵ0. Then S has an
adequate matrix if, and only if, S is uniform.
Proof. The “only-if” part follows from Lemma 4.1.1. So we continue with
the proof of the “if” part.
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We distinguish two cases: S is trivial and S is nontrivial. If the former
is the case, then the matrix 〈FmL,FmL〉 is adequate for S.
Now, we assume that S is nontrivial; that is, the set ΣcS of consistent sets
w.r.t. S is nonempty.
We introduce for each X ∈ ΣcS and each p ∈ VL, a new sentential variable
pX so that for any p, q ∈ VL and any X, Y ∈ Σ
c
S ,
pX = qY ⇐⇒ p = q and X = Y.
Accordingly, for an arbitrary X ∈ ΣcS , we denote:
VX = {pX | p ∈ VL}.
Thus for any X, Y ∈ ΣcS ,
X 6= Y =⇒ VX ∩ VY = ∅. (4.1)
A language L+ is defined as a primitive extension of L, by adding the
new sentential variables to VL. Then, we introduce (S)
+ according to Defi-
nition 3.5.2.
Next, for each X ∈ ΣcS , we define two L
+-substitutions:
σX : p 7→ pX , for any p ∈ VL, and σX : pY 7→ pY , for any pY ∈ VL+ \ VL;
ξX : pX 7→ p, for any pX ∈ VX and ξX : q 7→ q, for any q ∈ VL+ \ VX .
We observe: for any X ∈ ΣcS ,
ξX ◦ σX(β) = β, for all β ∈ FmL. (4.2)
Then, we make two observations. First, since for anyX ∈ ΣcS , V(σX(X)) ⊆
VX , (4.1) yields that for any X, Y ∈ Σ
c
S ,
X 6= Y =⇒ V(σX(X)) ∩ V(σY (Y )) = ∅. (4.3)
Second,
for each X ∈ ΣcS , the set σX(X) is consistent w.r.t. (S)
+. (4.4)
Indeed, for contradiction, assume that σX(X) is inconsistent. Let β be
any formula of FmL. By assumption, σX(X) ⊢(S)+ σX(β). Since (S)
+ is
structural (Proposition 3.5.4), we have that ξX(σX(X)) ⊢(S)+ ξX(σX(β)) and
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hence, in virtue of (4.2), X ⊢(S)+ β. Since (S)
+ is conservative over S, we
obtain that X ⊢S β. A contradiction.
Now, we define:
M := 〈FmL+,Cn(S)+(
⋃
{σX(X) | X ∈ Σ
c
S})〉.
We aim to show that M is adequate for S; that is, for any set Y ∪ {α} ⊆
FmL,
Y ⊢S α⇐⇒ Y |=M α.
Suppose Y ⊢S α. Since (S)
+ is conservative over S, this implies that
Y ⊢(S)+ α. Now, let σ be any L
+-substitution. Assume that σ(Y ) ⊆
Cn(S)+(
⋃
{σX(X) | X ∈ Σ
c
S}). Since (S)
+ is structural, we have: σ(α) ∈
Cn(S)+(σ(Y )) and hence σ(α) ∈ Cn(S)+(
⋃
{σX(X) | X ∈ Σ
c
S}).
Conversely, suppose that Y 6⊢S α. We denote:
X0 := CnS(Y ).
Thus α /∈ X0 and hence X0 ∈ Σ
c
S . The latter implies that σX0(X0) ⊆
Cn(S)+(
⋃
{σX(X) | X ∈ Σ
c
S}).
For contradiction, we assume that
σX0(α) ∈ Cn(S)+(
⋃
{σX(X) | X ∈ Σ
c
S}). (∗)
In virtue of finitariness of (S)+ (Proposition 3.5.5), there is a finite number
of sets X1, . . . , Xn ∈ Σ
c
S such that
σX0(α) ∈ Cn(S)+(σX0(X0) ∪ σX1(X1) ∪ . . . ∪ σXn(Xn)).
Since, according to (4.4), σXn(Xn) is consistent and
V(σX0(X0) ∪ σX1(X1) ∪ . . . ∪ σXn−1(Xn−1)) ∩ V(σXn(Xn)) = ∅,
in virtue of the uniformity of (S)+ (Lemma 4.1.2),
σX0(X0), σX1(X1), . . . σXn−1(Xn−1) ⊢(S)+ σX0(α)
Repeating this argument several times, we arrive at the conclusion that
σX0(X0) ⊢(S)+ σX0(α). Then, applying the substitution ξX0 , we get X0 ⊢(S)+
α. Finally, the conservativity of (S)+ over S yields X0 ⊢S α. A contradic-
tion.
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The case of nonfinitary abstract logics needs an additional investigation.
Definition 4.1.2 (couniform abstract logic). An abstract logic S in a lan-
guage L is called couniform if for any collection {Xi}i∈I of formula sets with
V(Xi) ∩ V(Xj) = ∅, providing that i 6= j, and V(
⋃
i∈I{Xi}) 6= VL, there
is at least one Xi which is inconsistent, whenever the union
⋃
i∈I{Xi} is
inconsistent.
The next lemma shows that couniformity is necessary for an abstract logic
to have an adequate matrix.
Lemma 4.1.3. If and abstract logic S has an adequate matrix, then S is
couniform.
Proof. Let a matrixM = 〈A, D〉 be adequate for S. We assume that a family
{Xi}i∈I of formula sets satisfies all the premises of couniformity. Suppose
each Xi is consistent w.r.t. S. Then for each i ∈ I, there is a formula αi
such that Xi 6⊢S αi. This implies that there is a valuation vi in A such that
vi[Xi] ⊆ D but vi[αi] /∈ D. Let us select either one of vi[αi] and denote
a := vi[αi].
Then, we select any variable p ∈ VL \ V(
⋃
i∈I{Xi}) and for each vi, define:
v∗i [q] :=
{
vi[q] if q ∈ V(
⋃
i∈I{Xi})
a if q ∈ VL \ V(
⋃
i∈I{Xi}).
It must be clear that for each i ∈ I, v∗i [Xi] ⊆ D. And since V(Xi) ∩
V(Xj) = ∅, providing i 6= j, we also have that v
∗
i [
⋃
i∈I{Xi}] ⊆ D. Thus⋃
i∈I{Xi} 6⊢S p, that is the set
⋃
i∈I{Xi} is consistent.
The next lemma is rather technical and we will need it for the proof of
Proposition 4.1.2 below.
Lemma 4.1.4. Let S be a couniform structural abstract logic in a language L
with card(VL) ≥ ℵ0 and L
+ be a primitive extension of L. Then the abstract
logic (S)+ is also couniform.
Proof. Let {Xi}i∈I be a nonempty family of nonempty sets of L
+-formulas,
about which we assume that the union
⋃
i∈I{Xi} is inconsistent and V(
⋃
i∈I{Xi}) 6=
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VL+. Let us select any p ∈ VL+ \ V(
⋃
i∈I{Xi}). Since
⋃
i∈I{Xi} is inconsis-
tent, we have that
⋃
i∈I{Xi} ⊢(S)+ p. By definition of (S)
+ (Definition 3.5.2),
there are a set Y of L-formulas, an L-variable q and an L-substitution σ such
that σ(Y ) ⊆
⋃
i∈I{Xi}, σ(q) = p and Y ⊢S q.
Next we define: for each i ∈ I,
Yi := {γ ∈ Y | σ(γ) ∈ Xi}.
Firstly, we notice that for each i ∈ I, σ(Yi) ⊆ Xi, and
⋃
i∈I{Yi} ⊢S q.
(The latter is true because
⋃
i∈I{Yi} = Y .) Secondly, q ∈ VL \ V(
⋃
i∈I{Yi}).
Indeed, if it were the case that q ∈ V(
⋃
i∈I{Yi}), then we would have that
p ∈ V(
⋃
i∈I{Xi}).
Thus we obtain that
⋃
i∈I{Yi} is inconsistent w.r.t. S. Since, by defini-
tion, S is couniform, there is i0 ∈ I such that Yi0 is inconsistent w.r.t. S.
This implies that Since (S)+ is a conservative extension of S, we receive that
Yi0 ⊢(S)+ q. And since (S)
+ is structural (Proposition 3.5.4), σ(Yi0) ⊢(S)+ p
and hence Xi0 ⊢(S)+ p. We recall that p /∈ V(Xi0). Therefore, the structural-
ity of (S)+ implies that Xi0 is inconsistent.
Proposition 4.1.2 (Wo´jcicki theorem). Let S be a structural abstract logic
in a language L with card(VL) ≥ ℵ0. Then S has an adequate matrix if, and
only if, S is both uniform and couniform.
Proof. The “only-if” part follows from Lemmas 4.1.1 and 4.1.3.
The proof of the “if” part repeats the steps of the “if” part of the proof of
the Los´-Suszko theorem (Proposition 4.1.1) up to the assumption (∗). Then,
we continue as follows.
First, we notice that, in virtue of (4.4) and of the couniformity of (S)+
(Lemma 4.1.4), the set
⋃
{σX(X) | X ∈ Σ
c
S} is consistent. Thus, we have:
σX0(X0),
⋃
{σX(X) | X ∈ Σ
c
S and X 6= X0} ⊢(S)+ σX0(α),
where the set
⋃
{σX(X) | X ∈ Σ
c
S and X 6= X0} is consistent w.r.t. (S)
+.
Let us denote
Y0 :=
⋃
{σX(X) | X ∈ Σ
c
S and X 6= X0}.
With the help of (4.1) and (4.3), we conclude that V(σX0(X0)∪{σX0(α)})V(Y′) =
∅. Then, using the uniformity of (S)+, we derive that σX0(α) ⊢(S)+ σX0(α).
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This, in virtue of structurality of (S)+ (Proposition 3.5.4), implies that
ξX0(σX0(α)) ⊢(S)+ ξX0(σX0(α)) and hence, according to (4.2), X0 ⊢(S)+ α.
Because of the conservativeness of (S)+ over S, the latter leads to X0 ⊢S α.
A contradiction.
Exercises 4.1
1. Prove that the relation |=◦
B2
obtained from |=B2 according to (4) is
finitary but not uniform.
4.2 Finitary matrix consequence
Given a (nonempty) class M of L-matrices, an abstract logic SM, accord-
ing to Proposition 3.3.3, is structural and, according to Corollary 3.3.5.2, is
determined by the class of all SM-models. The last class definitely contains
M. For the purpose of this section, it will not be an exaggeration to assume
that M coincides with the class of all SM-models. Under this assumption,
the question arises: What characteristics should M have in order for SM to
be finitary? Proposition 4.2.2 below proposes an answer to this question.
However, first we discuss the property that the matrix consequence of any
finite matrix is finitary. To prove this, we use topological methods discussed
in Section 1.1.
Let M = 〈A, D〉 be a finite logical matrix of type L and let VA := A
VL
(the set of all valuations in algebra A). We regard |A| as a finite topological
space with discrete topology and VA as the cartesian power of the space |A|
relative to the product topology. According to Corollary 1.1.2.1, the space
VA is compact.
For any formula α ∈ FmL, we denote:
VA(α) := {v ∈ VA | v[α] ∈ D}.
We aim to show that each VA(α) is open and closed in VA. The idea is
that, since an arbitrary formula α contains finitely many sentential variables
and the set |A| is finite, there are only finitely many restricted assignments
that validate α and there are finitely many restricted assignments that refute
it in M.
We show that each VA(α) is an open set in the product topology. The
closedness of it, that is the openness of its complement, is similar.
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Given an arbitrary formula α, we define a binary relation on VA(α) as
follows:
v ≡ w
df
⇐⇒ v(p) = w(p), for any p ∈ V(α).
It is clear that the relation ≡ is an equivalence. For any v ∈ VA(α), we
denote:
|v| := {w ∈ VA(α) | w ≡ v}. (the equivalence class generated by v)
It is well know that {|v| | v ∈ VA(α)} is a partition of VA(α). If we show
that each |v| is open in the product topology, so will be VA(α).
We observe that
|v| =
∏
p∈VL
Zp,
where
Zp =
{
{v(p)} if p ∈ VA(α)
|A| otherwise.
According to the description (1.1) of the product topology in Section 1.1,
this demonstrates that each |v| is open. In a similar manner, we prove that
each
VA \ VA(α) = {v ∈ VA | v[α] /∈ D}
is also open.
Now, assume that for a set X ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL, X |=M α. This implies (is
even equivalent to) that
⋂
β∈X VA(β) ⊆ VA(α). The last inclusion in turn is
equivalent to the following:
VA(α) ∪
⋃
β∈X
(VA \ VA(β)) = VA. (4.5)
This means that {VA(α}∪{(VA\VA(β))}β∈X is an open cover of VA. Since
the space VA is compact, it has a finite subcover {VA(α}∪{(VA \VA(β))}β∈Y ,
for some Y ⋐ X . The latter is equivalent to Y |=M α.
Thus we have proved the following.
Proposition 4.2.1. A single matrix consequence relative to a finite matrix
is finitary.
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Corollary 4.2.1.1. Let M be a nonempty finite family of finite matrices of
type L. Then the M-consequence is finitary.
Proof is left to the reader. (Exercise 4.1.1)
Now we turn to a more general case.
Proposition 4.2.2 (Bloom-Zygmunt criterion). Let M be the class of all
models of an abstract logic S in L. Then S is finitary if, and only if, the
class M is closed w.r.t. ultraproducts.
Proof. Suppose S is finitary. Then, according to Corollary 3.4.1.2, there is
a set R of modus rules such that S = SR. Thus, M is the class of all SR-
models. Then, in virtue of Corollary 3.4.2.1,M is closed under ultraproducts.
Next, let the class M be closed w.r.t. ultraproducts. For contradiction,
assume that S is not finitary. That is, for some set X ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL,
α ∈ CnS(X) but for any Y ⋐ X , α /∈ Y .
We denote:
I := {Y | Y ⋐ X}
and for any Y ∈ I,
〈Y 〉 := {Z ∈ I | Y ⊆ Z}.
We observe that for any Y1, . . . , Yn ∈ I,
〈Y1〉 ∩ . . . ∩ 〈Yn〉 = 〈Y1 ∩ . . . ∩ Yn〉.
That is, the set {〈Y 〉 | Y ∈ I} has the finite intersection property. According
to the Ultrafilter Theorem ([CK90], proposition 4.1.3), there is an ultrafilter
∇ over I such that
{〈Y 〉 | Y ∈ I} ⊆ ∇. (4.6)
Given an L-formula β ∈ X , we note that
〈{β}〉 = {Y ∈ I | β ∈ Y } ⊆ {Y ∈ I | β ∈ CnS(Y )}.
This, in view of (4.6), implies that for arbitrary formula β ∈ X ,
{Y ∈ I | β ∈ CnS(Y )} ∈ ∇. (4.7)
Using the notation LinS [Y ] := 〈FL,CnS(Y )〉 (Section 3.3.2), we define:
M :=
∏
F
LinS [Y ].
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Thus
M = 〈(FL)
I/∇, D〉,
where a set D ⊆ |(FL)
I/∇| and such that for any θ ∈ |(FL)
I |,
θ/∇ ∈ D ⇐⇒ {Y ∈ I | θY ∈ CnS(Y )} ∈ ∇. (4.8)
For any L-formula β, we define:
β : I −→ {β}
and then, for any β ∈ FmL,
v : β 7→ β/∇.
It must be clear that v : FL −→ (FL)
I/∇ is a homomorphism and, hence,
can be regarded as an assignment of the L-formulas in (FL)
I/∇.
We aim to show that v[X ] ⊆ D but v[α] /∈ D. This will imply that M
is not an S-model and hence does not belong to M. The latter in turn will
implies that M is not closed under ultraproducts, which is contrary to the
assumption.
Indeed, it follows from (4.8) and (4.7) that for any β ∈ X ,
v[β] = β/∇ ∈ D.
On the other hand,
{Y ∈ I | α ∈ CnS(Y )} = ∅.
Therefore, in view of (4.8), v[α] = α/∇ /∈ D.
Exercises 4.2
1. Prove Corollary 4.2.1.1.
4.3 The conception of separating means
Considering an abstract logic S as a consequence relation ⊢S , there are two
main tasks: to confirm X ⊢S α or to refute it. Given a finitary abstract
logic S, these two tasks can be regarded as one twofold problem (of extreme
importance): Is there an algorithm that for any set X ∪{α} ⋐ FmL, decides
whether X ⊢S α is true or false.
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Trying to confirm X ⊢S α, one can use rules of inference (sound w.r.t. S)
or a suitable adequate matrix or a set of matrices which determine S. On the
other hand, to refute X ⊢S α, we need “means” that would separate X from
α, for any X ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL or at least for any X ∪ {α} ⋐ FmL. According
to Corollary 3.3.5.1, the Lindenbaum atlas for S is a universal tool, for it
works, at least in principal, for both tasks. However, it is too complicated
and can be used mainly to prove very general theorems. For the refutation
task, the Lindenbaum atlas is very inefficient. Nevertheless, in many cases,
as we will see, it can be simplified to an extent to be useful.
A general view on the conception of separating means was formulated by
A. Kuznetsov [Kuz79]. According to him, if all formulas of a set X stand
in a relation R to an object A, but a formula α does not stand in R to A,
we say that A separates X from α w.r.t. R. In this case, the character of
the relation R must be such that from the separation of X from α it follows
that X ⊢S α does not hold.
1 He also emphasized that the object A which
was employed as a separating means in the above sense has often been of
algebraic nature.
While the Lindenbaum atlas relative to an abstract logic S can play a
role of universal separating means, but for a particular pair X and α, in case
X ⊢S α does not hold, potentially any S-matrix can be a separating means.
Therefore, it would be interesting to find an algebraic connection between
the Lindenbaum atlas or Lindenbaum matrix relative to S and any S-matrix.
This will be the topic of the next chapter.
1The conception of separating means, proposed by Kuznetsov, was intended to be
applied not only to the issue of derivability, but also to that of expressibility understood
within the framework of a given calculus.
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Chapter 5
Unital Abstract Logics
5.1 Unital algebraic expansions
From the discussion in Section 4.3, the following questions arise.
(1) Is there a regular method of simplifying the Lindenbaum atlas (Lin-
denbaum matrix) relative to an abstract logic S to obtain an adequate
atlas (or matrix), or at least weakly adequate matrix that would be a
more convenient separating means than Lin[ΣS ] or LinS?
(2) Is there a regular method of simplifying the Lindenbaum atlas (Lin-
denbaum matrix) relative to an abstract logic S to have a connection
between these simplified forms of Lin[ΣS ] or LinS and other S-atlases
and S-matrices, respectively?
As to the question the question (1), even any finite matrix generates
abstract logic, the Lindenbaum matrix of which is always infinite, for the
cardinality of any Lindenbaum matrix equals the cardinality of the set of
formulas. Take, for instance, the matrix B2 of Section 2.2.1. We showed
(Section 3.3.3) that B2 is adequate for the consequence relation ⊢2. We
denote the corresponding abstract logic by Cl. Even a rough comparison
between LinCl and B2 demonstrates the difference between their complexities.
One thing is remarkable about the logical matrices discussed in Sec-
tions 2.2.1–2.2.5. The logical filters of all of them consist of a single ele-
ment. A logical matrix M = 〈A, D〉 is called unital if D is a one-element
set. We denote the designated element of a unital matrix by 1 (perhaps with
subscript). Thus, if M = 〈A, {1}〉, we can consider the algebra 〈A, 1〉 as a
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semantics for L-formulas. We call 〈A, 1〉 a unital expansion of A. Very
often, such an expansion is not needed. Namely, when D = {c}, where c is a
constant from the signature of A, we count that 1 = c.
Thus, in case M is unital, instead of saying that an L-formula α is valid
in M, we say that α is valid in 〈A, 1〉, meaning that for any valuation
v in A, v[α] = 1. Further, given a unital expansion 〈A, 1〉, for any set
X ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL, we define:
X |=〈A,1〉 α
df
⇐⇒ v[X ] ⊆ {1} ⇒ v[α] = 1, for any valuation v in A.
The last definition allows us to adopt the definition of S-model to algebras
〈A, 1〉. Namely such an algebra is an (algebraic) S-model if for any set
X ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL,
X ⊢S α =⇒ X |=〈A,1〉 α.
Further, we say that an algebra 〈A, 1〉 is adequate for an abstract logic
S if for any set X ∪ {α} ⊆ FmL,
X ⊢S α ⇐⇒ X |=〈A,1〉 α;
and that A is weakly adequate for S if for any α ∈ FmL,
α ∈ TS ⇐⇒ for any valuation v in A, v[α] = 1.
Finally, the definition of M-consequence (Section 3.3.2) can be adopted
for the case when M = {〈Ai, 1i〉}i∈I . Namely for such a class M, we define:
X |=M α
df
⇐⇒ X |=〈Ai,1i〉 α, for each 〈Ai, 1i〉.
Abstract logics which can be defined as the M-consequence of this type are
called assertional ; see [Fon16], definition 3.5.
It will be convenient to treat the validity of an L-formula α in 〈A, 1〉 as
the validity of a first order formula in a first order model.
Namely, given a sentential language L, we define a first order language
FO∗L whose individual variables are the sentential variables of L and the
connectives of FL and the constants of CS are the functional symbols. (The
constant symbols are treated as 0-ary functional symbols). In addition, FO∗L
has a 0-ary functional symbol 1 which is interpreted in the FO∗L-models by
a constant 1. Also, FO∗L has symbol ‘≈’ which is interpreted in the FO
∗
L-
models as equality, the first order logical connectives & (conjunction), ⇒
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(implication) and universal quantifier ∀. The parentheses ‘(’ and ‘)’ are used
in the usual way.
Thus each L-formula becomes in FO∗L a term. In addition, FO
∗
L has
terms like α(p, . . . , 1, . . . , q) obtained from α(p, . . . , r, . . . , q) by replacement
of a variable r with the constant 1.
The atomic formulas of FO∗L, called also equalities, are the expressions
of the form:
r ≈ t,
where r and t are FO∗L-terms.
Thus FO∗L as a logical system is a first order logic with equality.
Given an FO∗L-formula φ, its universal closure is denoted by
∀ . . .∀φ.
The universal closure of an equality is often referred to as an identity.
Given equalities φ, φ1, . . . , φn, the formula
∀ . . .∀((φ1& . . .&φn)⇒ φ)
is called a quasiidentity.
With each expansion 〈A, 1〉 we associate an FO∗L-model A = 〈A, 1,≈〉 so
that, talking about validity of identities and quasiidentities in A, we, abusing
notation, will be writing
A |= α(p, 1, . . .) ≈ β(q, 1, . . .) and A |= (φ1& . . .&φn)⇒ φ
instead of, respectively, A |= ∀ . . .∀α(p, 1, . . .) ≈ β(q, 1, . . .) and
A |= ∀ . . .∀((φ1& . . .&φn) ⇒ φ). Thus, it must be clear that for any L-
formula α and any FO∗L-model A = 〈A, 1,≈〉,
|=〈A,1〉 α ⇐⇒ A |= α ≈ 1. (5.1)
Let X := {α1, . . . , αn}. We denote:
X ≈ 1
df
⇐⇒ α1 ≈ 1& . . .&αn ≈ 1.
Thus, in this notation, for any set X ∪ {α} ⋐ FmL, we can observe that
X |=〈A,1〉 α ⇐⇒ A |= (X ≈ 1⇒ α ≈ 1). (5.2)
(If X = ∅, we understand the last equivalence as (5.1).)
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Proposition 5.1.1. Let S be a finitary abstract logic. Then all algebraic
S-models form a quasivariety.
Proof. Indeed, let 〈A, 1〉 be a unital algebraic expansion. Then, since S is
finitary, 〈A, 1〉 is an S-model if, and only if, 〈A, 1,≈〉 |= X ≈ 1 ⇒ α ≈ 1,
for any X ∪ {α} ⋐ FmL such that X ⊢S α.
Remark. We note that there are finitary abstract logics S which are not
determined by their algebraic S-models. For instance, let S→ be the abstract
logic in a language containing only one connective→ and no other constants,
defined by premiseless rule α → α and modus ponens. Then S→ has no
adequate finite matrix and is not determined by any nonempty set of unital
matrices; see [MT48], p. 6, and [Men15], exercise 1.52, and [Fon16], example
6.78.
5.2 Unital abstract logics
Given a set X ⊆ FmL, we denote by θ(X) the congruence on FL, generated
by the set X ×X . We will be interested in congruences θ(D), where D is a
theory of an abstract logic S, in particular in congruences θ(TS).
The following observation will be useful in the sequel.
Proposition 5.2.1. A structural abstract logic S is nontrivial if, and only
if, it satisfies the following property: For any p, q ∈ VL,
p 6= q =⇒ p/θ(TS) 6= q/θ(TS). (5.3)
Proof. To prove the ‘only-if’ part, we assume that S is nontrivial. Then,
since S is structural, TS does not contain sentential variables. Let M be
the congruence class w.r.t. θ(TS), which contains the variable p. Now, we
define: M1 := {p} and M2 := M \ {p}. The new partition of FmL induces
the equivalence θ. It is obvious that θ ⊂ θ(TS). We will show that θ is a
congruence on FL.
Let F be an arbitrary n-ary connective with n ≥ 1. Assume that
for formulas α1, . . . , αn, β1, . . . , βn, each pair (αi, βi) ∈ θ. Then each pair
(αi, βi) ∈ θ(TS) and hence (Fα1 . . . αn, Fβ1 . . . βn) ∈ θ(TS). This means that
either both Fα1 . . . αn and Fβ1 . . . βn belong to M2 or they belong to a class
of θ(TS) that is different from M and hence is a class of θ. This implies that
{p} and {q} are two distinct congruence classes w.r.t. θ(TS).
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Conversely, suppose the implication (5.3) holds. Then, since one of the
congruence classes w.r.t. θ(TS) contains TS and there are more than two
classes, TS 6= FmL.
5.2.1 Definition and some properties
Definition 5.2.1 (unital abstract logic). A structural abstract logic S is
called unital if any S-theory D is a congruence class w.r.t. the congruence
θ(D).
Since any congruence class cannot be empty, from Definition 5.2.1 and
Proposition 5.2.1, we immediately obtain the following.
Proposition 5.2.2. For any unital abstract logic S, TS 6= ∅; in addition, S
is nontrivial if, and only, (5.3) holds.
As we will see below (Corollary 5.2.3.2), the unitality of an abstract logic
is connected to the following concept.
Definition 5.2.2. Let X ⊆ FmL and X 6= ∅. A congruence θ on FL is said
to be compatible with X if for any (α, β) ∈ θ,
α ∈ X ⇐⇒ β ∈ X ;
in other words, X is the union of congruence classes w.r.t. θ.
It is obvious that
θ0 := {(α, α) | α ∈ FL}
is a congruence of FL, which is compatible with any nonempty set X ⊆ Fm.
Proposition 5.2.3. Let X ⊆ FmL and X 6= ∅. For any congruence θ on
FL, X is a congruence class w.r.t. θ if, and only if, the following conditions
are satisfied :
(a) θ(X) ⊆ θ;
(b) θ is compatible with X.
Proof. Suppose X is a congruence class w.r.t. θ. Then (a) and (b) are
obviously true.
Conversely, suppose both (a) and (b) are fulfilled. Then, according to
(a), all formulas in X are θ-congruent to one another. In addition, in virtue
of (b), each formula in X cannot be θ-congruent to a formula beyond X .
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The next two corollaries follow immediately from Proposition 5.2.3.
Corollary 5.2.3.1. Let S be an abstract logic with TS 6= ∅ and D be an
S-theory. Then D is a congruence class w.r.t. θ(D) if, and only if, θ(D) is
compatible with D.
Corollary 5.2.3.2. Let S be a structural abstract logic with TS 6= ∅. Then
the following conditions are equivalent :
(a) S is unital;
(b) θ(D) is compatible with D, for each S-theory D;
(c) for any S-theory D, there is a congruence θ on FL
such that θ(D) ⊆ θ and θ is compatible with D.
5.2.2 Some subclasses of unital logics
In this subsection, we introduce several classes of abstract logics, which were
considered in the literature and which turned out to be included in the class
of unital logics.
Definition 5.2.3 (implicative logic). A structural logic S in a language L
is called implicative if L contains a binary connective → such that for any
S-theory D, the following conditions are satisfied :
(a) α→ α ∈ D, for any formula α;
(b) α→ β ∈ D and β → γ ∈ D imply α→ γ ∈ D, for any α, β, γ ∈ FmL;
(c) α ∈ D and α→ β ∈ D imply β ∈ D, for any α, β ∈ FmL;
(d) β ∈ D implies α→ β ∈ D, for any α, β ∈ FmL;
(e) if αi → βi ∈ D, βi → αi ∈ D, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and F is any n-ary connective,
then Fα1 . . . αn → Fβ1 . . . βn ∈ D, for any formulas α1, . . . , αn, β1, . . . , βn.
We note that if a logic S is implicative, then TS 6= ∅.
Let S be (at least) an implicative logic and D be an S-theory. We define:
(α, β) ∈ θD
df
⇐⇒ α→ β ∈ D and β → α ∈ D.
Proposition 5.2.4. Let D be a theory of an implicative logic S. Then θD is
a congruence on FL and D is a congruence class w.r.t. θD.
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Proof. That θD is a congruence follows straightforwardly from (a), (b) and
(e) of Definition 5.2.3.
Next, we first note that, by premise, D 6= ∅. Secondly, if both α and
β belong to D, then, according to (d) of Definition 5.2.3, both α → β and
β → α belong to D, that is (α, β) ∈ θD. And, thirdly, let (α, β) ∈ θD and
α ∈ D. Then β ∈ D. In virtue of Proposition 5.2.3, this implies that D is a
congruence class w.r.t. θD.
Corollary 5.2.4.1. If an abstract logic S is implicative, then S is unital.
The calculus in the language LA, which is defined by the inference rules
ax1–ax10 and (b-iii) (modus ponens) of Section 3.3.3, is called the clas-
sical propositional logic and denoted by Cl. The calculus in LA, which
is defined by the rules ax1–ax9, ax11 (Section 3.4.3) and modus ponens, is
called the intuitionistic propositional logic and denoted by Int. Also,
it will be convenient to consider another calculus in the language LA, P,
which is defined by the inference rules ax1–ax8 and (b-iii) (modus ponens)
of Section 3.3.3. We call P positive logic.
It must be clear that for any set X ∪ {α} ⊆ FmLA
X ⊢P α implies both X ⊢Int α and X ⊢Cl α. (5.4)
Further, it can be easily shown that P, Cl and Int are implicative. (See
Exercise 5.2.1.)
Another class of abstract logics, the class of Fregean logics, stems from
Frege’s principle of compositionality (FPC).
An abstract logic S has the FPC if for for any set X ∪ {γ(p, . . .), α, β} ⊆
FmL,
X,α ⊢S β and X, β ⊢S α imply X, γ(α, . . .) ⊢S γ(β, . . .).
This leads to the following (equivalent) definition.
Definition 5.2.4 (Fregean relation, Fregean logic). Given a structural logic
S and an S-theory D, the relation on FL defined by the equivalence
(α, β) ∈ ΛD
df
⇐⇒ D,α ⊢S β and D, β ⊢S α
is called a Fregean relation relative to D. A structural logic is Fregean
if for every S-theory D, ΛD is a congruence on FL.
99
We leave the reader to prove that for any structural logic S, the properties
of satisfying the FPC and being Fregean are equivalent. (See Exercise 5.3.3.)
Proposition 5.2.5. If S is a Fregean logic with TS 6= ∅, then S is unital.
Proof. Let D be an arbitrary S-theory. We observe that θ(D) ⊆ ΛD. Also,
ΛD is compatible with D. Applying Corollary 5.2.3.2, we obtain that S is
unital.
Exercises 5.2
1. Prove that the abstract logics P, Cl and Int are implicative.
2. Prove that the abstract logics P, Cl and Int are Fregean.
3. Prove that a structural logic S is Fregean if, and only if, it satisfies the
FPC.
5.3 Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra
5.3.1 Definition and properties
The concept of unital abstract logic in turn induces the following important
notion.
Definition 5.3.1 (Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra). Let S be a unital logic and
D be an S-theory. The algebra LTS [D] := 〈FL/θ(D), 1D〉, where 1D is D
understood as a congruence class w.r.t. θ(D), (or very often only the first
component FL/θ(D)) is called the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra (of S) rel-
ative to D. The algebra LTS := 〈FL/θ(TS), 1TS 〉 (or the first component
FL/θ(TS)) is called simply the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra of S.
We observe that, given a unital logic S and any S-theories D and D′, if
D′ ⊆ D, then θ(D) ⊆ θ(D′) and hence the algebra LTS [D] is a homomor-
phic image of LTS [D
′]. Thus, for any S-theory D, the algebra LTS [D] is a
homomorphic image of LTS .
Lemma 5.3.1. Let θ be a congruence on FL. Then for any valuation v in
FL/θ, there is an L-substitution σ such that for any formula α, v[α] = σ(α)/θ.
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Proof. Let v be any valuation in FL/θ; that is, v is a homomorphism of FL
to FL/θ. Suppose v[p] = βp/θ, where p ∈ VL. Then we define a substitution
as follows:
σ : p 7→ βp,
for all p ∈ VL, with any selection of βp from the class βp/θ. Thus, we have:
v[p] = σ(p)/θ, for all p ∈ VL.
Now let us take any formula α and assume that p1, . . . , pn are all variables
that occur in α. Then we have:
v[α] = α(v[p1], . . . , v[pn]) = α(σ(p1)/θ, . . . , σ(pn)/θ) = σ(α)/θ.
Proposition 5.3.1. Let S be a unital logic. Each LTS [D] is an S-model.
Proof. Suppose that X ⊢S α. Let us take any LTS [D] and consider a valu-
ation v in it. In virtue of Lemma 5.3.1, there is a substitution σ such that
for any formula β, v[β] = σ(β)/θ(D). Further, we note that, since S is
structural, σ(X) ⊢S σ(α).
Now, suppose that for any γ ∈ X , v[γ] = 1D. Then, since S is unital, for
any γ ∈ X , σ(γ) ∈ D. This implies that σ(α) ∈ D, that is v[α] = 1D.
Corollary 5.3.1.1. Let S be a unital logic. Then for any set X ∪ {α} ⋐ FmL,
and for any S-theory D,
X ⊢S α =⇒ LTS [D] |= X ≈ 1D ⇒ α ≈ 1D.
Proof. We apply successively Proposition 5.3.1 and (5.2).
Proposition 5.3.2. Let S be a unital logic and let D := CnS(X). Then for
any formula α,
|=LTS [D] α⇐⇒ |=LinS [X] α.
Hence, LTS is weakly adequate for S.
Proof. First, assume that |=LinS [X] α; that is for any substitution σ, σ(α) ∈ D.
Let v be a valuation in LTS [D]. By Lemma 5.3.1, there is a substitution σv
such that v[α] = σv(α)/θ(D). By premise, this implies that v[α] = 1D.
Conversely, suppose for some substitution σ, σ(α) /∈ D. We define a
valuation in LTS [D] as follows: v[p] := σ(p)/θ(D), for any p ∈ VL. Then
v[α] = σ(α)/θ(D) 6= 1D.
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Corollary 5.3.2.1. Let D be an S-theory of a unital logic S. Then for any
S-thesis α, the algebras LTS [D] validate α.
Proof. Having noticed that LTS [D] is a homomorphic image of LTS , we
apply the last part of Proposition 5.3.2.
We recall that ΣS denotes the set of all S-theories.
Corollary 5.3.2.2. Any unital logic S is determined by the class {LTS [D] | D ∈ ΣS}.
Proof. Indeed, if X ⊢S α, then, in virtue of Proposition 5.3.1, X |=LTS [D] α,
for each D ∈ ΣS .
On the other hand, if X 6⊢S α, then 6|=LinS [X] α and hence, according to
Proposition 5.3.2, 6|=LTS [D] α, where D = CnS(X).
Corollary 5.3.2.3. Let S be a unital logic. If a set X ⊆ FmL is closed
under arbitrary substitutions, then for any formula α,
X ⊢S α ⇐⇒ |=LTS [D] α,
where D = CnS(X).
Proof. We have:
X ⊢S α⇐⇒ |=LinS [X] α [Lindenbaum’s theorem (Proposition 3.3.4)]
⇐⇒ |=LTS [D] α. [Proposition 5.3.2]
Now we define a special valuation in LTS [D]:
vD : p 7→ p/θ(D), (Lindenbaum valuation)
for any p ∈ VL.
Proposition 5.3.3. Let S be a unital logic and D := CnS(X). Then for
any formula α, the following conditions are equivalent :
(a) X ⊢S α;
(b) X |=LTS [D] α;
(c) vD[α] = 1D.
In particular, the following conditions are equivalent :
(a∗) α ∈ TS ;
(b∗) v[α] = 1TS , for any valuation v in LTS ;
(c∗) vTS [α] = 1TS .
102
Proof. The implication (a)⇒(b) follows from Corollary 5.3.1.1.
Assume (b). Let us take any β ∈ X . We have: vD[β] = β/θ(D) = 1D.
Hence (c).
Now assume (c), that is vD[α] = 1D. This means that α/θ(D) = 1D,
that is α ∈ D. Hence (a).
We aim to show that the Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras are good as sep-
arating means (Section 4.3); or, better to say, they are useful for creating
separating means. With this in mind, given a unital logic S in a language L,
we define the following classes of unital expansions.
• PS is the class of all algebraic S-models; according to Proposition 5.1.1,
PS is a quasivariety.
• QS is the quasivariety generated by the set {LTS [D] | D ∈ ΣS}; ac-
cording to Proposition 5.3.1, QS ⊆ PS ; also, if S is finitary, then,
in virtue of Corollary 5.3.1.1, QS is determined by the quasiidentities
X ≈ 1⇒ α ≈ 1, for any X ∪ {α} ⋐ FL such that X ⊢S α.
• TS is the class of all unital expansions 〈A, 1〉 such that 〈A, 1〉 |= α ≈ 1,
for any α ∈ TS ; it is obvious that {LTS [D] | D ∈ ΣS} ⊆ TS .
Summing up, we conclude this subsection as follows.
Theorem 5.3.1. Let S be a unital logic. Then the following conditions are
equivalent :
(a) X ⊢S α;
(b) X |=〈A,1〉 α, for any 〈A, 1〉 ∈ PS ;
(c) X |=〈A,1〉 α, for any 〈A, 1〉 ∈ QS ;
(d) X |=LTS [D] α, for any D ∈ ΣS .
Proof. The implication (a)⇒(b) is due to definition of PS ; (b)⇒(c) is due to
inclusion QS ⊆ PS ; (c)⇒(d) is due to definition of QS ; and (d)⇒(a) is due
to Corollary 5.3.2.2.
Thus, we see that ifX 6⊢S α, an algebra 〈A, 1〉 separating X from α can be
found among the algebras of the class QS = SPr{LTS [D]}D∈ΣS ; cf. [Mal73],
§ 11, theorem 4. As we will see in the next subsection, under a restriction on
S, separating algebras (in the above sense) can be reached as homomorphic
images of LTS . In the proof of this below, the class TS plays a key role. The
importance of the class TS also lies in the fact that if X 6⊢S α, a separating
algebra 〈A, 1〉 is likely to belong to QS ∩ TS .
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5.3.2 Implicational unital logics
In view of (5.1), it is clear that the class TS is a variety. We aim to show
that, under above restriction on S, LTS is a free algebra over TS .
Definition 5.3.2 (implicational abstract logic). Let S be an abstract logic in
a language L. Assume that there is an L-formula of two sentential variables,
ι(p, q), such that for any L-formulas α and β, any algebra 〈A, 1〉 ∈ TS and
any valuation v in A,
v(α) = v(β) ⇐⇒ v(ι(α, β)) = 1 and v(ι(β, α)) = 1.
Then we call S implicational w.r.t. ι(p, q).
The abstract logics P, Cl and Int are examples of implicational logics.
(Exercise 5.3.1)
Below we will be considering implicational logics which are also unital.
Since for such a logic S, TS 6= ∅ (Proposition 5.2.2), we select an arbitrary
L-formula ⋆ ∈ TS .
In virtue of Proposition 5.3.3, for any valuation v in LTS ,
v(⋆) = 1TS . (5.5)
(Exercise 5.3.2)
We recall the signature of any unital expansion 〈A, 1〉 is of type L ex-
panded by an additional constant symbol 1 which is interpreted by the 0-ary
operation 1 in 〈A, 1〉 (denoted is denoted by 1TS in LTS). We denote this
extended type by L⋆.
Let t be a term of type L⋆. The conversion of t is the L-formula (or
term of type L), denoted by t⋆, which is obtained from t by simultaneous
replacement of all occurrences of 1, if any, in t by ⋆.
Consequently, any valuation v in an algebra A of type L is extended to the
valuation v⋆ in 〈A, 1〉 such that v⋆(p) = v(p), for any p ∈ VL, and v
⋆(1) = 1,
where the first occurrence of ‘1’ is a 0-ary constant of L⋆, and the second is
the 0-ary operation 1 of 〈A, 1〉. We refer to v⋆ as a ⋆-extension of v. We
note that the valuation v can be restored from v⋆ in the sense that if w is
any valuation in 〈A, 1〉, there is a unique valuation v in A such that v⋆ = w.
(Exercise 5.3.3)
Using (5.5), we observe that for any L⋆-terms t and r and any valuation
v⋆ in LTS ,
v⋆(t) = v⋆(r) ⇐⇒ v(t⋆) = v(r⋆). (5.6)
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(Exercise 5.3.4)
For any terms t and r of type L⋆, we denote:
TS |= t ≈ r
df
⇐⇒ for any 〈A, 1〉 ∈ TS , |=〈A,1〉 t ≈ r.
The equivalence (5.6) can be generalized as follows.
Lemma 5.3.2. Let 〈A, 1〉 ∈ TS . Then for any term t of type L
⋆ and any
valuation v⋆ in 〈A, 1〉, v⋆(t) = v(t⋆).
Proof can be carried out by induction on the number of functional symbols
of the language L⋆. We leave it to the reader. (Exercise 5.3.5)
Proposition 5.3.4. Let S be nontrivial unital logic which is implicational
w.r.t. ι(p, q). Then for terms t and r of type L⋆,
TS |= t ≈ r ⇐⇒ v
⋆
0(t) = v
⋆
0(r),
where v⋆0 is the ⋆-extension of v0. Hence LTS is a free algebra of rank card(L)
over the variety TS and also over the quasivariety QS ∩ TS .
Proof. We successively obtain:
TS |= t ≈ r ⇐⇒ TS |= t
⋆ ≈ r⋆ [Lemma 5.3.2]
⇐⇒ TS |= ι(t
⋆, r⋆) ≈ 1TS and TS |= ι(r
⋆, t⋆) ≈ 1TS
[for S is implicational w.r.t. ι(p, q)]
⇐⇒ ι(t⋆, r⋆) ∈ TS and ι(r
⋆, t⋆) ∈ TS
[since LTS ∈ TS and Proposition 5.3.2, part 2]
⇐⇒ v0(ι(t
⋆, r⋆)) = 1TS and v0(im(r
⋆, t⋆)) = 1TS
[Proposition 5.3.2, part 2]
⇐⇒ v0(t
⋆) = v0(r
⋆) [for S is implicational w.r.t. ι(p, q)]
⇐⇒ v⋆0(t
⋆) = v⋆0(r
⋆) [in virtue of (5.6)].
According to [Mal73], § 12.2, theorem 1, this implies that LTS is a free
algebra over the class TS . In virtue of Proposition 5.2.1, the rank of LTS
equals card(L).
Since the quasivariety QS ∩TS contains all algebras LTS [D] and because
of Corollary 5.3.2.2, S is determined by QS ∩ TS . It is obvious that LTS is
a free algebra over QS ∩ TS .
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5.3.3 Examples of Lindenbaum-Tarski algebras
Let S be a nontrivial unital logic in a language L with card(VL) = κ.
Then, according to (5.3), card(|LTS |) ≥ κ. In particular, card(|LTCl|) =
card(|LTInt|) = card(VLA). It must be clear that {p/θ(TS) | p ∈ VL} is the
set of free generators of LTS , if the latter can be considered as a free algebra
of TS . For some questions like decision problem for the consequence relation
or theoremhood of S, it suffices to consider the formulas built of a limited
set of variables. Thus, if V ⊆ VL with card(V) = κ and our consideration of
S is limited to the formulas built from V, we denote by LTS(κ) a subalgebra
of LTS , generated by the set {p/θ(TS) | p ∈ V}. The notation is justified
by the fact if V ′ ⊆ VL and card(V
′) = card(V), then the subalgebras of LTS ,
generated by {p/θ(TS) | p ∈ V} and, respectively, by {p/θ(TS) | p ∈ V
′} are
isomorphic; cf. [Gra¨08], §24, corollary 2. Since each such LTS(κ) is a free
algebra in QS (or even in TS), it is called the free algebra of rank κ. We note
that, since LTS is always has at least one 0-ary operation, 1, even it makes
sense to talk about a free algebra of rank 0.
We consider the free algebras LTCl(0), LTInt(0), LTCl(1) LTCl(2) and
LTInt(1), in order. The first two algebras should be understood as subalgebras
of LTCl and LTInt, generated by their unit, 1. The resulting algebras are
isomorphic (see Section 1.2.1 and Section 1.2.2) and can be depicted by the
diagram:
•
•
1
Figure 5.1: Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra LTCl(0), or equivalently LTInt(0)
Before discussing the structure of the other just mentioned Lindenbaum-
Tarski algebras, we first consider the varieties TCl and TInt. Namely, we
aim to show that these varieties coincide with the varieties of Boolean and
Heyting algebras, respectively.
Since the classes TCl and TInt consist of the algebras validating the theses
of Cl and Int, respectively, (defined in Section 5.2.2) we take a look at these
calculi more closely.
Lemma 5.3.3. In addition to modus ponens, the inference rules (a–i)–(a–
iii) and (b–i)–(b–ii) of Section 3.3.3 are sound w.r.t. P and hence w.r.t. Int
and Cl.
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Proof. To prove the main assertion, we have to show that for any LA-formulas
α and β, the following hold:
α, β ⊢P α ∧ β, α ⊢P α ∨ β, β ⊢P α ∨ β, α ∧ β ⊢P α and α ∧ β ⊢P β.
When it’s done, we apply (5.4). We leave this task to the reader. (Exer-
cise 5.3.6)
The next lemma is known as the deduction theorem.
Lemma 5.3.4. The hyperule (c–i) of Section 3.3.3 is sound w.r.t. P and
hence w.r.t. Int and Cl.
Proof. First of all, we notice that for any LA-formulas α and β,
1. ⊢P α→ (β → α) [an instance of ax1]
2. ⊢P α→ ((β → α)→ α) [an instance of ax1]
3. ⊢P (α→ (β → α))→ ((α→ ((β → α)→ α))→ (α→ α)) [an instance of ax2]
4. ⊢P (α→ ((β → α)→ α))→ (α→ α) [from 1 and 3 by (b–iii)]
5. ⊢P α→ α. [from 2 and 4 by (b–iii)]
Thus for any formula α,
⊢P α→ α. (∗)
Now assume that X,α ⊢P β. That is, there is a P-derivation from X,α:
α1, . . . , β. (∗∗)
Let us form a finite sequence:
α→ α1, . . . , α→ β
and denote: γi := α → αi, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n; so that γn := α → β. By
induction on the number n of the formulas of (∗∗), we prove that ⊢P γn.
If n = 1, then either β = α or β ∈ X . If the former is the case, then
we apply (∗). If β ∈ X , then we successively obtain: ⊢P β → (α → β) and
X ⊢P α→ β.
Next, assume that β is obtained from αi and αj = αi → β. By induction
hypothesis, ⊢P α → αi and ⊢P α → (αi → β). Using ax2 and (b–iii) twice,
we receive that ⊢P α→ β.
We obtain the last part of the statement with the help of (5.4).
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Lemma 5.3.5. The hyperrules (c–ii) and (c–iii) of Section 3.3.3 are sound
w.r.t. Int and Cl. Hence the rule (a–iv)is sound w.r.t. Int and Cl.
Proof. The proof of the first part is straightforward and is left to the reader.
(Exercise 5.3.7)
The proof of the second part is as follows. Let S be either Int or Cl. Since
α,¬α ⊢S α and α,¬α ⊢S ¬α, by (c-ii), we conclude that α ⊢S ¬¬α.
Corollary 5.3.4.1. The logic Cl is an extension of Int.
Proof. We show that ⊢Cl ax11, that is, for any LA-formulas α and β,
⊢Cl β → (¬β → α). (5.7)
Indeed, since β,¬β,¬α ⊢Cl β and β,¬β,¬α ⊢Cl ¬β, by the hyperrrule
(c–ii), we derive that β,¬β ⊢Cl ¬¬α. Also, since, in virtue of Lemma 5.3.5,
¬¬α ⊢Cl α, by cut, we obtain that β,¬ ⊢Cl α. Then, we apply twice the
hyperrule (c–i).
Lemma 5.3.6. For any LA-formulas α, β and γ, the following formulas and
their converses are theses of P:
(a) (α ∧ β)→ (β ∧ α),
(b) (α ∧ (β ∧ γ))→ ((α ∧ β) ∧ γ),
(c) ((α ∧ β) ∧ γ)→ (α ∧ (β ∧ γ)),
(d) ((α ∧ β) ∨ β)→ β,
(e) (α ∨ β)→ (β ∨ α),
(f) (α ∨ (β ∨ γ))→ ((α ∨ β) ∨ γ),
(g) ((α ∧ β) ∨ β)→ β,
(h) α ∧ (α ∨ β)→ α,
(j) (α ∧ (β ∨ γ))→ ((α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ)),
(i) (α ∨ (β ∧ γ))→ ((α ∨ β) ∧ (α ∨ γ)).
Proof. We show about one of these formulas, namely (j), that it and its
converse are theses of P. First, we prove that
⊢P (α ∧ (β ∨ γ))→ ((α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ)).
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We obtain:
1a. α ∧ (β ∨ γ) ⊢P α [Lemma 5.3.3 and rule (b–i)]
2a. α ∧ (β ∨ γ) ⊢P β ∨ γ [Lemma 5.3.3 and rule (b–ii)]
3a. α, β ⊢P α ∧ β [Lemma 5.3.3 and rule (a–i)]
4a. α ∧ (β ∨ γ), β ⊢P α ∧ β [from 1a and 3a by cut (Section 3.1)]
5a. α ∧ β ⊢P (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ) [Lemma 5.3.3 and rule (a–ii)]
6a. α ∧ (β ∨ γ), β ⊢P (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ) [from 4a and 5a by cut]
7a. α, γ ⊢P α ∧ γ [Lemma 5.3.3 and rule (a–i)]
8a. α ∧ (β ∨ γ), γ ⊢P α ∧ γ [from 1a and 7a by cut]
9a. α ∧ γ ⊢P (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ) [Lemma 5.3.3 and rule (a–iii)]
10a. α ∧ (β ∨ γ), γ ⊢P (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ) [from 8a and 9a by cut]
11a. α ∧ (β ∨ γ), β ∨ γ ⊢P (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ) [from 6a and 10a by hyperrule (c–iii)]
12a. α ∧ (β ∨ γ) ⊢P (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ) [from 2a and 11a by cut]
13a. ⊢P (α ∧ (β ∨ γ))→ ((α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ)). [from 12a by hyperrule (c–i)]
Further, we have:
1b. α ∧ β ⊢P α [Lemma 5.3.3 and rule (b–i)]
2b. α ∧ β ⊢P β [Lemma 5.3.3 and rule (b–ii)]
3b. β ⊢P β ∨ γ [Lemma 5.3.3 and rule (a–ii)]
4b. α ∧ β ⊢P β ∨ γ [from 2b and 3b by cut]
5b. α ∧ γ ⊢P α [Lemma 5.3.3 and rule (b–i)]
6b. α ∧ γ ⊢P γ [Lemma 5.3.3 and rule (b–ii)]
7b. γ ⊢P β ∨ γ [Lemma 5.3.3 and rule (a–iii)]
8b. α ∧ γ ⊢P β ∨ γ [from 6b and 7b by cut]
9b. (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ) ⊢P β ∨ γ [Lemma 5.3.5 and hyperrule (c–iii)]
10b. (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ) ⊢P α [Lemma 5.3.5 and hyperrule (c–iii)]
11b. α, β ∨ γ ⊢P α ∧ (β ∨ γ) [Lemma 5.3.3 and rule (a–i)]
12b. (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ), α ⊢P α ∧ (β ∨ γ) [from 9b and 11b by cut]
13b. (α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ) ⊢P α ∧ (β ∨ γ) [from 10b and 12b by cut]
14b. ⊢P ((α ∧ β) ∨ (α ∧ γ))→ (α ∧ (β ∨ γ)). from 13b by hyperrule (c–i)
We leave for the reader to complete the proof of this lemma. (Exer-
cise 5.3.8)
Lemma 5.3.7. For any LA-formulas α and β, the following formulas and
their converses are theses of Cl:
(k) ((α ∧ ¬α) ∨ β)→ β,
(l) ((α ∨ ¬α) ∧ β)→ β.
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Proof. We prove that (k) and its converse are theses of Cl and leave the rest
to the reader. (Exercise 5.3.9)
First, we prove that
⊢Cl ((α ∧ ¬α) ∨ β)→ β.
Indeed, we have:
1a. α ∧ ¬α ⊢Cl β [Lemma 5.3.3, rules (b-i), (b–ii), (5.7) and cut]
2a. β ⊢Cl β
3a. (α ∧ ¬α) ∨ β ⊢Cl β [Lemma 5.3.5 and hyperule (c–iii)]
4a. ⊢Cl ((α ∧ ¬α) ∨ β)→ β. [Lemma 5.3.5 and hyperule (c–i)]
For the converse, we have:
1b. ⊢Cl β → ((α ∧ ¬α) ∨ β). [rule ax7]
Proposition 5.3.5. TCl coincides with the class of all Boolean algebras.
Proof. Let B = 〈B;∧,∨,¬, 1〉 be a Boolean algebra. Expanding this algebra
with an operation
x→ y := ¬x ∨ y, (∗)
according to Proposition 1.2.2, we obtain a Heyting algebraH = 〈B;∧,∨,→,¬, 1〉.
In virtue of Proposition 1.2.3, the rules ax1–ax9 are valid in H and hence in
B. In view of Corollary 1.2.2.1, the rule ax10 is also valid in B. And, because
of the property (h2) (Section 1.2.2), modus ponens preserves this validity
over any Cl-derivation.
Now, assume that an algebra A = 〈A;∧,∨,¬, 1〉 ∈ TCl. That is, for any
LA-formula α ∈ TCl, A |= α ≈ 1. This means that for any α ∈ TCl and any
LA-valuation v in A, v(α) = 1. Therefore, in virtue of Lemma 5.3.6 and the
fact that P is implicational w.r.t →, the properties (l1)–(l4) are valid in A.
Namely, we have: (a) and its converse prove the validity of (l1–i); (b) and its
converse prove the validity of (l1–ii); (c) and its converse prove the validity
of (l2–i); (f) and its converse prove the validity of (l2–ii); (g) and its converse
prove the validity of (l3–i); (h) and its converse prove the validity of (l3–ii);
(j) and its converse prove the validity of (l4–i); (i) and its converse prove the
validity of (l4–ii). Thus 〈A;∧,∨〉 is a distributive lattice.
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Further, if ⋆ is an arbitrary Cl-thesis and p is an arbitrary variable, then
⊢Cl p→⋆. (5.8)
This implies that for any element x ∈ A, x ≤ 1, that is the equalities (b1)
hold in 〈A;∧,∨, 1〉, where 1 turns to be a greatest element in the sense of ≤
(Section 1.2.1).
Finally, we use Lemma 5.3.7 and the fact that Cl is and implicational
abstract logic w.r.t. → to conclude that A is a Boolean algebra.
Corollary 5.3.5.1. LTCl is a free Boolean algebra of rank card(VLA). Hence,
LTCl(κ), where κ ≤ card(VLA), is a free Boolean algebras of rank κ.
According to Corollary 5.3.5.1 and Proposition 1.2.1, any LTCl(κ) of a
finite rank κ is finite. Let us take κ = 1, assuming that V = {p}. For
simplicity, we denote
[p] := p/θ(TCl).
It is not difficult to show that the subalgebra of LTCl generated by [p]
consists of the four pairwise distinct elements: [p], [¬p], [p∨¬p] and [p∧¬p].
(Exercise 5.3.3.10)This subalgebra is LTCl(1). The relation ≤ between [α]
and [β] of this algebra is defined, according to (1.2), as follows:
[α] ≤ [β]
df
⇐⇒ [α] ∧ [β] = [α].
Thus, we arrive at the following diagram:
•
•[p]•[¬p]
•
1 = [p ∨ ¬p]
0 = [p ∧ ¬p]
Figure 5.2: Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra LTCl(1)
If V = {p, q}, we obtain LTCl(2) as a subalgebra of LTCl generated by
the classes [p] and [q]. If we identify any congruence class of this subalgebra
with its representative, we can depict LTCl(2) by the following diagram:
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•••
•
p
•p ∧ q
••(p ∧ q) ∨ (¬p ∧ ¬q)
•¬p ∨ ¬q
•¬p ∧ q
•(p ∧ ¬q) ∨ (¬p ∧ q)•
•
•¬p
•¬p ∨ ¬q•
•
p ∧ ¬q¬p ∧ ¬q
¬p ∨ q p ∨ q
¬q q
1
0
Figure 5.3: Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra LTCl(2)
Now we turn to Heyting algebras.
Lemma 5.3.8. Let ⋆ be an arbitrary Int-thesis. For any LA-formulas α, β
and γ, the following implications and their converses are Int-theses:
(a) (α ∧ (α→ β))→ (α ∧ β),
(b) ((α→ β) ∧ β)→ β,
(c) ((α→ β) ∧ (α→ γ)→ (α→ (β ∧ γ))
(d) (α ∧ (β → β))→ α,
(e) (¬⋆ ∨ α)→ α,
(f) ¬α→ (α→ ¬⋆).
Proof. We prove that ⊢Int (¬⋆ ∨ α) → α and ⊢Int α → (¬⋆ ∨ α) and leave
for the reader to complete this proof. (Exercise 5.3.11)
Indeed, we obtain:
1. ⊢Int ⋆ [by premise ⋆ is an Int-thesis]
2. ⊢Int ⋆→ (¬⋆→ α) [rule ax11]
3. ⊢Int ¬⋆→ α [from 1 and 2 by modus ponens]
4. ⊢Int α→ α [because of (∗) in the proof of Lemma 5.3.4]
5. ⊢Int (¬⋆ ∨ α)→ α. [from ax8, 3 and 4 by modus ponens]
Further, α→ (¬⋆ ∨ α) is an instantiation of ax7.
Proposition 5.3.6. TInt coincides with the class of all Heyting algebras.
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Proof. Let H = 〈H;∧,∨,→,¬, 1〉 be a Heyting algebra. In virtue of Propo-
sition 1.2.3, the rules ax1–ax9 are valid in H. In virtue of the properties
(1.7), (1.8) and (1.9), we receive that ax11 is also valid in H. Noticing, that
modus ponens preserves validity in any Heyting algebra, we conclude that if
α ∈ TInt, then H |= α ≈ 1.
Next, assume that an algebra H = 〈H;∧,∨,→,¬, 1〉 ∈ TInt. That is,
for any α ∈ TInt and any valuation v in H, v(α) = 1. We show that the
properties (l1)–(l4), (b1), and (h1)–(h6) are valid in H.
In virtue of Lemma 5.3.6 and the fact that P is implicational w.r.t →,
the properties (l1)–(l4) are valid in H. Thus 〈H;∧,∨〉 is a distributive lattice.
Further, similarly to (5.8), we derive that
⊢Int p→⋆,
for any variable p and Int-thesis ⋆. This implies that the equalities (b1) are
true in H.
To prove the properties (h1)–(h6), we apply Lemma 5.3.8.
Corollary 5.3.6.1. LTInt is a free Heyting algebra of rank card(VLA). Hence,
LTInt(κ), where κ ≤ card(VLA), is a free Heyting algebras of rank κ.
Below we give a description of LTInt(1). For this, we consider the following
formulas of an arbitrary variable p.
First, we define:
P0 := p ∧ ¬p, P1 := ¬p, P2 := p, P∞ := p→ p.
Then for any n ≥ 0, we define:
P2n+3 := P2n+1 → P2n and P2n+4 := P2n+1 ∨ P2n+2.
The elements of LTInt(1) are the congruence classes w.r.t. θ(TInt). It will
be convenient, in writing, to depict each congruence class by its representa-
tive; in other words we will treat Pn, on the one hand, as an LA-formula and,
on the other, as the congruence classes it generates. In accordance with this
agreement, we have:
1 := P∞ and 0 := P0.
Also, we will be writing Pi ≤ Pj in the sense that Pi → Pj = 1, that is
⊢Int Pi → Pj; compare with (1.8).
We conclude with the following observation, due to Iwao Nishimura [Nis62];
see also L. Rieger [Rie57].
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Proposition 5.3.7. Every LA-formula of one variable p is equivalent in Int
to one and only one formula Pi, which by themselves are not equivalent to
each other and related to each other as shown in the following diagram.
•
• P2 = p•P1 = ¬p
•P4 = p ∨ ¬p • P3 = ¬¬p
• P6 = ¬p ∨ ¬¬p•P5 = ¬¬p→ p
•P8 = P5 ∨ P3 • P7 = P5 → P4
• P10 = P5 ∨ P7
•P12 = P7 ∨ P9
•P9 = P7 → P6
• P11 = P9 → P8
•
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
•
1 = p→ p
0 = p ∧ ¬p
Figure 5.4: Lindenbaum-Tarski algebra LTInt(1)
Exercises 5.3
1. Show that the abstract logics P, Cl and Int are implicational.
2. Prove (5.5).
3. Prove that for any valuation w in 〈A, 1〉, there is a unique valuation v
in A such that v⋆ = w.
4. Prove (5.6).
5. Prove Lemma 5.3.2.
6. Complete the proof of Lemma 5.3.3.
7. Show that the hyperrules (c–ii) and (c–iii) are sound w.r.t. Cl and Int.
8. Complete the proof of Lemma 5.3.6.
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9. Complete the proof of Lemma 5.3.7.
10. Show that the elements [p], [¬p], [p ∨ ¬p] and [p ∧ ¬p] are pairwise
distinct in LTCl. (Hint: prove that the matrix B2 is a Cl-model.)
11. Complete the proof of Lemma 5.3.8.
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